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This dissertation examines the United States’ changing relationship with the transatlantic slave 
trade during the traffic’s final, illegal, phase from 1850 to 1867. During this period, the trade ran 
primarily along a new slaving network connecting the US, West Central Africa, and Cuba, and 
ensnared more than a quarter of a million captives. Viewing New York and other US ports in 
national and international perspectives, this dissertation explores how and why the US participated 
in the illegal slave trade after 1850, but dropped out of the traffic in the 1860s. It also probes the 
global repercussions of these developments. 
The dissertation argues that US participation in the trade was made possible not only by 
the actions of slave traders themselves, who proved adept at evading suppression both in the US 
and abroad, but by many Americans’ desire to incorporate Spanish Cuba into the US, and by the 
growing power of the US in global affairs. Americans’ pursuit of Cuba, I contend, ultimately 
worked against suppression in the US by lumping blame for the traffic onto Spain. Meanwhile, the 
US’ increasing commercial and geopolitical strength provided traffickers with tools necessary for 
sustaining the trade and helped Washington repel international criticism of its lax approach to 
suppression. When the antislavery Republican Party took power in the early 1860s, however, the 
new President, Abraham Lincoln, quickly set about dismantling American participation in the 
trade. The powerful influence of the US now worked against the traffic, which slowly petered out 
during the mid-1860s.   
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On July 5, 1852, the prominent American abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, addressed an 
antislavery gathering in Rochester, New York. In what would become his most famous speech, 
Douglass, who had been born into slavery in Maryland, focused on the question of what the fourth 
of July meant to American slaves. To the slave, Douglass argued, Independence Day was not an 
occasion for celebration, but a “day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the 
gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim.” Although the US had enshrined 
liberty and equality into its founding documents, Douglass explained, its laws and large swathes 
of its population betrayed these principles by protecting and sustaining slavery in the South. He 
was particularly critical of the domestic or “internal” slave trade that had now been operating in 
great scale between the Upper South and Lower South for at least a generation. Douglass noted 
that he had been exposed to this brutal, family-splitting traffic in Baltimore during the 1830s, when 
he had watched “slave ships in the Basin, anchored from the shore, with their cargoes of human 
flesh, waiting for favorable winds to waft them down the Chesapeake.” With this picture in mind, 
he concluded that “shouts of liberty and equality” on the fourth of July, represented “hollow 
mockery” to the slave.1  
 To bolster his charge of hypocrisy, Douglass argued that Americans’ support for slavery 
clashed with the uncompromising approach they, and their laws, took towards the transatlantic 
slave trade. Although “the men engaged in the slave-trade between the states pass without 
condemnation, and their business is deemed honorable,” he contended, “much execration is poured 
out by Americans upon those engaged in the foreign slave-trade.” Referring to the federal Act of 
                                                
1 Philip S. Foner ed., Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 1999), 188-
206. 
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1820, which superseded and strengthened the slave trade Abolition Act of 1808, Douglass pointed 
out that US participation in the transatlantic trade “has long since been denounced by this 
government, as piracy.” Indeed, as he correctly noted, the US sent a portion of its Navy to the 
African coast to patrol for slave ships. “Everywhere, in this country,” he argued, “it is safe to speak 
of this foreign slave-trade, as a most inhuman traffic, opposed alike to the laws of God and of 
man.”2 
Although Douglass simplified American attitudes towards slavery and the slave trade, his 
argument about US opposition to the transatlantic traffic appeared to hold considerable merit in 
1852. Douglass was correct to say that federal law prohibited US participation in the international 
slave trade and that these statutes seemed to have serious teeth. The US had actually been the first 
nation to declare the slave trade piracy – a crime punishable by death. By midcentury, only a few 
nations had followed their lead.3 In addition, although Douglass elided the fact that US 
involvement in the transatlantic traffic had continued in various forms long after the 1808 and 
1820 laws, much of this activity had recently ended with the closure of the slave trade to Brazil in 
1850.4 In fact, by 1852, US participation in the slave trade was probably at its lowest level since 
the piracy act. Meanwhile, many prominent Americans, including the editors of leading 
newspapers and senior policymakers, were excoriating Spain for allowing the trade to continue to 
its colony, Cuba, which was now the final open market for African slaves in the Americas.5 In 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 On this legislation, see Paul Finkelman, “Regulating the African Slave Trade.” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 
379–405; Leonardo Marques, The US and the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the Americas, 1776-1867 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 91-101; W.E.B. Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the US of 
America, 1638-1870 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1896), 118-130; Craig Hollander, “Against a Sea of 
Troubles: Slave Trade Suppressionism During the Early Republic" (Ph.D Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 
2013), 90-136; Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the US Government’s Relations to 
Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 150-2. 
4 See, especially, Marques, The US, 106-84. 
5 See chapter 1 and especially chapter 5. 
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1852, therefore, federal law was set against the trade, illegal US participation in the traffic had 
ebbed, and many Americans were calling for Spain to suppress the trade completely.    
Yet Douglass’s argument about the US’s robust approach to the slave trade was about to 
be put to the test. Although he presented Southern slavery as the final target for American 
antislavery activists, another challenge was reemerging. In the same year as he gave his address in 
upstate Rochester, downstate, traffickers from all over the Atlantic basin were converging on the 
thriving metropolis of New York City with the aim of making the US a major player in the 
transatlantic slave trade once again. Their arrival would herald a new phase of American 
engagement with slavery and a new challenge for abolitionists both in the US and abroad.6 
 
* 
Douglass’s Rochester speech came in the middle of a century dominated by conflict over the 
transatlantic slave trade and slavery not just in the US, but in many parts of the Atlantic world. In 
contrast to previous centuries, when opposition to human bondage had been mainly limited to the 
actions of enslaved peoples, the slave trade and slavery now came under sustained assault from a 
much larger cast of reformers and revolutionaries. These assailants delivered several early blows 
during, and soon after, the ‘Age of Revolutions,’ which swept many parts of the Atlantic basin 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the Americas, these conflicts brought 
forth colonial rebellions, armed slaves, and in some cases, put emerging talk of liberty and equality 
into action. In the French colony of Saint Domingue, for example, slaves and free blacks opened 
the century with an extraordinary uprising that ousted the French, severed the slave trade, and even 
destroyed slavery itself. Shortly after the Haitian Revolution, Denmark, Britain, and the US banned 
                                                
6 For the arrival of these traffickers in US ports, see chapter 1. 
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their slave trades, although they kept slavery in place. International opposition to the trade was 
growing, however, and through various means, every major slave trading nation outlawed the 
traffic by 1836. Meanwhile, Britain launched a major naval campaign to extinguish the trade on 
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. British vessels were joined by cruisers from several other nations, 
including the US. In 1833, Britain went a step further by abolishing slavery throughout its empire, 
including in its Caribbean colonies, which had depended on human bondage for centuries.7   
 Despite this onslaught, slavery, and even the slave trade, remained remarkably robust 
during much of the nineteenth century. Crucially, the ideological arguments and economic 
incentives that underpinned them remained in place in many parts of the Atlantic world. Indeed, 
in much of the Americas they became stronger. In the US, Cuba, and Brazil, where large tracts of 
fertile land remained uncultivated, planters sought more slaves to expand their agricultural 
operations. Meanwhile, despite having made commitments to abolish the trade, metropolitan elites 
in Europe and local officials in Africa and the Americas, many of whom were deeply connected 
to slave interests, ignored or even abetted the slave trade for decades. More broadly, demand for 
slave-produced commodities such as sugar, coffee, and cotton from the US and Europe increased 
slave prices in the Americas and created healthy profit rates for traffickers willing to defy abolition 
laws. These developments reverberated on the African coast, where societies that had long been 
tied to the traffic and found limited demand for alternative exports continued to supply captives 
for incoming slave ships. Overall, slave traders in Africa forced almost four million captives 
aboard slavers from the beginning of the century to the final closure of the traffic in the 1860s.8 
Although slavery collapsed in the US during the same decade, it survived in Brazil and Cuba until 
the 1880s. The nineteenth century, therefore, had witnessed the extinction of both the Atlantic 
                                                
7 For more on these developments in the first half of the nineteenth century, see chapter 1. 
8 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/mcqgSotc 
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slave trade and slavery in the Americas, but their demise had been halting and marked by intense 
struggle.9    
A small, but growing number of historians have explored the ways the US engaged with 
the transatlantic slave trade during this turbulent century. The first major work was W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States. Published in 1896, this 
pioneering book tracked US participation in the trade over its entire history, but included a lengthy 
consideration of the traffic after federal abolition in 1808.10 Another important study, Warren 
Howard’s American Slavers and the Federal Law, appeared during the 1960s, a decade that 
witnessed the US Civil Rights movement and renewed scholarly interest in American slavery in 
general. Howard’s book was the first major work to focus entirely on US involvement in the illegal 
slave trade.11 After a generation of little attention, the early twenty-first century has seen a flurry 
of new scholarship on the US traffic. Activated perhaps by the bicentennial of the US abolition of 
the slave trade in 2008, these historians, including Sylviane Diouf, Gerald Horne, Ernest Obedele-
Starks, Leonardo Marques, and Sharla Fett, have explored the ways in which the traffic continued 
well after abolition.12 
                                                
9 The strength and dynamism of Atlantic slavery during the nineteenth century is captured in recent literature on the 
“second slavery.” The foundational work is Dale W. Tomich, Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and 
World Economy (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003). See also, Rafael Marquese, Tâmis 
Parron, and Márcia Berbel, Marques, Leonardo trans. Slavery and Politics: Brazil and Cuba, 1790-1850 
(Alberquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 2016). For overview of pro and antislavery clash in the 
Atlantic world, particularly in the nineteenth century, see Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and 
Antislavery (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Robin Blackburn, The American Crucible: 
Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights (London & New York: Verso, 2011); David Brion Davis, The Problem of 
Slavery in the Age of Emancipation (New York, NY: Knopf, 2014).  
10 Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade. For another account of the trade produced around the same 
time, see also John Randolph Spears, The American Slave-Trade: An Account of its Origin, Growth and Suppression 
(New York, NY: Scribner's Sons, 1900). 
11 Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1963). Other works from this period include, Tom Henderson Wells, The Slave Ship Wanderer (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1967); Ronald Takaki, A Pro-Slavery Crusade; the Agitation to Reopen the African 
Slave Trade (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1971). Spears’s The American Slave-Trade, was republished in 1967. 
12 These works include, Erik Calonius, The Wanderer: The Last American Slave Ship and the Conspiracy That Set 
Its Sails (New York, N.Y.: St Martin’s Press, 2006); Ron Soodalter, Hanging Captain Gordon: The Life and Trial of 
an American Slave Trader (New York: Atria, 2006); Sylviane Diouf, Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Story of the 
 6 
These studies have addressed three main issues. The first is the question of what the US 
role in the illegal slave trade actually entailed. This matter is complicated by the shadowy nature 
of the traffic and the incomplete state of records, not to mention the complex international 
dimensions of the trade itself. Assessments have become remarkably more refined over time, 
however, as historians broadened their research to include overseas archives and took advantage 
of new research tools. The launch of the updated Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (hereafter 
Voyages) in 2008, a website that stores research data on legal and illegal slaving voyages, has been 
particularly helpful to historians attempting to stitch together the various forms of US involvement 
in the traffic.13 Marques, for instance, drew strongly on this dataset in his 2016 book, The US and 
the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the Americas, 1776-1867. Focusing primarily on how slave 
traders responded to growing international opposition to the trade, Marques’s work offers a new 
degree of specificity about US involvement in the traffic over the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, especially with regard to the continued use of the US vessels and the American flag. 
A second focus had been the effect of US politics and geopolitics on American enforcement 
of its anti-slave trade laws. Du Bois addressed this issue directly, arguing that the South’s 
                                                
Clotilda and the Last Enslaved African Brought to America (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Ernest Obadele-Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers: The Foreign Slave Trade in the US After 1808 (Fayetteville, 
AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2007); Gerald Horne, The Deepest South: The US, Brazil, and the African Slave 
Trade (New York: New York University Press, 2007); David Eltis, “The US Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1644-1867: 
An Assessment,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 347-78; Karen Fisher Younger, "Liberia and the Last Slave 
Ships" Civil War History, 54, 4 (Dec. 2008): 424-442; David Head, “Slave Smuggling by Foreign Privateers: The 
Illegal Slave Trade and the Geopolitics of the Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic, 33, 3 (2013): 433-
462; Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (Oxford University Press, 2013), 130-153; 
Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery, Capitalism, and Imperialism in the Mississippi Valley (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 395-422; Craig Hollander, “Against a Sea of Troubles: Slave Trade 
Suppressionism During the Early Republic" (Ph.D Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2013); Ted Maris-Wolf, 
“‘Of Blood and Treasure': Recaptive Africans the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War 
Era 4 (2014): 53-83; Jonathan M. Bryant, Dark Places of the Earth: The Voyage of the Slave Ship Antelope (New 
York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 2015); Stephen M. Chambers, No God But Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and the Making of the US (New York, N.Y.: Verso, 2015); Marques, The US; Sharla Fett, 
Recaptured Africans: Surviving Slave Ships, Detention, and Dislocation in the Final Years of the Slave Trade 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Randy J. Sparks, "Blind Justice: The US's Failure to 
Curb the Illegal Slave Trade" Law and History Review, 35, 1 (Feb. 2017): 53-79. 
13 ‘Voyages’. Accessible at http://slavevoyages.org. 
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commitment to slavery, including illicit importations of African slaves, helped protect the traffic 
from serious US suppression efforts at home and even at sea.14 More recently, however, historians 
have pointed out that the South was not a major importer of slaves, especially after 1820, and have 
offered alternative characterizations of the US relationship with the traffic. In his 2001 book, The 
Slaveholding Republic, Don Fehrenbacher concludes that US suppression succeeded in some 
ways, but failed in others. The shortcomings, he contends, were largely because suppression was 
of marginal importance to US policymakers and because successive administrations were 
unwilling to permit the British Navy to search American vessels for slaves.15 Marques has also 
emphasized how American attachments to sovereignty and suspicion of British motives forestalled 
suppression, although he also notes that US commitment to free trade aided the slave traffic in 
many ways, especially through the provision of ships for the trade from Africa to Brazil and 
Cuba.16 Each of these historians, and others, have further noted that the politics of the slave trade 
became strongly tied to the question of slavery in the US during the 1850s, particularly when a 
handful of southerners proposed overthrowing federal law and reopening the slave trade to the 
South. Battles over the ‘reopening’ movement are widely perceived to have contributed to the 
sectional tensions that resulted in the outbreak of Civil War in 1861.17   
A final concern has been the experiences of enslaved people who were subjected to US 
participation in the trade and its suppression. Although the paucity of sources left by traffickers 
and slaves makes this focus particularly challenging, a few historians have drawn valuable 
information from a few richly documented voyages. Marcus Rediker and Sylviane Diouf, for 
example, have examined African experiences aboard the slave ships Amistad (1838) and Clotilda 
                                                
14 Du Bois, The Suppression of the Slave Trade, 168-87. 
15 Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 204. 
16 Marques, The US. 
17 On the reopening movement, see Takaki, A Pro-Slavery Crusade, and chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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(1861), two vessels that brought captives to the US (although the former was neither a transatlantic 
voyage nor destined for US shores).18 Sharla Fett has also examined the experiences of several 
hundred “recaptives” who were freed from illegal slaving voyages by the US Navy during the mid-
nineteenth century. These Africans spent short periods under federal jurisdiction in the US before 
Congress sent them back across the Atlantic Ocean to Liberia.19  
This dissertation contributes to the growing scholarship on the slave trade by charting the 
rise and fall of US participation in the traffic between 1850 and 1867. I have chosen this 
periodization for three reasons. First, the midcentury trade was a discrete era of the traffic. Not 
only was it bounded by the closure of the massive illegal slave trade to Brazil in 1850 and the 
complete suppression of the traffic in 1867, it was during this period that the slave trade once again 
returned to US soil, having been largely absent for a generation. As the traffic reappeared in US 
ports, they became key nodes in a powerful new slaving network that stretched to many parts of 
coastal Africa and to Cuba. This new axis was the final triangle in the infamous, although crudely 
described, ‘triangular trade.’ A second reason is that the traffic was still substantial in scale, despite 
being smaller than previous eras. In total, around 272,000 captives boarded slave ships in Africa 
between 1850 and 1867.20 This concluding era of the slave trade, therefore, witnessed an intensity 
of interaction that makes close examination worthwhile. Finally, this period of the traffic has not 
been extensively examined by historians. Although aspects of the midcentury trade have been 
addressed in larger synthetic works by Marques and others, and in Diouf and Fett’s analyses of 
                                                
18 Marcus Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion:  An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom (New York: Viking, 
2012); Diouf, Dreams of Africa in Alabama. The Amistad was not a transatlantic slave ship, but a slave ship that 
carried Africans who had recently been transported across the Atlantic Ocean.  
19 Fett, Recaptive Africans. 
20 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/Z9QItbNn 
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Africans arriving in the US, the last phase of the trade as a whole has not received book-length 
analysis.     
The relatively short periodization of this dissertation permits a capacious study of the 
traffic. The following work is intended to be a local, national, and yet highly international study 
of US involvement in the illegal slave trade. It will focus particularly on New York, the hub of the 
US traffic during the 1850s and 1860s, but will pay attention to other US ports, as well as to the 
national political, social, and economic factors that influenced the course of the trade. This 
dissertation also analyzes the ways in which US participation in the traffic was always modified 
by broader international commercial networks and geopolitical developments. In many ways, the 
dissertation looks out from New York City to the broader Atlantic world, to which it was intimately 
connected. It recognizes that slave traders spun networks from Lower Manhattan to parts of the 
African coast and to Cuba, and also that other states, especially the British, directed antislavery 
attention inward towards US ports. The dissertation views these slave trading havens as global 
hubs for slave traffickers and their opponents, and therefore as intense zones of interaction over 
the trade. 
 The dissertation’s major argument is that US role in the midcentury traffic was largely 
determined by the shifting politics of slavery at home and by rising US economic and diplomatic 
power in global affairs. During the 1850s, I contend, successive pro-slavery Democratic 
administrations failed to prioritize suppression. Although these administrations (and the vast 
majority of the American public), did not support the slave trade, their preoccupation with 
expanding American slavery into new zones, especially by incorporating Cuba into the US, led 
them to neglect suppression at home and overseas. Crucially, one of their key arguments for 
wresting the island from Spain was that the Iberian power had surrendered the legitimacy of its 
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rule by permitting the slave trade to continue to the island. In this way, leading US policymakers 
considered Spain solely responsible for the trade, thereby eliding growing US participation in the 
traffic and muting their attempts to suppress the trade. In other words, although Du Bois was 
correct to contend that successive US administrations neglected suppression, the main reason for 
their neglect, at least by midcentury, was overweening interest in Cuba, rather than an affinity with 
the slave trade itself.  
At the same time, not all Americans viewed Spain as solely culpable for the traffic. 
Opponents of slavery in the US, including the newly founded Republican Party, saw growing US 
participation in the trade as a further evidence that the slave interests had taken over the federal 
government. Having already witnessed extraordinary victories for slavery during the 1840s and 
1850s, including the annexation of Texas by the US, they viewed the growing slave trade, 
especially in Northern cities such as New York, as a new sign that slavery was expanding 
inexorably throughout the republic. It was only after the election of a Republican President, 
Abraham Lincoln, and in the midst of the Civil War, that the US government would finally take 
robust action against American participation in the traffic, and subsequently, slavery itself. 
 If slavery politics played an important role in determining the course of the slave trade 
during the 1850s and early 1860s, rising American power in global affairs was also key. The 
growing commercial strength of the US was critical. New York, in particular, had become the 
largest port in the Americas, a massive financial and trading hub that spun webs across the globe 
and into slave trading zones in Cuba and in Africa. These assets would shape the ways the US 
would participate in the traffic, especially with regard to providing ships for the trade and financial 
services to slave trade investors. The growing geopolitical strength of the US also had important 
implications for the traffic. The US, which by midcentury had established itself as the leading 
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power in the hemisphere and a growing global force, was robust in defending itself against 
criticism from international pressure concerning the trade. The US, for example, was the only 
major nation strong enough to reject British demands to search its merchant vessels for slaves by 
1850, which proved a huge boon to traffickers. Certainly, other powers were directly involved in 
the trade, especially Spain (both directly and via Cuba) and several West Central Africa polities, 
but they withstood growing international pressure not primarily on the basis of their own strength, 
but because they were protected by complicated geopolitical situations that precluded direct 
intervention by the British. Indeed, it was largely because of US strength that its departure from 
the traffic had serious repercussions on the broader trade. The collapse of US participation in the 
traffic during the Civil War, along with the decline of slavery in the US, the largest slave 
population in the Americas, heralded the end of the trade for good. 
 Although the internal politics of slavery and rising US power in global affairs largely 
determined the contours of American participation in the trade, this dissertation also contends that 
the traffic as a whole was shaped by broader global changes during the mid-nineteenth century. 
This was an era of global integration thanks to breakthroughs in transportation technologies, the 
spread of global capital, and mass international migrations. These changes were directly manifest 
in the slave trade as traffickers used larger and faster vessels, including steam ships, to quicken 
voyages and lower transportation costs. At the same time, growing demand for slave-produced 
staples from industrialized nations made the trade more profitable than ever and encouraged 
traffickers to force record numbers of captives aboard their vessels (in a few cases, over one 
thousand). In addition to harnessing new technologies, slave trade investors developed new 
international investment strategies along joint stock company lines and used growing (legal) 
commercial ties between slaving zones to circuit their capital to distant speculators. Meanwhile, 
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although the slave trade wasnow confined to only a few regions, the traffic as a whole became 
more internationalized as slave traders joined the masses of migrants moving around the Atlantic 
world during midcentury, finding niches in the traffic and escaping regions where they were no 
longer welcome. The final phase of the slave trade, in other words, was marked by the imprint of 
wider global developments concerning industry, capital, and global mobility.21  
 These arguments are developed over five chapters. I began by examining the global origins 
of US participation in the midcentury trade. The US continued to be tied to the traffic during the 
first half of the nineteenth century despite national and international abolition laws. Although few 
captives arrived on US shores, especially after 1820, Americans were still involved in other 
branches of the trade, particularly to Brazil and Cuba. A major international assault on the illegal 
slave trade during the mid-nineteenth century, however, dramatically curtailed the traffic on both 
sides of the Atlantic basin and restricted US participation in the trade. In response to this pressure, 
slave traders, especially from the Southern Atlantic, migrated to the US in the early 1850s, forged 
networks with local allies, and began developing a new slaving axis running between US ports, 
parts of Africa, and Cuba.  
 Chapter 2 describes the key US roles in the slave trade between 1850 and 1863. Drawing 
on precedents set by US and foreign slave traders in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere during the 1840s, 
traffickers in American ports, especially New York, harnessed the power of US shipping for the 
trade after 1850. They made particular use of American-built vessels and the US flag. Slave trade 
investors in New York and elsewhere also began financing voyages in new combinations. Drawing 
on ties with Africa and Cuba, speculators based in the US clubbed together with distant associates 
                                                
21 On these broader changes during the nineteenth century, see C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-
1914 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the Modern World: A Global 
History of the Nineteenth Century, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Eric 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital (New York: Vintage Books edition, 1996). 
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to jointly finance voyages. Although not every vessel arrived safely in Cuba, this approach enabled 
investors to overcome many of the risks posed by increasing international suppression. New York 
also became an import hub for laundering their capital during this period. Local merchants, many 
with no other connection with the slave trade, acted as intermediaries for traffickers, turning ‘dirty’ 
money into clean, and transmitting it to investors across the Atlantic basin. 
 The third chapter examines midcentury slaving voyages. Pre-voyage preparation began in 
US ports, where traffickers procured vessels and crews, and sought to evade detection by US 
authorities. Meanwhile, in Africa, especially in West Central Africa, where the vast majority of 
slaves embarked slavers during this period, Atlantic slave traders bought captives for incoming 
ships. These slaves were younger and lived nearer to the coast than captives during previous eras 
of the trade. They also endured a brutal the middle-passage. Although voyages were generally 
faster than before, captives experienced greater than normal physical confinement and unfamiliar 
diets. Mortality rates fluctuated wildly. Cuba was the only substantial market for African slaves 
during this period, but the destinations and fates of middle passage survivors varied considerably. 
Most faced slavery in Cuba, but others were dispersed to myriad destinations around the Atlantic 
basin after capture by antislavery cruisers. To determine these contours of the midcentury trade, I 
focus throughout on a particularly rich case study, the voyage of the Julia Moulton, as well as 
information from other examples and the Voyages database. 
 Chapter 4 examines the British government’s attempt to overcome weak American 
suppression efforts by hiring a spy, Emilio Sanchez, to report on the traffic in New York City 
between 1859 and 1862. Facing continued slaving in the US and elsewhere, Britain developed a 
growing network of spies across the Atlantic world from the late 1840s to the early 1860s. Spies 
such as the Cuban-born Sanchez labored for the British government for a number of reasons, 
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including revenge against traffickers, financial gain, and ideological opposition to the trade. 
Sanchez conducted impressive undercover work on the docks of Lower Manhattan and gleaned 
rich information from a variety of sources both in the US and from his native Cuba. Indicating the 
growing international reach of the British government and increasing global integration, Britain 
transmitted Sanchez’s intelligence from New York via London to the British fleet suppressing the 
slave trade off the African coast. This process led to a substantial number of captures by the British, 
but also underlined that the end of the slave trade could only come with the full support of states 
in which the slave trade was still active. 
 The final chapter closely examines the politics of the illegal slave trade in the US. Although 
federal anti-slave trade laws seemed to be robust, they contained many loopholes. Moreover, full 
suppression of the traffic depended on energetic action emanating from Washington. The ruling 
Democratic Party’s prioritization of slavery expansion, and especially the incorporation of Cuba 
into the US, however, worked against serious federal suppression efforts for much of the 1850s. 
On the other hand, the emergent antislavery Republican Party viewed US participation in the slave 
trade and radical southerners’ calls for reopening the slave trade to the South as a disturbing plot 
to nationalize slavery. Rising antislavery opposition to the slave trade eventually overwhelmed US 
participation in the slave trade during the early years of the Civil War, driving slave traders out of 






The International Origins of The Midcentury Slave Trade 
 
In the spring of 1854, Joseph Crawford, the British consul in Havana, wrote via London to John 
Crampton, the British Minister in Washington D.C., informing him that a slave trader, Joaquim 
Gaspar da Motta, was on his way from Cuba to the US. According to Crawford, Motta was a highly 
experienced Portuguese slave trader and was travelling to New York to purchase ships on behalf 
of the “Brazilian and Portuguese Slave Trade Association.”1 This shadowy organization 
supposedly had tentacles in Europe, South America, and the Caribbean, and was deeply engaged 
in the illegal slave trade between various parts of the African coast and Cuba. With Motta’s 
departure from Havana, Crawford suspected that the “Association” was now aiming to bring the 
US into its spider’s web of illicit dealings. Fearing the worst, Crampton immediately informed the 
American authorities of Crawford’s news. He also wrote to Anthony Barclay, the British consul 
in New York, who watched Motta’s movements closely when he arrived in Lower Manhattan, just 
a few weeks after Crawford’s tipoff from Havana.2  
 Crawford’s report highlights important dynamics of the slave trade during the nineteenth 
century. On the one hand, the traffic was illegal and being suppressed. By the time Motta arrived 
in New York, every major slave trading nation had long since banned the traffic. These 
prohibitions forced slave traders who wished to continue their work to operate underground. The 
British, especially, were attentive to the ongoing trade wherever it occurred and were most 
committed to squashing it completely. Many of the traffickers in the “Association” cited by 
Crawford were on the move precisely because they were under pressure from states seeking to 
                                                
1 Crawford to FO, Jan. 28, 1854, in FO to Crampton, Mar. 6, FO84/948, TNA. 
2 Crampton to Barclay, Mar. 30, 1854, Barclay to Crampton, Apr. 5, 1854, Crampton to FO, Feb. 19, 1854, 
FO84/948, TNA. 
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suppress the trade. Motta himself had actually been kicked out of Cuba by the island’s governor, 
Captain General Juan de la Pezuela, in the spring of 1854 under suspicion of trafficking. On the 
other hand, the existence of the Association indicated that states had not succeeded in suppressing 
the trade entirely. The trade to Brazil and Cuba, in particular, reached records levels after it was 
formally abolished in the early nineteenth century. Behind this growth lay rising demand for slave 
labor and strong attachments to the trade in Africa. In addition, despite abolishing the trade, many 
powers had deep vested interests in permitting it to continue. In Cuba, Pezuela was one of the few 
governors to seriously tackle the slave trade up to the 1860s. Furthermore, some nations, including 
the US, were determined to suppress certain forms of American participation in the slave trade, 
but not others. Indeed, if any nation best summed up the contradictions and entanglements of the 
illegal slave trade, it was the US. Washington’s limited approach to suppression presented 
opportunities for traffickers such as Motta and was why he journeyed to the US after his expulsion 
from Cuba.  
This chapter identifies the origins of the American role in the illegal slave trade during the 
mid-nineteenth century by examining the international battle over the traffic up to Motta’s arrival 
in the US. It begins with an overview of the slave trade up to the late 1840s. During this period, 
the traffic came under serious assault for the first time in most parts of the Atlantic basin. The 
pressure came mainly from reformers of various stripes, and eventually states, including Britain, 
which encouraged other states to give up their trades. Although these efforts succeeded in making 
the traffic illegal, they did not overcome a wide array of interests on both sides of the Atlantic 
basin that sought to continue the trade. In this context, the US, although no longer importing slaves, 
became a major player in the traffic to Brazil and Cuba. The second part of the chapter analyzes a 
renewed and international assault on the slave trade during the mid-nineteenth century. 
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Responding to internal and external pressures, several major slaving states finally took serious 
measures to suppress the illegal traffic. These efforts resulted in landmark achievements, yet the 
traffic remained protected in parts of the African coast and in Cuba. In addition, the US government 
made only limited efforts to suppress the traffic under the American flag. The final section 
describes how some traffickers, including Motta, responded to the midcentury assault on the slave 
trade by incorporating the US into their operations. Appreciating the weaknesses of American 
suppression, these traffickers quickly forged strategic relationships with local merchants, 
particularly in New York. Having secured these alliances, they set about creating a powerful slave 
trading network running between US ports, West Central Africa, and Cuba. 
 
The US and the slave trade before 1850 
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the US was entwined in a major international 
struggle over the future of the transatlantic slave trade. In contrast to the eighteenth century, when 
proslavery forces overmatched tepid opposition and drove the trade to record levels, the traffic 
now came under serious and sustained assault in many parts of the Atlantic basin. During this 
period, an array of ideological, economic, geopolitical pressures forced a large number of states to 
outlaw the trade. Yet powerful countervailing forces remained. Some nations were still committed 
to the trade, despite abolishing the traffic. Meanwhile, rather than dissipating, demand for enslaved 
African labor grew in the Americas, especially as planters pushed into new territory and turned 
more land over to slave-grown coffee, sugar, and cotton. A wide cast of merchants, including 
Americans, responded to this demand, supporting an underground slave traffic that still involved 
many parts of the Atlantic basin by the end of the 1840s.3 
                                                
3 One of the best overviews of this struggle remains David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).  
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 In terms of individual states, the most serious assault on the trade came from Britain. 
Despite being the largest ‘carrier’ of slaves during the eighteenth century, a popular abolitionist 
campaign by religious and political reformers forced Parliament to ban the British traffic in 1807. 
The British were not the first to abolish their trade – the Danes abolished their traffic in 1803 and 
Haiti permanently closed a very large trade to its shores in 1804 – but British abolitionism had 
especially far-reaching implications. Sensing that further action could serve broader British 
objectives, including expanding free international trade (which Britain aimed to dominate), and 
curtailing supplies of new labor to the rivals of British Caribbean colonies, successive London 
governments internationalized its abolitionist campaign dramatically. One important feature of this 
effort was a sustained attempt to convince other powers, including Portugal and Spain, to abolish 
their trades. Britain was also the main force behind a network of international slave trade courts 
known as Courts of Mixed Commission, which were designed to adjudicate violations of slave 
trading treaties that participating nations had signed, usually with the British. By the 1830s, these 
tribunals were dotted around the Atlantic basin from Freetown in Sierra Leone to Rio de Janeiro. 
In addition, Britain created a slave trade suppression fleet known as the Africa Squadron to patrol 
the western coasts of Africa for illegal slave ships. In 1833, Britain burnished its antislavery 
credentials further by becoming the first major power after the Revolutionary Haitians to abolish 
slavery throughout its empire. By then, opposition to the slave trade, and even slavery itself, had 
become a core element of British state policy and national identity.4  
                                                
4 The literature on British abolitionism and suppression is enormous. Important works include, Christopher Leslie 
Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Omohundru Institute, UNC Press, 2006); Robin 
Blackburn, The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights (London & New York: Verso, 2011), 
221-233; Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade: The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968); Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and 
Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Robert Burroughs, Richard Huzzey eds. The 
Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade: British Policies, Practices and Representations of Naval Coercion 
(Manchester: UK, University of Manchester Press, 2015). See also Jenny Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins 
of International Human Rights Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Leslie Bethell, "The Mixed 
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The new republic of the US also took action against the trade early in the nineteenth 
century. Although North American participation in the slave trade had always been limited 
compared to other regions, Rhode Island slave ship owners and planters in South Carolina and 
Georgia had been strongly tied to the trade during the eighteenth century.5 The traffic came under 
increasing criticism, however, particularly in the aftermath of the American Revolution (1775-
1783). Although there was never a mass movement against the trade as in Britain, a peculiar 
abolitionist coalition gradually emerged in the US. Some opponents of the traffic, mainly in the 
North, where slavery itself was already marginal, objected to the traffic on religious and economic 
grounds. Others, especially in the South, were concerned about a growing African population in 
their midst. An important additional factor was Upper South planters who believed they already 
had sufficient numbers of enslaved laborers, and sought to raise the value of their existing slaves 
by halting the trade. The views of the traffic’s proponents and detractors were eventually resolved 
in the Constitution in 1787, which permitted American participation in the trade for another twenty 
years. In the ensuing two decades, many US states banned the trade themselves before Congress 
outlawed American participation in the traffic completely in 1808.6 
 Slave traders’ defiance of the 1808 Act and growing opposition to the illegal trade in the 
US resulted in further legislative measures during the Early Republic. Undeterred by the federal 
abolition law, Rhode Island slave traders brought thousands of enslaved Africans to the Spanish 
                                                
Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century", The Journal of 
African History, 7, 1 (1966), 79-93. 
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1807 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1981). 
6 For more on these views and the shift from the international to internal slave trade see, Adam Rothman, “The 
Domestication of the Slave Trade in the US,” in Walter Johnson and David Brion Davis eds. The Chattel Principle: 
Internal Slave Trades in the Americas (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004), 32-54. Leonardo Marques, The 
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12-55; Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the US Government’s Relations to Slavery 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 135-146. 
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colony of Cuba, where the trade remained legal. Meanwhile, some slave traders, including the 
infamous Lafitte brothers of Louisiana, smuggled captives into the Louisiana Territory and 
Georgia, often intercepting Spanish slavers on their way to Cuba.7 For many Americans, however, 
continued slave trading sat uneasily with their conception of the US, rather than the British, as the 
world’s true beacon of liberty. In addition, to many policymakers, suppression of the slave trade, 
at least near US shores, promised to be a convenient pretext for pushing the Spanish out of Florida, 
which many sought to incorporate into the US. Moreover, growing demand for slave labor in the 
Deep South was increasingly being satisfied by another source: the slave trade from Upper South 
plantations. This traffic grew enormously throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and 
reduced the importance of the transatlantic trade. These objections to the trade eventually found 
legislative expression in a series of new Acts passed by Congress between 1818 and 1820. Among 
their provisions, the new statutes increased fines for slave trading offences such as owning or 
serving aboard slave ships, offered cash payments to informants, and even sent a few vessels to 
African waters to patrol for illicit American slavers. The 1820 Act also took the dramatic step of 
declaring the slave trade piracy, a crime punishable by death. This was a step not even the British 
would take until 1824.8  
While the US made progress on suppression, albeit haltingly, other nations proved much 
less willing to take serious action against the trade. In France, Portugal, Spain, and Brazil, 
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abolitionism remained tepid both in elite policy circles and in the public sphere until at least the 
1830s, and in some cases, far beyond.9 The weakness of abolitionist sentiment was partly because 
these powers were intimately connected to the slave trade. Ships under their colors dominated the 
traffic in the early nineteenth century, especially after British abolition and the suppressive 
measures in the US.10 In addition, Spain, France, and Portugal were strongly tied to the trade 
through their Atlantic colonies. Portuguese Angola, for instance, had not only been the single most 
important slave exporting zone in Africa for centuries, but was sending record numbers of captives 
to the Americas in the early nineteenth century. Meanwhile, in French Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
and French Guiana, and Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, many planters sought new slave labor to 
boost sugar production, especially after many powers froze Haiti out of world markets in the early 
nineteenth century after the Haitian Revolution. In Brazil, planters and merchants remained deeply 
committed to the slave trade after independence from Portugal in 1822, especially as the coffee 
frontier opened up in the south.11 
 Despite their strong ties to the trade, many of these powers formally abolished the traffic 
in the early nineteenth century. Under pressure from the British, who enjoyed growing naval and 
commercial power, as well as military success during the Napoleonic Wars, all the major slave 
trading nations condemned the traffic at Congress of Vienna in 1815. Soon thereafter, France 
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declared the slave trade smuggling, while Portugal agreed to abolish its trade north of the equator 
in 1818, and Spain its entire trade in 1820. In return, Britain gave £300,000 in compensation to 
Portugal and £400,000 to Spain. In 1826, the recently created Empire of Brazil promised to abolish 
its trade in 1830 in exchange for diplomatic recognition by Britain. A year after this treaty went 
into effect, with the trade to Brazil dipping sharply, the Brazilian legislature created its own law 
against the traffic. Meanwhile in Lisbon, Portugal became the final major ‘carrier’ of slaves to 
abolish the trade completely in 1836. In addition to these measures, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil 
agreed to participate in the Courts of Mixed Commission. Britain also secured the right to stop 
Spanish slave ships and search them for slaves in 1817 (with an updated agreement in 1835), and 
a more limited right to seize vessels under the Portuguese and Brazilian flags. Meanwhile, in 
Africa, besides Portuguese Angola, many slave exporting states signed abolition treaties with the 
British. By 1857, there were forty-five such treaties, including agreements with Cabinda and 
Dahomey, key exporting polities in West Central Africa and the Bight of Benin, respectively.12  
 Although these powers abolished their trades, few made serious efforts to enforce their 
bans, at least initially. The Portuguese, for example, largely turned a blind eye both to the slave 
trade in Angola and to illegal slavers sailing under their flag for much of the 1830s and early 
1840s.13 Angola’s great slaving partner, Brazil, did likewise. Under the influence of the 
conservative Regresso movement, which was strongly tied to Brazilian planters, the Brazilian 
government rendered the 1831 law effectively toothless. The flagrant violations of these statutes 
and continued rejection of British demands to concede a comprehensive right of search agreement, 
led British Foreign Secretaries, Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, to authorize British cruisers 
                                                
12 For an overview of these commitments, see Eltis, Economic Growth, 81-91. 
13 On the metropolitan context, see João Pedro Marques, The Sounds of Silence: Nineteenth-Century Portugal And 
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Translated by Richard Wall (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 99-
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to capture all Portuguese and Brazilian vessels suspected of slave trading in 1839 and 1845, despite 
protests from Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro. Spain was especially duplicitous; making several 
agreements with the British, while at the same time welcoming slave ships to Cuba, and less 
frequently, to Puerto Rico.14 Meanwhile, many coastal African states, which had been exporting 
slaves for centuries and saw little prospect in alternatives, failed to live up to their anti-slave trade 
commitments. One bright spot was France, which after failing to seriously suppress the illegal 
slave trade after 1818 and a subsequent abolition law in 1826, committed greater resources to 
suppression in the 1830s, when a new reformist administration came to power in Paris. By the 
1840s, the French were patrolling the African coast as vigorously as the British, which contributed 
to a sharp decline in French participation in the trade.15 
These powers’ determination to continue the trade proved highly successful. Despite 
abolition laws, the traffic continued on a massive scale during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. In total, around 3.7 million captives boarded slave ships in Africa during this period.16 As 
Figure 1.1 shows, the total number of captives embarking slave ships broadly increased from 1808, 
when the British and US bans went into effect, up to 1830. Strikingly, over a million captives 
embarked slavers after Portugal became the final carrier of slaves to outlaw the trade in 1836. Tens 
of thousands of others disembarked in the Americas in violation of various slave trading bans 
before that year. Overall, an average of around 60,000 captives a year endured the middle passage 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, although the annual figures fluctuated considerably, 
especially when treaties were about to go into effect, such as the Brazilian bans in 1830 and 1831.  
                                                
14 The literature on the slave trade to Brazil and Cuba is very large. For a comparative perspective, see Márcia 
Regina Berbel, Rafael de Bivar Marquese, and Tâmis Parron, Marques, Leonardo trans. Slavery and Politics: Brazil 
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1859 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florid Press, 2003).  
15 Eltis, Economic Growth, 87-8. 
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Figure 1.1 Number of captives embarking aboard slavers in Africa per year, 1808-1850 
 
Source: ‘Voyages’, http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/KSOneK6T 
 
The South Atlantic dominated the trade during the first half of the nineteenth century. As 
Figure 1.2 shows, West Central Africa, which comprised Angola to the south and the Lower Congo 
River basin to the north, was an especially important provenance zone for captives. Although this 
region had always been a major exporter of captives, its role increased from the 1830s. This pattern 
was partly a result of the Portuguese abolition of the slave trade north of the equator in 1820 and 
a subsequent right of search agreement with Britain, and partly due to the dominance of Brazilian 
import markets, which were always closely tied to West Central Africa. Between 1837 and 1850, 
six out of every ten captives departing African shores boarded slavers in this region.17 Elsewhere, 
the Bights of Benin and Biafra, South Eastern Africa, especially Mozambique, and Sierra Leone 
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remained important secondary export zones, especially after 1820.18 Meanwhile, in the Americas, 
Brazil was by far the largest slave disembarkation zone; Cuba was a distant second. Between 1800 
and 1850, Brazil accounted for seventy six percent of new arrivals, compared to sixteen percent 
for Cuba. By contrast, only one percent of the total, around 10,000 captives, arrived in the US.19 
Only a few hundred of that number disembarked after 1820, when Southern planters turned 
towards the domestic slave trade and the more stringent American anti-slave trade legislation went 
into effect.20  
Figure 1.2. Routes of captives in the transatlantic slave trade 1820-1850 
 
Source: slavevoyages.org. The numbers in the green discs refer to the number of smaller export zones within larger 
regions.  
                                                
18 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/9OVcgOnE 
19 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/TT8FfUWY 




The organization and financing of the trade mirrored its main routes. Rather than Europe, 
which had dominated slave ship outfitting during the eighteenth century, most voyages originated 
in the Americas, especially in Brazil, and to a lesser extent Cuba. The voyages that set out to Africa 
from these regions were supported by tight connections between slave traders in slave importing 
regions and their agents on the African coast. Many prominent traffickers, such as the Brazilian, 
Francisco Antonio Flores, rose through the ranks, first operating in Rio de Janeiro and then in West 
Central Africa from the 1840s. Others, particularly in the Bight of Benin, such as Domingo 
Martins, had strong familial and business ties with Bahia.21 Slave traders in Cuba tended to have 
weaker links with the African coast, due partly to Spain’s historically limited presence in Africa, 
but some Havana traders, such as Pedro Martinez, had correspondents on the coast, especially in 
the Sherbro River in Sierra Leone.22 Although it is difficult to determine sources of capital with 
precision, most direct investors in voyages were located along these routes. In the trade to Brazil, 
investors were generally Brazilians and Portuguese, while most speculators in the Cuban trade 
were Spaniards or Cubans. These organizational and financial patterns became even more marked 
during the 1830s as the French departed from the trade.23  
Despite the sharp decline in the slave trade to the American South, the US played an 
important part in the traffic between other regions. One contribution was American built vessels. 
As Leonardo Marques has noted, demand for US vessels in major slaving ports such as Rio de 
Janeiro, Havana, and even on the African coast, was small, but growing in the 1820s, and ballooned 
from the mid 1830s. Although US vessel were also used by slave traders in Cuba, they were 
especially prominent in the traffic to Brazil. Between 1831 and 1850, 58 percent of voyages to 
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Brazil took place in American ships. By contrast, the next largest builder of vessels in this branch 
of the trade, Brazil, was far behind at 15 percent. Across the entire trade, around two captives in 
every three arriving in the Americas during the 1830s and 1840s disembarked from an American-
built vessel; around half a million in total.24  
 One of the important factors behind this shift was the growing supremacy of American 
shipbuilding during the early nineteenth century. Combining British and American shipping 
technologies and enjoying a plentiful supply of lumber from expansive forests, US shipbuilders 
had a considerable competitive edge over the European nations that formerly dominated slave ship 
outfitting. Building on these advantages, the US enjoyed a golden age in ship construction from 
the 1820s, as yards from Maryland to Maine produced record numbers of brigs, barques, and 
schooners. Many of these vessels, including the famed Baltimore clipper, were especially fast 
sailors. These craft were attractive to traffickers who sought to avoid cruisers patrolling the slaving 
coasts of Africa and the smaller number of cruisers policing Brazilian and Caribbean waters. Fast 
vessels also had the added benefit of shortening sailing times, which reduced slave mortality during 
the middle passage and costs such as food and sailors’ wages.25  
In addition to the prevalence of US-built vessels, the illegal slave trade was increasingly 
conducted under the American flag. In the Brazilian market, slave ships flew the US flag almost 
as regularly as Brazilian colors during the late 1840s.26 The American flag also frequently appeared 
in the smaller trade to Cuba, especially in the late 1830s and 1840s, as the Spanish and Portuguese 
flags came partly under the jurisdiction of the British. Traffickers based in Brazilian and Cuban 
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slaving ports were careful to earn the right to fly the US flag, often purchasing or chartering vessels 
through a resident American, who acted as a straw buyer and retained legal ownership of the ship. 
This procedure allowed the vessel to retain the right to fly American colors.27   
One of the reasons why traffickers sought the US flag was the protection it offered at sea. 
Americans jealously regarded the right of their merchant marine to sail free from interference from 
foreign powers, especially Britain. Indeed, frustration over British interference with American 
vessels and sailors during the Early Republic had been a major cause of the War of 1812. To many 
Americans, conceding the so-called Right of Search was a matter of principle; to do so, would be, 
as Secretary of State John Quincy Adams put it in 1822, “making slaves of ourselves.”28 
Channeling this spirit, US administrations denied other nations’ cruisers the right to stop and 
search American vessels, even in cases when they were clearly carrying slaves. When Congress 
did expand its suppression efforts, sovereignty remained paramount. In 1842, the US responded to 
rising American participation in the slave trade by forging the Webster Ashburton Treaty with 
Britain. This agreement required the US Navy to send a permanent, although still relatively small, 
squadron to the African coast, but did not grant the key concession, the Right of Search. In 
addition, in contrast with Spain and Portugal, which had been weakened by the loss of their 
American colonies during the Age of Revolutions, the US was becoming more powerful during 
the nineteenth century. In a sign of this growing strength, the US was the only major maritime 
power to deny Britain the right to interfere with its vessels by the 1830s, when the French conceded 
a limited Right of Search to British cruisers.29  
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More broadly, the value of US vessels and the American flag to slave traders was also 
bolstered by American prioritization of commerce over slave trade suppression. Although the US 
did send a small number of vessels into African and Brazilian waters, as well as to the Caribbean, 
especially after the Webster Ashburton Treaty, these cruisers departed US shores with the primary 
purpose of supporting American commerce rather than suppressing the slave trade.30 Underscoring 
the point, US cruisers in African waters spent most of their time north of the equator, where 
American trade was thickest, rather than in the main slaving grounds, which were increasingly 
located south of the equator near West Central Africa. Indeed, despite pleas from US naval officers 
off the African coast, successive administrations refused to move the American supply depot from 
the Cape Verde Islands, near Upper Guinea, to a more southerly point. With these small 
deployments rarely in position to strike, slave traders held little fear of interception by American 
cruisers.31 
Senior American diplomats maintained the same priorities as the Navy. Although the 1818-
20 Acts prohibited US ownership of slavers, much depended on how far particular administrations 
would enforce the law. Most proved more interested in facilitating commerce than suppression. 
Successive secretaries of state were unprepared to interfere with the purchase or lease of American 
vessels in foreign ports, even when US consuls pointed out that local traffickers were snapping 
them up for the slave trade. During the 1840s, US consuls in Rio de Janeiro wrote repeatedly to 
the State Department for their assistance, but none came. As a result, Consul Gorham Parks wrote 
to Secretary of State John Clayton from Rio in 1849 that by following his orders from Washington, 
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he had “been obliged in doing to aid more in the slave trade than perhaps any other Citizen of the 
US has done.”32   
Although the use of the American flag and the sheer number and type of vessels were the 
main and most easily quantifiable ways of measuring American contributions to the slave trade, a 
final important factor was the indirect support provided by legal American commerce with slave 
trading regions. During the nineteenth century, the US became the chief importer of Brazilian 
coffee and Cuban sugar. Soaring demand for these staples encouraged planters to seek enslaved 
labor to increase production on their estates. Meanwhile, American capital and manufactured 
goods surged into Brazil and Cuba, underpinning both slavery and the slave trade.33 American 
vessels also delivered goods such as firearms to slaving zones in Africa, where they were used to 
purchase slaves for export to Brazil and Cuba.34 The US was by no means alone in any of these 
contributions. The British probably supported the slave trade in even greater scale by importing 
Cuban sugar, providing credit to slave traders in Brazil and Cuba, and sending manufactured goods 
and new technologies to the Caribbean and South Atlantic.35 Although the trade had been 
outlawed, international commerce brought almost every major power into the traffic in some way.  
 Americans citizens on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean were ultimately responsible for US 
participation in the trade. US merchants living in slaving ports typically played important roles as 
middlemen, working in close association with local traffickers. James Birckhead and Maxwell, 
Wright & Co., coffee exporters in Rio, were the main suppliers of vessels to Manoel Pinto da 
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Fonseca, the major slave trader Brazil during the 1840s. Although they always remained a minority 
amongst crews, American ship captains and sailors sometimes took on the role of middlemen and 
occasionally sailed aboard slavers. Captains Joshua Clapp and Nathaniel Gordon, for example, 
were involved in several voyages between Angola and Brazil during the 1840s.36 Meanwhile, US 
consuls became important conduits for the trade. Some, including Gorham Parks in Rio, were 
reluctant facilitators, but others, such as Nicholas Trist, the US consul in Havana during the 1830s, 
turned a blind eye to the trade and took kickbacks from traffickers.37 Each of these American roles: 
middlemen, seamen, and consuls, would become key elements of the slave trade after 1850, when 
the traffic shifted to an axis that involved US ports directly.  
 
The midcentury assault on the slave trade  
 
From the mid-1840s to the early 1850s, many states on both sides of the Atlantic basin launched a 
renewed assault on the international slave trade. This onslaught was not centrally planned and 
depended on external forces as well as internal factors in slaving zones. The chief instigators were 
national governments, especially British, Portuguese, and Brazilian, although planters and slaves 
also played important roles. The effect of this wave was substantial. Most importantly, it ended 
the massive trade to Brazil almost completely, cutting the overall scale of the trade enormously, 
and causing serious ructions in slaving zones throughout the Atlantic basin. The demise of some 
branches of the traffic did not, however, herald the end of the entire trade. Critically, the market to 
Cuba remained protected thanks largely to a favorable geopolitical situation, while on the African 
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coast, traffickers moved their operations into areas beyond the control of threatening states. These 
changes paved the way for more direct US involvement in the trade after 1850. 
 Portugal dealt the first major blow of this assault during the 1840s in Angola. Successive 
Portuguese governments and colonial administrations had tolerated a very large slave trade from 
Angola and under the Portuguese flag since abolition in 1836, but by the mid-1840s, policymakers 
in the metropole were beginning to take suppression seriously. This change was partly in response 
to exterior pressure. In 1845, Britain and France agreed to allow one another to make treaties with 
African polities, including those on the northern margins of Angola near the Congo River, and in 
some cases to occupy the coast (see Figure 1.3). The agreement caused alarm in Lisbon, where 
leading statesman, including Prime Minister Sá da Bandeira, viewed Lower Congo polities as 
under Portugal’s sphere of influence. At the same time, an ideological shift was taking place in 
Portugal. As historian João Pedro Marques had noted, although the traditional approach of 
tolerating the slave trade remained powerful, policymakers were beginning to identify suppression 
with national honor, largely because of Portugal’s increasing isolation as a major violator of 
abolition laws. Indeed, Marques has contended that Portuguese action was stirred less by concern 
about territorial encroachment per se than by the slight to national honor caused by the British 
doing what Portugal ought to be doing itself.38 The same principle applied to capturing Portuguese 
flagged vessels, which the British had been intercepting throughout the Atlantic basin since 1839. 
At the same time, suppression also served internal aims, including increasing Portuguese control 
over parts of Angola that enjoyed considerable independence from Luanda. The southern coastal 
town of Benguela was a particular concern. The colony’s second largest slaving port after the 
capital, Benguela was heavily influenced by Brazilian traffickers. The connections between 
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Benguela and Brazil raised broader concerns in Portugal that Angola saw its future with Rio da 
Janeiro rather than Lisbon.39 
 
Figure 1.3. The slaving coasts of West and West Central Africa during the nineteenth century * 
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 Spurred by these concerns, Portugal began suppressing the traffic more vigorously during 
the mid to late 1840s. Much of this effort focused on the coasts of Portuguese Africa. Portugal had 
already stationed most of its warships in Angolan waters from 1840, but from 1843 to 1850 these 
cruisers nearly doubled the number of slavers they intercepted.40 Many of the captured slavers 
were adjudicated at a Portuguese prize court in Luanda, which was established in 1844, while other 
cases were heard at Luanda’s Court of Mixed Commission, which was created under joint British 
and Portuguese jurisdiction the same year.41 These actions occurred despite complaints from the 
Brazilian government on behalf of Brazilian ship owners and slave trade investors. Meanwhile, 
the Portuguese and British jointly attacked the traffic in and around Benguela, which not only 
damaged the trade in southern Angola, but brought the region under greater control of Luanda. In 
the capital itself, officials brought a growing number of slave traders to trial for violations of slave 
trade laws. In addition, although the Portuguese refused to permit British incursions north of 
Angola, in 1847, they granted Britain the right to patrol much of coastal Mozambique and renewed 
the agreement three years later.42 Much of this action would continue into the 1850s as Portugal 
increasingly viewed suppression, imperial control, and expansion in Africa as convenient 
bedfellows. 
 The effect of Portuguese and British action in Angola was to relocate rather than eliminate 
the slave trade in West Central Africa. On the one hand, slave exportations declined markedly 
from Angola. Luanda and Benguela, the two largest Angolan slaving ports for centuries, finally 
became small players in the traffic, at least in terms of departures, which dropped tenfold after 
1845 compared to the 1830s. On the other hand, the slave trade was shifting elsewhere. Many 
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traffickers simply moved their operations from Angola to the north, just beyond Portuguese 
control. In the Congo River, especially, a network of small, decentralized states and many secluded 
creeks and thick brush gave these slave traders added protection from outside interference. The 
movement north had already been taking place since the 1830s, but intensified during the late 
1840s. At the same time, Luanda remained intimately connected to the trade. Traffickers in the 
capital continued to receive slaves from the interior, but instead of shipping them directly to the 
Americas, now sent them north for incoming ships.43 Meanwhile, rather than diminishing, the slave 
trade as a whole increased, both from West Central Africa and Mozambique, during the late 1840s. 
Between 1845 and 1849, traffickers sent around 50,000 captives from West Central Africa and 
Mozambique each year. These figures were marginally higher than the annual 46,000 sent during 
the late 1830s and much higher than the 29,000 or so, who embarked during the first half of the 
1840s.44  
 A more consequential blow against the slave trade was struck in Brazil in 1850. Although 
there remains considerable debate among historians about the origins of Brazilian suppression, 
including the impact of a slave rebellion in the southern Paraíba Valley in 1848 and a yellow fever 
outbreak in 1849-50, both of which Brazilian legislators and writers linked to the slave trade, the 
main impetus seems to have come from Britain.45 In 1846, Lord Palmerston became Foreign 
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Minister for a second time and was determined to press Brazil even further than his predecessor 
Lord Aberdeen, whose so-called Aberdeen Act in 1845 had unilaterally given the British navy to 
right to intercept Brazilian slavers, even in Brazilian waters. Under Palmerston’s direction and in 
association with the British minister, James Hudson, and consuls in Brazil, the Foreign Office also 
began a series of convert operations including bribing Brazilian politicians, funding the nascent 
Brazilian abolitionist press, and hiring spies to report on the movement of illegal slavers during 
the late 1840s. The spies became especially useful when Palmerston strengthened the British naval 
presence off the Brazilian coast in 1849. With the British fleet reinforced, seaborne operations 
became much more aggressive and successful. During 1849 and early 1850, British cruisers 
entered Brazilian ports, opened fire on a coastal fort, and intercepted dozens of slavers. Much of 
this action took place just outside the main Brazilian slave trading hub, Rio de Janeiro.46 
 The aggressive British assault left Brazilian policymakers with little alternative, but to 
make suppression effective. Although Brazilian sovereignty had been flagrantly violated, and 
some planters who relied heavily on the slave trade argued for war with Britain, few supported this 
proposition. Not only was the Brazilian navy no match for Britain’s, but having become 
increasingly isolated as a slaving nation, Brazil could expect little support from other nations in 
the event of open hostilities. Even the US, which had denied European powers the right to interfere 
with affairs in the Americas since the Monroe Doctrine in 1824, and was itself deepening its 
commitment to slavery in the US South and the West, was not prepared to come to the aid of a 
power so clearly committed to the slave trade. Lacking support from abroad, the Brazilian 
government aimed to preserve the Empire’s sovereignty by finally taking serious action against 
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the traffic. In the summer of 1850 the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate passed a new 
law, which included a raft of provisions targeting slave ships, their owners, and various 
accomplices. Meanwhile, the government strengthened the Brazilian naval deployment off the 
coast and the police began searching estates for newly arrived slaves. Several more slavers would 
appear on Brazilian shores during the 1850s, but the decline was precipitous. By 1852, the largest 
branch of the slave trade was effectively dead.47  
The Brazilian government’s new measures had a significant impact on slave traders and 
their accomplices in Brazil. Some receded from the trade, hoping that the crackdown would be 
temporary and that they could return to slaving in the future. Others faced punishment or expulsion. 
The police, especially in Rio, arrested and charged several Brazilian traffickers with slave trading 
offences. Meanwhile, the Brazilian government expelled several prominent Portuguese traffickers 
who had earned considerable wealth through the traffic, including the notorious Joaquim da 
Fonseca.48 Many of these exiles, including José Bernardino de Sa and Augusto Gomes Netto 
returned to their homes in northern Portugal and Lisbon with large sums of money and purchased 
estates and titles through the Portuguese government.49 Back in Brazil, American citizens engaged 
in the trade also scattered. In the spring of 1852, Edward Kent, the US consul in Rio, reported to 
the State Department that “[t]he permanent and temporary residents in this city, natives of the US, 
who were generally understood to have some connection directly or indirectly with this trade have 
failed in business, and nearly all of them have departed to ‘places unknown.’” Kent, who was 
apparently glad to see their departure, perhaps not least because US policy itself had made his 
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office complicit in their dealings, added, “I trust they will never return to disgrace this country and 
outrage humanity.”50 
 The closure of the trade to Brazil reverberated powerfully in West Central Africa. The 
impact on the slaving community was especially great. In 1851, George Brand, the British vice 
consul in Luanda, reported that among the slaving merchants of Angola, “with the exception of 
two or three possessed of a little property and who have withdrawn from here and are not now 
solely dependent on the traffic, there is scarcely one believed to be in a state of solvency.”51 With 
the closure of the Brazilian trade, slave traders’ credit was also drying up. According to Brand, 
one of the leading traffickers in the region had attempted to draw bills of exchange on Rio but they 
were rejected, “there being no funds belonging to him there” since “no slaves had been received.”52 
Because the slave trade formed such a major part of the economy in coastal West Central Africa, 
the effects of the collapse of the Brazilian trade went beyond traffickers. Brazilian gold, which was 
formerly abundant, especially in Luanda, was now scarce. Moreover, according to Brand, slave 
traders’ inability to pay their debts, created “distrust in all commercial transactions.”53  
 The British and the Portuguese attempted to capitalize on these disruptions by stepping up 
their suppression efforts. During the early 1850s, British cruisers heavily patrolled northern West 
Central Africa, especially around the town of Ambriz, which lay just beyond Portuguese 
jurisdiction. They also increased their attempts to make treaties with African polities, resulting in 
accords with Francisco Franque, a powerful trader in Cabinda (1853), and the Queen of 
Ambrizette, Cangala (1855). Meanwhile, the Portuguese, concerned about British encroachment 
into its sphere of influence under the pretext of suppression, bolstered its naval patrols, increased 
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its military presence in northern Angola, and occasionally launched attacks on coastal slaving 
factories.54  
Unlike in Brazil and Angola, however, these efforts were not successful. Although several 
African polities made anti-slave trade treaties, they were not committed to ending the trade. 
Finding limited demand for alternative exports, they were willing to play all sides: signing treaties 
with the British, while accommodating the mostly Brazilian, Portuguese, and Luso-African 
traffickers on the coast. In this way, they were able to keep the suppression powers at arm’s length. 
Meanwhile, the slave traders themselves remained adaptable. In 1851, when Brazilian suppression 
shook the region, traffickers in the Lower Congo River forced slaves to gather ground nut and 
orchilla weed for export, while planning to sell the captives themselves at a later date.55  
 Although suppression in West Central Africa remained an ongoing struggle, Britain 
stepped up attacks in other parts of the African coast. In 1849, the same year that British cruisers 
began aggressive action in Brazilian waters, the African Squadron launched a direct assault on 
slaving factories on the Gallinas River, between the British colony of Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
The River, which at its mouth was really a series of shallow lagoons, was a haven for the few 
Spanish slave trading agents on the African coast, such as Pedro Blanco, as well as a number of 
Portuguese and Brazilians who traded heavily with Bahia.56 Although this part of the coast was a 
much smaller exporting zone than West Central Africa, accounting for around a six percent of 
slave exports during the 1830s and 1840s, it was regionally significant; during the 1830s, slave 
trader Theo Canneau had described the Gallinas River as “the notorious slave mart of the 
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Northwest Coast of Africa.”57 Noting the importance of the River, the British Navy had destroyed 
factories at Gallinas in 1840, during Palmerston’s first stint as Foreign Secretary, and then in 1845. 
In February 1849, the Navy attacked again, destroying three factories and driving at least 34 slave 
traders – 6 Spanish, 14 Brazilian, and 14 Portuguese – from the River.58 This assault, in conjunction 
with the closure of trade to Brazil, was decisive in bringing the Gallinas slave trade to a close. 
After 1850, only one slaver purchased captives in the River.59 Meanwhile, as Figure 4 shows, the 
British press reported, and celebrated, news of the attack. 
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Along the coast, in the Bight of Benin, the British took further aggressive action against 
the trade. The Bight was second only to West Central Africa in terms of slave exports during the 
mid-nineteenth century. Lagos was an especially important hub, accounting for 73,000 
embarkations during the 1840s, around two thirds of the regional total.60 The trade from Lagos 
was maintained chiefly by Brazilian and Portuguese slave traders such as Francisco da Souza, who 
operated in conjunction with King Kosoko, the ruler of Lagos from 1845-51. Their operations were 
permanently disrupted, however, in 1851, when Royal Navy cruisers bombarded the port. After 
this successful attack from the sea, the British deposed Kosoko and replaced him with a new king, 
Akitoye, who signed an anti-slave trade treaty aboard a British cruiser and promised to work 
against the trade. Having become what Robin Law has called a “quasi-protectorate of Britain,” 
Lagos would be annexed completely by the British in 1861.61 Meanwhile, in neighboring 
Dahomey, one of the key provenance zones of slaves departing the Bight of Benin, the King 
Ghezo, having heard what had happened in Lagos, signed a treaty with the British and promised 
to expel the Portuguese and Brazilian slave traders from his jurisdiction. Yet, unlike Lagos, 
Dahomey and its main slaving ports, Ouidah, were not at the mercy of the British. Dahomey was 
a large and powerful state, and Ouidah sat back from the Atlantic Ocean, rendering British cruisers 
much less threatening. With these advantages, some traffickers, including Carlos de Souza Nobre, 
moved their operations to Ouidah after the Lagos attack, and kept the slave trade open. As in West 
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Central Africa, the embarkation zones in the Bight of Benin had narrowed, but not entirely 
closed.62 
 As the slave trade came under renewed pressure in Brazil and on the African coast, the 
traffic to Cuba had almost dried up. After large numbers of imports in the early 1840s, the traffic 
declined sharply in 1845. This change was caused in large part by planters’ concerns about an 
uprising by slaves and free blacks. In late 1843 and early 1844 rumors had abounded that an 
insurrection was about to break out in the key slaving importing zone of Matanzas and would then 
spread to other parts of the island. Although the rebellion never took place, the supposed 
conspiracy, which came to be known as La Escalera, had serious repercussions. In addition to 
torturing and executing scores of slaves and free blacks, whom they believed were involved in the 
conspiracy, the colonial government, led by Captain General Leopoldo O’Donnell, took serious 
steps to curb the illegal slave trade to the island.63 In 1845, a new Penal law came into effect, which 
stiffened punishments for crews aboard illegal slavers.64 This step was mainly a response to the 
demands of planters, who had formerly benefitted from the traffic, but now feared that further 
arrivals would foment new rebellions. In this new context, illicit imports of slaves dropped from 
around 10,000 in 1844 to 1,000 in 1845. They would remain around 1,000 to 2,000 for the 
remainder of the 1840s. Meanwhile, Cuban planters began to seriously consider importing labor 
from other sources, such as China and the Yucatan Peninsula.65 
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 The Cuban assault on the slave trade did not, however, represent a fatal blow to the trade. 
As in other regions of the Atlantic world after rebellions (or rumors of rebellion), planter demand 
for enslaved Africans was not permanently depressed. By the 1830s, the island had become the 
world’s largest sugar producer. Sugar cultivation was labor intensive and production on a large 
scale depended on an abundance of coerced workers. With the slave trade depressed, the labor 
problem became acute, especially since natural reproduction amongst Cuban slaves remained low 
and large imports from China and Yucatan failed to materialize until the mid-1850s. Some sugar 
planters were able to secure additional labor during the late 1840s by purchasing slaves from the 
island’s coffee plantations, many of which were devastated by a series of hurricanes that swept 
through the island in the mid-1840s, but this supply was not sustainable.66 Unlike the US and 
Brazil, which developed robust interregional slave trades by the mid-1850s, Cuba lacked a large 
internal supply of captive laborers.67  
Another problem was that opposition to the slave trade was inherently weak. The Penal 
Law had been largely shaped by Cuban planters and actually prevented the authorities from 
entering planters’ estates to search for newly imported slaves (known in Cuba as bozales).68 The 
colonial authorities had also used La Escalera to silence internal critics of Spanish policy in Cuba, 
including on the slave trade. In the aftermath of the conspiracy, O’Donnell had exiled dozens of 
island-born whites, known as creoles, who attacked the authorities during the 1830s and early 
1840s. One of their main arguments was that Spain encouraged the traffic to keep creoles from 
rebelling against colonial rule because doing so would likely instigate an explosive race war that 
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would ultimately rebound on creole themselves. In addition to these Cuban concerns, there was 
little pressure for suppression back in Spain, where abolitionism remained in nascent form, and 
merchants and industrialists, especially in Catalonia, were closely tied to Cuban sugar interests. 
Indeed, many of Cuba’s most important traffickers during the 1830s and 1840s, such as Pedro 
Martinez, had been born in Spain and maintained strong ties to the Iberian Peninsula.69 
  If pressure to suppress the trade definitively was not forthcoming within the Spanish 
Empire, there were limits to the force that could be applied from the outside. Unlike in Brazil and 
on parts of the African coast, the British had to tread carefully in Cuba. One important factor was 
that Spain was a European nation, whose sovereignty the British government felt more duty bound 
to respect than the rights of Brazil or African polities. In addition, the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 
1835 forbade any additional suppression measures by the British in the Cuban trade. Even more 
compelling was the role of the increasingly powerful US. After American annexation of Texas in 
1848, many US expansionists, including planters and leading policymakers, turned their attention 
to Cuba. Spain resisted American pressure to surrender the island, leaning heavily on the British, 
who also opposed growing US aggression in the Caribbean. In return, Britain sought robust 
Spanish action on the slave trade to Cuba. Spain, however, would prove adept at playing off 
London’s fear of US expansion against its opposition to the slave trade during the 1850s.70  
 The midcentury assault on the slave trade had therefore produced mixed results. On the 
one hand, the overall traffic declined sharply from record highs during the 1840s. The blow to the 
slave trade in the South Atlantic had been especially powerful, permanently ending the largest 
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slaving nexus in the history of the traffic between Angola and Brazil. Under pressure from the 
British, especially, the trade also collapsed in parts of West Africa, including the Gallinas River 
and Lagos. On the other hand, several regions remained open to the trade. Although traffickers in 
Ouidah and other parts of the African coast remained open to exporting slaves, the main threat 
came from northern West Central Africa and Cuba, where the traffic was merely depressed, rather 
than permanently suppressed.  
 
 
The arrival of the Slave Trade in US ports 
 
The midcentury assault on the slave trade fragmented the trafficking community in the Atlantic 
world. Although many slave traders withdrew from the traffic, around a dozen, mostly from Brazil 
and Africa, immigrated to the US with the aim of creating a new slaving trading network running 
between US ports, Africa, and Cuba. Although they had been pushed out of their respective slaving 
zones, these traffickers recognized that US ports held great potential as places for organizing the 
trade. New York, in particular, enjoyed a large and growing legal commerce with slaving zones, 
and traffickers would quickly forge strategic ties with merchants in these trades. Powerful national 
political forces would also protect their work, including continued American commitment to 
sovereignty at sea and rising national interest in incorporating Cuba into the US. Both issues 
superseded American concerns about the slave trade and paved the way for a decade of slave 
trading in US ports.  
 During the early 1850s, slave traders, especially in the South Atlantic, struggled to maintain 
a foothold in the traffic. Since the trade to Brazil showed little sign of reopening, a small number 
of traffickers travelled to Cuba, aiming to break into the trade to the island. In 1851, Augusto 
Botelho, a Portuguese living in Brazil, joined a small group of Portuguese and Brazilian slave 
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traders who established themselves in Cuba. In 1853, the British consul general in Havana, Joseph 
Crawford, reported that Botelho was “acting for a Brazilian Company of Slave Traders who had 
establishments at Trinidad [on the South side of Cuba], at Los Perros on the North side and in this 
city.”71 This group, also described by Crawford as the “Brazilian and Portuguese Slave Trade 
Association” had some success, receiving several cargos on various parts of the island. Most, if 
not all, of its members were ousted, however, in 1854 by a new Captain General, Juan de la 
Pezuela, who was less sympathetic to the slave trade than his predecessors, and found it easier to 
take action against the Brazilians and Portuguese than local slave traders who were often politically 
connected.72 In the spring of 1854, Pezuela captured Botelho expelled him from the island. The 
same year, they arraigned and deported two other foreign traffickers, Antonio Severino de Avellar 
and Gaspar de Motta.73 
 Having been expelled from their respective slaving regions, each of these individuals 
joined a small stream of traffickers on their way to the US. As Leonardo Marques has noted, during 
the early to mid-1850s, around a dozen slave traders, mainly from Brazil, West Central Africa, and 
Portugal, converged on US ports aiming to create a new node in the traffic to Cuba. Mainly of 
Portuguese and Brazilian birth, they were highly experienced people-traffickers, particularly in the 
illegal South Atlantic trade. By the mid-1850s, they had established themselves in the merchant 
and shipping district of Lower Manhattan, where they became known by some observers as the 
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“Portuguese Company.”74 Although New York would remain their base until the early 1860s, 
many of these slave traders would also operate out of other US ports, including Boston, Baltimore, 
and New Orleans. They would also move around the Atlantic basin to organize voyages, supervise 
transatlantic voyages in person, and, occasionally, to escape pressure from the American 
authorities.75 
Manoel Basílio da Cunha Reis typified these immigrant traffickers. Born in Portugal in 
1822, Cunha Reis had moved to Brazil as a young man and operated in Rio de Janeiro, the shipping 
and finance center of the illegal slave trade in South America.76 By the early 1850s, he had 
established himself at Ambriz, one of the main slave depots north of Angola in West Central 
Africa. In 1854, he was described by the British Foreign Office as a “notorious slave dealer” who 
kept captives in barracoons, or ramshackle prisons, on the Congo river.77 The same year, the British 
and Portuguese targeted Cunha Reis, eventually running him out of town. He arrived in New York 
in April 1855, along with another trafficker from West Central Africa, José da Silva Maia 
Ferreira.78 They were joined by other traffickers including Botelho, Avellar, Motta, as well as José 
da Costa Lima Viana, José Lucas Henriques da Costa, and José Pedro da Cunha. Each of these 
men had similar career trajectories and experience in the South Atlantic slave trade.79   
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 Large US ports such as New York were attractive alternative bases for these exiled slave 
traders. As their experience in Rio and elsewhere had shown, the best places to organize voyages 
were big ports with strong ties to slaving zones. In these respects, New York was an especially 
good fit. By midcentury New York was not only America’s largest port, but handled more trade 
than anywhere else in the western hemisphere.80 Positioned between the expanding American 
West, to which it was connected by a growing network of canals and railroads, and the Atlantic 
Ocean, New York was a major global commercial and financial hub. Britain remained the US’s 
main trading partner and chief source of credit, but American ports were connected to slave trading 
regions in the Caribbean and Africa. By 1840, the US had become Cuba’s largest trading partner, 
surpassing Britain and Spain.81 New York did more business with the island than any other port, 
its vessels carrying grain, lumber, and manufactured goods to Cuba and returning with sugar, rum, 
and molasses for American refineries and consumers. New Orleans was also tightly connected to 
Cuban markets, laying about a week away by sail and less by steam. Several US ports, mainly in 
the North, also traded with slave-exporting regions of Africa. A few firms even sent vessels to the 
Lower Congo River basin, in part to avoid paying tariffs to the Portuguese in Angola.82  
 The arriving traffickers quickly created allies among the overseas merchant community in 
New York. One of their key associates was a native of the Azores, João Alberto Machado. 
Machado had immigrated to the US in the late 1840s, and was one of New York’s main Africa 
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traders, doing business with several parts of the coast. Although this business was not directly 
connected to the slave trade, Machado had previously resided in Sierra Leone, where the British 
believed he had been involved in the traffic to Brazil.83 Other important allies included Portuguese 
merchant-officials in the US. When Cunha Reis and Maia Ferreira arrived in New York, they 
quickly attached themselves to Cesar Figanière the Portuguese Consul General, who ran a 
merchant house that imported wines from Portugal. In exchange for several thousand dollars, 
Cunha Reis became a partner in the firm, which subsequently changed its name to Figanière, Reis 
and Co. As Cunha Reis took the partnership, Ferreira was appointed the firm’s secretary.84 
Similarly, Augusto Lopes Baptista, a Brazilian who operated both as a merchant and as the 
Portuguese vice-consul in Baltimore, became an important ally for traffickers in the early 1850s.85 
At the top of the Portuguese delegation, in Washington D.C., was Cesar Figanière’s father, 
Joaquim Figanière e Morao. He was assisted by another son, Frederico. Foreshadowing some of 
the work the family would do for slave traders during the 1850s, in 1849 Frederico represented 
slave traders in Brazil and Angola who brought a libel suit against US officers who had captured 
an illegal slaver named Susan in African waters. The suit failed, but the Figanières’ affiliations 
were clear.86  
The ‘Portuguese’ would also forge alliances with merchants who had connections to Cuba. 
These men were of diverse origins in the Spanish-speaking Atlantic, but were residents of New 
York, New Orleans, and Charleston during the 1850s. Unlike some of the Portuguese, such as 
Machado, they were not experienced slave traders; none had obvious connections to the traffic 
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before 1850. Instead, they had strong trading interests with Cuba. One important figure, Antonio 
Maximo Mora, spent his formative years on the island before migrating to the New York in 1853. 
After establishing himself in Lower Manhattan he became one of the nation’s largest importers of 
Cuban sugar.87 Another key ally, Albert Horn, was a New York merchant who had been born in 
Havana.88 In Charleston, the main figure was, Ramón Salas, a Spaniard, who operated in the Cuba 
trade with his partner Charles Poujaud.89 In New Orleans, the most important ally was a native of 
Mexico named Salvador Prats.90 These individuals would support the Portuguese, but also work 
on behalf traffickers in Cuba, especially later in the 1850s. 
The importance of mercantile connections was underlined in the development of a Masonic 
Lodge, La Fraternidad, in New York. Although many Americans treated freemasonry with 
suspicion and even hostility, masonic lodges proliferated in the US and around the Atlantic world 
during the nineteenth century. Described in a 1859 masonic manual as a “universal language” that 
promoted “kind and friendly offices” between brothers, freemasonry was an ideal institution for 
forging connections and engaging in clandestine activity.91 In New York, lodge no. 387, La 
Fraternidad, was founded by Cuban merchants in 1855.92 It soon became colonized by immigrant 
slave traders eager to exploit the secrecy of the lodge, as well as its members’ commercial 
connections with the island. Almost all the Portuguese traffickers became members, including 
Inocêncio Antonio de Abranches, Francisco Diaz Perez de Almeida, and Manoel Fortunato da 
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Oliveira Botelho (Antonio Botelho’s brother). By 1857, these slave traders formed almost half the 
lodge’s membership.93 They were joined by Justo de San Miguel, a sugar planter born in Santander, 
who was based in Cuba and implicated in illegal slaving voyages. One of the Portuguese members, 
Cunha Reis, was the most senior member of the lodge. He had been a freemason since at least the 
1840s in Rio de Janeiro and would become the most powerful slave trader in New York.94  
  While traffickers developed important commercial connections in US ports, they also 
benefitted from broader national political priorities that were crystallizing at midcentury. 
American concerns with sovereignty remained a serious obstacle to the full suppression of the 
traffic. Despite continued British pressure on the US to grant the Right of Search, this concession 
seemed less likely than ever. Tensions were already high between the two powers after the US 
annexed Texas in 1845 over British objections, and then went to war with Mexico, ultimately 
taking even more territory from its beleaguered neighbor. The Democratic Party, which was a 
major force behind these efforts, would maintain control over the US government throughout the 
1850s and was especially hostile to Britain.95 Making matters worse, the proximity of Cuba to the 
US rendered British interference with US vessels in the Gulf of Mexico even more untenable to 
all policymakers and the vast majority of Americans. The US position was captured by Andrew 
Hull Foote, who had commanded the USS Perry on the African coast during the 1840s. In his 
popular 1854 book, Africa and the American Flag, Foote noted although he “sympathize[d] with 
the capture and deliverance of a wretched cargo of African slave from the grasp of a slaver, 
irrespective of his nationality” it was “contrary to national honor and national interests that the 
right of capture should be entrusted to the hands of any foreign authority.”96  
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While the sovereignty issue would continue to protect US participation in the slave trade, 
additional cover was offered, indirectly, by American ambitions in Cuba. The island’s dramatic 
economic growth in the early part of the nineteenth century caught the attention of many 
Americans who eyed incorporating the “Pearl of the Antilles” into the US.97 For planters (and 
prospective planters), Cuba held special attractions as a new frontier for American slavery. As a 
new state, the island would also send representatives to Congress and bolster legislative support 
for slavery, which was becoming a growing point of tension as Americans spilled into western US 
territories from both slave states and free. Indeed, many northerners rejected the incorporation of 
Cuba into the Union precisely because it would strengthen the role of slavery in national affairs. 
At the same time, other northerners, especially in states such as New Hampshire and Maine, which 
were already deeply involved in the Cuba trade, eyed the economic benefits of adding the island 
to the US. If not all Americans viewed the prospect favorably, the majority certainly agreed that 
in contrast to the energy of the US, Spain – an old, monarchical, and Catholic power – was a 
corrupting and restraining force on Cuba.98  
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Expansionist impulses were shared and openly expressed at the highest level in the federal 
government during the late 1840s. Although leading policymakers from Thomas Jefferson to John 
Quincy Adams had viewed the island as a natural appendage of the US, American agitation over 
Cuba reached a crescendo during the mid-nineteenth century when the nation entered a decade of 
Democratic domination both of the presidency and in Congress. Unlike the second major party, 
the Whigs, whose members were wary of slavery, most Democrats gave it their full-throated 
support and encouraged its westward and southward expansion. Following the annexation of Texas 
in 1845, prominent Democratic expansionists turned their attentions to Cuba. Reflecting the 
increasingly forceful rhetoric, Jefferson Davis, a Democratic senator from Mississippi stated his 
position bluntly on the Senate floor in 1848: “Cuba must be ours.” In the same year, Democratic 
President James Polk authorized his minister in Madrid, Romulus Sanders, to offer the Spanish 
government $100 million for the island. The Spanish rejected the offer, but American 
determination to wrest Cuba from Spain would grow, not wane, during the following decade.99 
During this period of intense agitation over Cuba, some American expansionists used the 
issue of the illegal slave trade to support their case for acquiring the island. By 1850, Americans 
were well aware that the traffic to Cuba, although relatively small compared to Brazil, was 
ongoing, with newspapers’ foreign correspondents and travelers reporting dramatic stories of the 
latest clandestine landings. Almost all these reports blamed Spain for allowing the trade to endure. 
The expansionist writer Cora Montgomery, for example, wrote provocatively in her 1850 Cuba 
book, The Queen of Islands, that “[t]he supply [of slaves] is kept up by an energetic importation 
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from Africa, under the patronage of [the Spanish] Queen Christina, who employs in the slave trade 
much of the $25,000 a month which she draws from the revenues of Cuba.”100 According to this 
interpretation, Spain could easily suppress the trade. As the New York Herald explained: “it is 
possible, and even easy, for the government of Spain to stop the slave trade in Cuba, if it were so 
inclined.”101 The New York Times correspondent in Cuba agreed, arguing that the slave trade “will 
be continued so long as the Spanish flag flies here.”102 The implication of the Times’ correspondent 
was that the slave trade could only be stopped by American possession of the island. This argument 
would be made forcefully later in the decade by many influential policymakers, including a sitting 
US president. By that point, the idea that Spain was solely responsible for the trade still held sway 
and was powerfully shaping American approaches to the traffic in its own ports. 
 
Conclusion 
The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a serious assault on the transatlantic slave trade 
from abolitionists, slaves, political reformers, and eventually, other states. This onslaught resulted 
in all the major slave trading nations banning the traffic, and some taking additional steps to 
suppress continued slaving. Despite these measures, many states remained deeply invested in the 
trade. With their slave economies growing, but not yet at full capacity, Brazil and Cuba, especially, 
had strong interests in permitting the traffic to continue their shores. Meanwhile, Portugal and 
Spain, were similarly prepared to abet illegal slaving under their flags and between their colonies. 
In the US, the situation was different; most Americans opposed the trade by the abolition Act of 
                                                
100 Cora Montgomery, The Queen of Islands and the King of Rivers (New York: Charles Wood, 1850), 23; The 
Philadelphia Inquirer agreed that “the agent of the Queen Mother of Spain was and is actually engaged in the 
infamous traffic.” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 12, 1850 
101 New York Herald, Aug. 22, 1858. 
102 For more on the NYT’s position on Cuba, see NYT, Nov. 27, 1852. 
 55 
1808, and certainly by 1820, when Congress declared the traffic piracy. Meanwhile, the internal 
slave trade supplied southern planters with labor. But although the consensus against the traffic 
ended slave imports to American shores, the US continued to be involved in the trade through the 
provision of American ships and the American flag in foreign ports. Like the British, ostensibly 
the strongest adversary of the trade, the US also supported the traffic indirectly through growing 
demand for Brazilian coffee and Cuban sugar. As these connections showed, the principles of free 
trade and sovereignty were formidable barriers to suppression.  
 During the mid-nineteenth century, the traffic came under renewed attack in many parts of 
the Atlantic basin. Responding to increasing British pressure and growing internal calls for 
imperial reform, Portugal attempted to drive the enormous traffic from Angola during the mid and 
late 1840s. The most consequential assault on the trade came in 1850, when the Brazilian 
government finally closed the traffic to its shores, under strong pressure from the British navy. 
Around the same time, the British took even more ruthless action against the traffic in the Gallinas 
River and in Lagos, effectively ending the trade in much of West Africa. These successes did not, 
however, herald the end of the traffic. In West Central Africa, slave traders moved their operations 
north, beyond Portuguese control and effective British interference. In the Lower Congo River 
basin, especially, they were protected by local rulers, who were willing to play the Portuguese and 
British against each other, and by topography conducive to slave smuggling. A similar situation 
prevailed at Ouidah in the Bight of Benin. Meanwhile, in the Americas, Cuban slave imports 
slumped during the 1840s, but with the island committed to sugar production, and Spain, Britain, 
and the US, locked in a diplomatic stalemate over the status of the island, the opportunity for a 
resurgence in the trade remained. 
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 Although it was only partially successful, the midcentury strike against the traffic ruptured 
the slave trading community, especially in the South Atlantic. While many retired from the trade, 
a small number of traffickers converged on US ports with the intention of forging a new slaving 
network between the US, Cuba, and the African coast. Their hub, New York, was an especially 
attractive base due to its commercial connections with Cuba and Africa. Slave traders soon forged 
connections with merchants in these trades, including Portuguese consuls and members of La 
Fraternidad. American political priorities also rendered the US a convenient place to operate. By 
midcentury, the US government was increasingly under the control of Democrats, who were 
committed to expanding slavery into new territories. This approach created hostilities with Britain 
and made the chances of a Right of Search agreement even more remote. Moreover, American 
expansionists were becoming more deeply committed to acquiring Cuba. Part of their developing 
argument, that Spain was solely responsible for the slave trade and only American occupation 
could prevent it, would help forestall decisive American action against the trade in the US for most 
of the 1850s. 
   
  
  











Chapter 2  
 
The United States’ Role in the Midcentury Slave Trade 
 
In April 1857, the New York Herald described a special collection that had recently taken place at 
one of the City’s uptown churches.1 The paper did not reveal the name or denomination of the 
church, but noted it was “fashionable” and its congregation was well heeled. Apparently, they were 
also generous. According to the Herald, they had organized a collection to buy a “handsome 
present” for their minister. There were even rumors they would send him to Europe if there were 
sufficient funds. That seemed to be a distinct possibility as the plate completed its early rounds. 
Already, it was carrying a “multitude” of notes.      
 The warmth of this scene diminished markedly, however, when the plate reached a 
“comfortable, reverend looking” gentleman named Tom. As the plate approached, Tom reached 
into his pocket for a fifty-dollar bill, but when it appeared, he realized he was holding a hundred-
dollar bill instead. Reluctant to part with this sum, he hesitated awkwardly. Thankfully, a neighbor 
in his pew leaned in with reassurance. “‘Don’t worry, Tom,’” he said, “‘it’s only two black birds, 
and you’ll soon make it up.’” At this point, the Herald cut away from the collection and translated 
for its readers. “The two black birds,” it explained, “signifies two negroes.” To the Herald, the 
implication was clear: “the liberal and pious member of the church was deeply interested in the 
slave trade.”           
 The traffic the Herald referred to was the illegal transatlantic slave trade. Between 1850 
and 1863 this traffic ran principally between US ports, West Central Africa, and Cuba, drawing 
around a quarter of a million captives into its path.2 Despite its scale, the ‘underground’ nature of 
                                                
1 New York Herald, Apr. 1, 1857. 
2 ‘Voyages,’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/jJtXLuGJ  
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this trade meant that most Americans knew little about who was running the traffic and how they 
were doing it. In this context, many newspapers attempted to fill the information gap. Some, 
including the Herald, created their own version of the truth. With its southern sympathies on full 
display, the Herald spun a yarn around domestic slavery politics, claiming that pious northerners 
who publically distanced themselves from slavery in the South, were privately bankrolling the 
transatlantic slave trade. It was a clever fiction, but that was all. Like most interested observers, 
the Herald was locked out of the slave traders’ world. Only a few insiders understood how the 
trade operated and what the US role actually entailed.    
 Historians have addressed these questions with more accuracy than contemporary 
newspapers. Leonardo Marques has offered the most thorough analysis to date in two chapters of 
his 2016 book, The United States and the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the Americas. Drawing on 
scraps of information from slave trade suppression archives in London, Lisbon, and Rio de Janeiro, 
Marques contends that the main US roles were the use of American-built ships and the US flag in 
the trade. He also contends that a small cadre of emigrant traffickers from Brazil, West Central 
Africa, and Portugal controlled the US side of the traffic from New York. Marques offers less 
detail on the financial side of the trade, but suggests that these merchants funded at least some 
voyages departing from US ports.3         
                                                
3 Leonardo Marques, The United States, 185-218. See also, Leonardo Marques, “US Shipbuilding, Atlantic Markets, 
and the Structures of the Contraband Slave Trade,” in The Rise and Demise of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the 
Atlantic World, eds., Philip Misevich and Kristin Mann (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2016), 196-
219. Other contributions include David Eltis, Economic Growth & The Ending of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially 157-8; Eltis, “The US Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1644–
1867: An Assessment” Civil War History, 54 (2008): 371-377; Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An 
Account of the US Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 135-204; Eric 
Anderson, “Yankee Blackbirds: Northern Entrepreneurs and the Illegal International Slave Trade, 1808-1865,” (MA 
thesis, University of Idaho, 2000); Obedele-Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers: The Foreign Slave Trade in the US 
after 1808 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2007); Gerald Horne, The Deepest South: The US, Brazil, 
and the African Slave Trade (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How 
Illicit Trade Made America (Oxford University Press, 2013), 130-153; W.E.B. Du Bois, The Suppression of the 
African Slave-Trade to the US of America, 1638-1870 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1896), 168-193; 
Warren Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 
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 The following chapter uses three groups of sources to revise these conclusions. The first is 
slave trading merchants’ correspondence and accounting documents. British and Brazilian slave 
trade suppression fleets found most of these papers aboard captured slavers, although the 
Portuguese authorities found some in the home of a notorious slave trader, João Soares, in Novo 
Redondo, Angola. There are twenty-nine letters in all, as well as accounting documents for fifteen 
voyages.4 The second group is slave trade reports by spies who worked for the British and 
American governments. The British informant was Emilio Sanchez, a Cuban-born merchant who 
lived in New York City. Sanchez spied for the British government between 1859 and 1862 and 
wrote over 180 letters to Edward Archibald, Britain’s consul in New York.5 The American spy, 
who is unnamed in the sources, divulged slave trade secrets to John O’Sullivan, the American 
Minister to Portugal. This informant divided his time between New York and Lisbon and was 
familiar with the lusophone traffickers in Manhattan.6 The final group of records is slave trade 
reports from Spanish diplomats in Washington, D.C. and Havana.7     
 These sources indicate that the US had three major roles in the midcentury trade. Each will 
be addressed in a subsection of this chapter. The first was, as Marques suggests, shipping. In 
                                                
1963). For the very small illegal traffic to the American South (just two voyages after 1850), see Walter Johnson, 
River of Dark Dreams: Slavery, Capitalism, and Imperialism in the Mississippi Valley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 395-422; Sylviane A. Diouf, Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Slave Ship Clotilda and the 
Story of the Last Africans brought to America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Du Bois, Horne, and 
Obedele-Starks argue for extensive capital emanating from the US, but their supporting evidence is very limited. See 
Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 178-9; Gerald Horne, The Deepest South, 136-7; Obedele-
Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers, 168.  
4 These records are found in FO84/995, FO84/910, FO84/932, FO84/1235, ADM 123/184, and at The National 
Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter TNA); M43: Dispatches from US Ministers to Portugal, 1790-1906, Roll 16, Jan 31, 
1856-July 28, 1856, State Department Records, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. 
(hereafter M43, SDR, NARA); New York Times, June 25, 1856.  
5 For the Sanchez correspondence see FO84/1086, FO84/1111, FO84/1138, TNA. He work is analyzed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
6 For the Lisbon spy see M43, Roll 17, SDR, NARA. 
7 Especially, Legajo 451/7891, Embajada de España en Washington, Archivo general de la administración, Alcalá de 
Henares, Spain (hereafter AGA); Legajos 3549 & 4686, Ultramar, Archivo Histórico Nacional (hereafter AHN); 
FO84/1197, TNA. 
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contrast to his view, however, I contend that shipping was not merely the domain of lusophones 
in New York, but also of hispaniphones in several US ports, who held strong ties with Cuba. The 
second role was voyage financing. Slave trading merchants based in the US were major investors 
in slaving voyages. Typically, they co-financed voyages with their counterparts in Cuba and West 
Central Africa. By joining forces in this way, traffickers limited the substantial risks of illegal 
slaving and increased the chances of handsome returns for all parties. The third role was laundering 
capital bound up in slaving voyages. Like financing, this role was not limited to the US, but the 
booming port of New York City and its burgeoning financial services industry specialized in it. 
 There are several reasons why recovering this history is important. First is the intervention 
in slave trade historiography, which has tended to misunderstand and limit the role of the US in 
the traffic. Second, understanding this role expands conceptions of the republic’s engagement with 
slavery beyond its boundaries.8 Specifically, this chapter identifies how the US was intimately tied 
to African and Cuban slavery in the nineteenth century. It made an especially important 
contribution to the rapidly growing slave society of Cuba.9 Finally, because the nature of the trade 
forced US-based traffickers to work with allies in Africa and Cuba, a close study exposes vast 
proslavery networks that underpinned the slaving Atlantic. Ultimately, the shape and nature of 
these networks help explain the resiliency of the traffic in the face of stiff suppressionist pressure 
in the mid-nineteenth century.         
 Before attempting this exposé, it is important to define what I mean by the “US role” in the 
                                                
8 The historiography on slavery with US borders is exhaustive. Some useful recent contributions are Edward E 
Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and The Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 
2014); Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery, Capitalism, and Imperialism in the Mississippi Valley 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2013). 
9 For Cuba’s transition from a society with slaves to a slave society see Franklin Knight, Slave Society in Cuba 
during the Nineteenth Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970); Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El 
Ingenio: Complejo economico-social Cubano del azucar, vols. 1-3 (2nd edition, La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales, 1978). For the early stages of that transition and the influence of the Haiti Revolution, see Ada Ferrer, 
Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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slave trade. Voyages involving US citizens, US ships, or US ports are a few potential definitions, 
but as this chapter will show, they would be too narrow and would not produce a well-rounded 
history of US participation in the traffic. My definition is more expansive. It includes any place, 
person, or property that came under US jurisdiction on land or at sea. That includes: US ports, 
natives and foreign aliens living in those ports, and vessels and capital flowing through the US 
proper. Having established those broad parameters, the chapter now turns to the centrality of US 
shipping in the midcentury trade.  
 
US shipping and the slave trade after 1850 
In 1860, Gabriel García Tassara, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington D.C., compiled a report 
on US involvement in the slave trade. As Figure 2.1 shows, there had been a sharp uptick in 
smuggling to Cuban shores during the past decade. In fact, more captives had arrived on the island 
during the previous year than any other year in Cuban history. Aware that the US was playing 
some role in this growing traffic, Tassara’s bosses in Madrid had demanded a summary report 
from the front lines. Several months later, after soliciting his own reports from his vice consuls in 
US ports, Tassara offered his conclusions. In his view, the US role centered on shipping. His 
evidence clearly showed that American-built vessels were dominating the traffic. He also noted 
that the trade was being “done almost exclusively under the [US] flag.”10 Finally, he argued US 
ports had become major departure points for slavers. He identified one particular hotspot: “New 
York” he wrote, “is generally the port where the ships leave for the trade.”11 
 
                                                
10 See notebook in Legajo 451/7891, AGA.  
11 Ibid. In 1860, for instance, the London Times called New York the “greatest slave trading mart in the world.” 
Quoted in Gene Dattel, Cotton and Race in the Making of America (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009), 90.  
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One way to test Tassara’s conclusions is by measuring them against information stored in 
Voyages. The researchers behind Voyages have compiled data for approximately 36,000 slaving 
voyages during the trade’s three and a half century lifespan. For the period after 1836, when the 
slave trade was illegal throughout the Atlantic world, they lean heavily on diplomatic and naval 
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suppression records in state archives.12 Given that traffickers ran the trade underground, one might 
suspect that suppression records would be incomplete, leading Voyages to underestimate and 
misrepresent the trade. But the authors of Voyages are bullish on their data. They contend they 
have identified 97 percent of all voyages bound for Cuba and Puerto Rico after 1830.13 This 
coverage exceeds rates for most other, predominantly legal, branches of the slave trade.14 
Accepting their claims, it follows that around 359 voyages took place between 1851 and 1866.15 
 Voyages’ information on the post 1850 trade suggests that Tassara’s analysis was roughly 
accurate. His claim that American vessels were dominating the trade was certainly true. Voyages 
shows that between 1851 and 1866, 88 percent of all voyages took place aboard vessels constructed 
in US shipyards.16 As Table 2.1 shows, Baltimore was by far the most prolific builder of vessels 
that entered the slave trade. Yards from Maine down to New York lagged far behind, although 
collectively their production was about the same as Baltimore. Shipyards south of Maryland were 
not prolific builders of slavers. Despite their deep involvement in the domestic slave trade during 
this era, Richmond, Norfolk, and Mobile produced only a handful of vessels that ended up in the 
transatlantic trade.17  
 
 
                                                
12 Voyages draws on extensive Spanish, Cuban, British, and African sources for the post 1821 slave trade to the 
Spanish Americas. See David Eltis and David Richardson, “A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Slave Trade,” in 
Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, eds., Eltis and David Richardson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 36-7. 
13 Ibid, 37. 
14 Overall, the Voyages’ authors believe they have identified 93 percent of all slaving voyages in British vessels, 94 
percent for French and Spanish, and 80 percent for vessels under US colors or sailing from the American colonies 
before independence. Ibid, Tables 4 & 5, 32-3, 38. 
15 ‘Voyages,’ http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/pq1bj2I5. VOYAGES lists 348 non-Brazilian voyages. This figure is 
97 percent of a total of 359 voyages. 
16 ‘Voyages,’ http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/IxJ3Nb5r. 
17 For this trade see Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the Old South 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Calvin Schermerhorn, The business of slavery and the rise of 
American capitalism, 1815-1860 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015). 
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Table 2.1: Number of voyages in US-built vessels, 1851-1866 
Place of Construction Number of Vessels   Place of Construction 
Number of 
Vessels 
Baltimore, MD 95  Cherryfield, ME 3 
New York, NY 21  Damariscotta, ME 3 
Philadelphia, PA 12  Dorchester, MD 3 
Bristol, RI 9  Florida, Unspecified 3 
Brookhaven, NY 9  Freeport, ME 3 
Newbury, NH 9  Kennebunk, ME 3 
Prospect, ME 9  Massachusetts, Unspecified 3 
Robbinston, ME 9  Medford, MA 3 
Sheepscutt River, ME 9  Milwell, NJ 3 
USA unspecified 9  Mobile, AL 3 
Bath, ME 6  New Orleans, LA 3 
Cohasset, MA 6  Newcastle, DE 3 
Kingston, MA 6  Norfolk, VA 3 
Pembroke, ME 6  Plymouth, MA 3 
Providence, RI 6  Port Jefferson, NY 3 
Rockland, ME 6  Portsmouth, NH  3 
Thomaston, ME 6  Richmond, VA 3 
Waldoboro, ME 6  Saco, ME 3 
Amesbury, MA 3  Sag Harbor, NY 3 
Brewer, ME 3  Seaport, ME 3 
Calais, ME 3  South Carolina, Unspecified 3 
Camden, ME 3  Wells, ME 3 
              Total: 317  
Note: Voyages does not give complete information on all 359 voyages that took place between 1851 and 
1866. This table is based on a sample of 123 voyages for which place of construction is available from 
Voyages and American Lloyds’ Registry (1859). To arrive at my estimates, I have taken the raw number 
from these sources and factored it into the 88 percent of voyages that took place on US-built ships (315). 
The discrepancy between the table’s total (317) and 315, is due to rounding.  
 
Sources: http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/iGgUpubx; American Lloyds’ Registry of American and Foreign Shipping 
(New York, NY: E. & G.W. Blunt, 1859) 
 
  
Tassara’s second claim was that the trade was carried out almost entirely under the 
American flag. Voyages suggests that although this was not quite true, the US flag was clearly 
dominant. Between 1851 and 1866, 70 percent of all voyages sailed under US colors. The Spanish 
flag accounted for eighteen percent; the Brazilian four percent; and the French and a few other 
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flags, a few percent each.18 Tassara’s statement is more accurate if we consider the moment in 
which he was writing. As Table 2.2 indicates, the use of the American flag increased dramatically 
in the early to mid-1850s. In 1860, when Tassara reported his findings, 83 percent of all illegal 
slave ships were flying under US colors.19 The use of the American flag would only drop after the 
Lyon-Seward Treaty in 1862, which permitted Britain to capture US-flagged slavers. 
 
Table 2.2: Percentage of voyages sailing under the US flag, 1851-1866 







Note: Estimates are based on voyages for which flag designation is known (217 of all 359 voyages, 
1851-1866). Source: http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/Mg78FoNM  
 
  
Tassara was also correct in noting that US ports, especially New York City, were important 
departure ports for slavers. As Table 2.3 shows, slavers’ departure points were widely dispersed 
throughout the Atlantic basin, but most left from US and Cuban ports. Overall, Cuba accounted 
for 42 percent of all departures during this period, while the US accounted for 34 percent. Looking 
more granularly, we see that although ships departed from several ports in these jurisdictions, there 
were concentrations. In the US case, slavers embarked from ports throughout the eastern seaboard 
as well as in the Gulf of Mexico, but New York accounted for 78 of all 121 US departures (about 
2 in every 3). A similar pattern is discernable in Cuba. Slavers departed from all over the island’s 
                                                
18 Mexico, Argentina, France, Norway, Norway, and Sardinia. VOYAGES: 
http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/Mg78FoNM (consulted June 16, 2016) 
19 Voyages: http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/1rfhkYq4 consulted June 16, 2016) 
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long northern and southern coasts, but Havana was clearly dominant. The Cuban capital was the 
single most important point of departure during this era.   
 
Table 2.3: Number of voyage departures by port, 1851-1866 
Port No. of departures  Port Number of departures  
Havana 96 Bahia 8 
New York 78 Lisbon  7 
New Orleans 26 Charleston 5 
Rio de Janeiro 26 New Bedford 4 
Cuba, port unspecified 21 Boston 3 
Cadiz, Spain  18 Baltimore 3 
Matanzas, Cuba 14 Mobile 1 
Cardenas, Cuba 14 Savannah 1 
Barcelona, Spain 8   
 
Note on calculating estimates: Voyages offers the departure port for 278 voyages. The Voyages figure for 
each port is divided by 278 and multiplied by 359 (the approximate number of voyages that took place 
1851-1866) to arrive at the estimate for each port. Non-US ports that sent fewer than 5 vessels into the trade 
have not been included in this table. Departures from these ports, along with rounding, accounts for the 




The immigrant merchants from the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Atlantic basin were 
largely responsible for harnessing US shipping to the slave trade. The ‘Portuguese,’ who had long 
experience in the traffic, had come to New York with this aim in mind. From their new base in the 
shipping district of Lower Manhattan, shown in Figure 2.2, they purchased vessels and organized 
voyages. They did much of this work in association with their partners in West Central Africa. In 
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1855, for example, Guilherme José da Silva Correia, a Brazilian trafficker on Congo River wrote 
to the Portuguese, João José Vianna, in New York, instructing him to “purchase a patacho or pilot-
boat to carry 400 packages [captives].” Correia went on to remind Vianna about the essential 
details. The ship “must be a fast vessel,” he wrote, and “come under the American flag.”20 Correia 
also suggested Vianna consider purchasing the vessel in Baltimore, where he believed it could be 
found more cheaply than New York. The ‘Spanish’ merchants, including Antonio Mora, who were 
deeply involved in the sugar trade with Cuba and had not come to the US to secure vessels for the 
trade, purchased few vessels at the beginning of the decade, but would become major players in 
the trade later in the 1850s. 
Figure 2.2. New York City’s Illegal Slaving District, 1850-1863. From John Bachman’s Birds 
Eye View of New York and Environs, c.1865 
 
 
                                                
20 Guilherme Jose da Silva Correa to João José Vianna, Apr. 21, 1855, enc. in John Morgan to Lord Clarendon, 13 
June 1856 in Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons vol. 44 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1857), 132. Many 
of the fast slave ships used in midcentury illegal slave trade are found in William Crothers’ book on US shipping: 
The American-built clipper ship, 1850-1856 (Camden, ME: Intl Marine Pub Co., 1996). See also Marques, “US 
Shipbuilding,” 201.  
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These merchants were stealthy in their acquisition of the American vessels and the US flag. 
Their main problem was that very few were naturalized US citizens and so their vessels were not 
entitled to fly US colors. To overcome this difficulty, they paid American merchants, shipbrokers, 
and ship captains to purchase vessels on their behalf, just as slave traders in Brazil, such as Manoel 
Fonseca, had done through merchant James Birckhead and captain Joshua Clapp during the 1840s. 
This strategy not only gave their vessels protection from British interference at sea, it also kept 
their names off the bill of sale and the ship’s registry. In large ports, such as New York, which 
contained hundreds of merchants, shipbrokers, and captains, handling the port’s massive trade, 
straw buyers were not hard to find. In 1854, one of the Portuguese in New York, who went by the 
name Vilela, was paying American citizens only $25 to register slavers under their names.21 
According to a first mate, Henry Wills, Vilela claimed “he could go to the US Hotel [in Manhattan] 
and any captain there with whom he was acquainted would do it for him with pleasure.” By the 
late 1850s, some intermediaries were making numerous straw purchases for their slave trading 
friends in New York. Ship captain Jonathon Dobson, for instance, purchased the Panchita and Isla 
de Cuba, for the notorious Portuguese trafficker Cunha Reis in 1858. The following year, a New 
York merchant, Harrison S. Vining, purchased the Orion for another Portuguese, Joaquim 
Miranda.22 By the early 1860s, these maneuvers were becoming notorious, prompting the former 
US African Squadron officer, Robert Schudfelt, to claim that false ownership of US vessels was 
giving “immunity … to the combined rascality of Christendom.”23     
 Traffickers in New York and other US ports were also adept at outwitting local authorities. 
                                                
21 NYT, Dec. 2, 1854 
22 Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Apr. 5, 1859, & Archibald to Malmesbury, July 25, 
1859, FO84/1086, TNA. Looking back on the activities of these individuals in 1863, Consul Archibald ruefully 
acknowledged to his superiors in London, “in the purchase of suitable vessels, the [slave traders] had here a wide 
field.” Archibald to Foreign Office, Dec. 31, 1863, FO84/1197, TNA. 
23 Robert Schufeldt to Truman Smith in Frederick C. Drake, “Secret History of the Slave Trade to Cuba Written By 
an American Naval Officer, Robert Wilson Schufeldt, 1861,” The Journal of Negro History 55 (1970): 229.  
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The federal government tasked federal marshals and the custom houses attached to each port with 
eradicating the slave trade from their jurisdictions. Traffickers’ practice of recruiting 
intermediaries from maritime professions to purchase slavers made their job more difficult. Since 
merchants and ship captains commonly bought and sold vessels, it was not particularly obvious 
when a vessel was being transferred into the slave trade. When it was time to clear the vessel from 
port, traffickers simply had these same individuals fill out the necessary paperwork at the custom 
house in their stead. Slave traders were also careful in selecting their clearance destinations. 
Knowing New York had a small legal trade with several points on the African coast, they often 
had their intermediaries openly make clearances for African ports.24 On other occasions, they had 
them give false destinations, throwing custom house clerks off the scent.25   
 While some officials were outfoxed by slave traders, others were corrupt. The American 
spy in Lisbon noted, “[b]ribery is largely employed and is relied upon as a sure and successful 
mode of getting the vessels off [from US ports].”26 He pointed to the example of the slaver Altivie, 
which departed New York in 1856.27 Apparently, “an officer jumped aboard” the vessel just as it 
was about to depart down the East River. Instead of arraigning the ship and arresting its crew, 
however, the marshal went below deck. There, “wine [was] produced, [and] five hundred dollars 
laid on the table in gold.” Faced with lining his pockets or being carried away, the marshal 
allegedly “took the money.” The case of the slaver Storm King proved these tales were not mere 
slander. In 1860, US Commissioner Joseph Bridgham fired New York marshals Theodore Rynders 
                                                
24 The slaver Cora, for instance, cleared and sailed for Luanda, Angola in 1860. Sanchez to Archibald, enc. in 
Archibald to Foreign Office, July 6, 1860, FO84/1111, TNA. VOYAGES #4655. For more on the cover of the 
Africa trade, see Archibald to Foreign Office, Dec 31, 1863, FO84/1197, TNA. 
25 The Isla de Cuba, for instance, cleared New York for the Azores, but instead went to the African coast. Sanchez 
to Archibald enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Mar. 29, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. VOYAGES does not 
attribute an 1859 voyage to this vessel, though it may accounted for in one of the many voyages for which 
VOYAGES it does not offer a name. 
26 John O’Sullivan to William Marcy, 24 August 1856 and 28 March 1857, SDR, NARA.  
27 Voyages #42930. 
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and Henry Munn after learning they had boarded the suspicious Storm King, only to retire and let 
it slip out to sea. Bridgham made his decision having learned that the pair had received assurances 
from the men onboard that they would receive $1,500 in the City the following day.28  
 When slave ships got out of US ports, they started on one of the two main routes shown in 
Figure 2.3. The first route began in a general easterly direction, following the North Atlantic’s 
clockwise winds and currents. It then dropped down to the African coast using the Canaries and 
Guinea Currents. Some vessels following this path sailed directly to Africa from US ports.29 The 
Mary E. Smith, for example, journeyed straight from Boston to the Congo River where it received 
520 captives.30 Others stopped in the Iberian Peninsula, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, or 
São Tomé, for extra men, supplies, or repairs, or for information on shipments of captives and the 
locations of cruisers. The New York ship Haidee, for instance, visited Cadiz to repair a yard-arm 
before continuing its journey to the Loango Coast in 1858.31 The brig North Hand, by contrast, 
left New York, paused at the Cape Verde Islands, and sailed onward to Snake’s Head, near the 
Congo River.32 Depending on the stops, these outbound voyages took from three weeks to three 
months.  
Lusophone traffickers in New York dispatched almost every vessel following this route. 
They were able to dominate this path thanks to their strong ties with Portugal, and especially, the 
main slave embarkation zone, West Central Africa. José Lucas Henriques da Costa, for example, 
had lived in southern Angola before his departure for the U.S and kept up a correspondence with 
                                                
28 NYT, May 7, 1860. Sanchez also noted “US officials connived at” the slave trade. Sanchez to Archibald, enc. in 
Archibald to Foreign Office, Dec. 24, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. Archibald came to the same conclusion, see 
Archibald to Foreign Office, Dec. 31, 1863, FO84/1197, TNA. 
29 NYT, June 28, 1856. 
30 W. Stafford Jerningham to Lord Clarendon, June 13, 1856 & John Morgan to Clarendon, Aug. 11, 1856, 
FO84/995, TNA. 
31 Sanchez to Archibald, enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA 
32 NYT, Sept. 13, 1857. 
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his associates in Africa after his arrival in New York. In May 1856, he wrote to Bento Pacheco 
dos Santos, a slaver trader at Novo Redondo, about the voyage of the American slaver the Pierre 
Soulé.33 The previous year, Vianna had drawn on similar ties with Correia to arrange the purchase 
of “fast” American vessel for the Congo River. Through these connections, lusophone traffickers 
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean were able to organize voyages together. 
 
Figure 2.3. Routes Taken by Slavers Departing US Ports, 1851-1863  
 
                                                
33 Lucas to Bento Pacheco dos Santos, May 20, 1856 enc. in O’Sullivan to State Department, 28 July 1856 and 28 
March 1857, SDR, NARA. 
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 The second route taken by slavers departing US ports began not with a big swing to the 
east, but with a short run south to Cuba. Most vessels following this path went to Havana. One of 
these vessels was the brig Echo, which arrived in Havana from New Orleans in 1858.34 Other 
vessels arrived in Matanzas, Cardenas, and other minor ports on Cuba’s long coasts. The Antelope, 
for instance, cleared New York for San Juan de los Remedios, in north-central Cuba, in 1859.35 
Depending on the ports involved, the journey to Cuba could take five days or up to two weeks. 
When they arrived, these vessels were manned and fitted out for their transatlantic voyages. Then, 
they were dispatched to Africa, following a southeasterly path to their destination (see Figure 
2.3).36 This route was described by Assistant Treasurer of the US, John J. Cisco, to the Secretary 
of the Interior, Caleb Smith, in June, 1861. “It is a well known fact,” Cisco wrote, “that many 
vessels are first sent [to Cuba] from our northern cities; and then transferred to other parties, and 
dispatched to the coast; the preliminary arrangements being made here.”37    
 Spanish-speaking merchants in US ports dominated this route. The key was their 
commercial and familial ties with Cuba. According to Cisco, among the merchant houses engaged 
in the trade in Cuba, “many of them have branches and others, correspondents here.”38 The two 
Mora brothers, Antonio and José, are one example of these connections. By the late 1850s, Antonio 
was running the Cuban end of their sugar business in Havana, while José looked after their affairs 
in New York. In 1859 they arranged the delivery of three vessels, the Panfilia, the JJ Cobb, and 
                                                
34 Archibald to Russell, Oct. 10, 1859, FO84/1086. 
35 Ibid. 
36 In 1858, English-born sailor William Petterson described boarding the slaver Rufus Soule at Matanzas, Cuba and 
“beating down” the African coast to the Congo. Testimony enc. in Totten to Conover, Dec. 10, 1858, FO84/1085. 
37 John J. Cisco to Caleb Smith, June 5, 1861, Misc. Letters Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Dec. 30, 
1858-Feb 3, 1871, Records Of The Office Of The Secretary Of The Interior Relating to the Suppression Of The 
African Slave Trade And Negro Colonization, 1854-72, Publication M-160, NARA. 
38 John J. Cisco to Caleb Smith, June 5, 1861, Misc. Letters Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Dec. 30, 
1858-Feb 3, 1871, Records Of The Office Of The Secretary Of The Interior Relating to the Suppression Of The 
African Slave Trade And Negro Colonization, 1854-72, Publication M-160, NARA. 
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the City of Norfolk, to the notorious slave-trading firm Ximenes, Martínez, and Lafitte in Havana.39 
Another prominent dealer in slavers in New York, Albert Horn, had been born in Cuba, where his 
brother, William, retained residency.40 In other cases, perhaps where the Cuba-US bond was not 
quite so strong, Cuban slave traders travelled to American ports to ascertain vessels’ suitability for 
the slave trade. Again, commercial ties were important. In 1859, the British spy in New York, 
Emilio Sanchez reported that “parties from Havana” had arrived to inspect the Antelope.41 After 
approving the vessel, they called upon Antonio Ros to facilitate the purchase. According to 
Sanchez, Ros was a “late a clerk with J[uan] M. Ceballos[,] one of the largest regents of Cuban 
[merchant] houses.”42          
 By the late 1850s, the lusophones and hispaniphones in US ports no longer controlled their 
respective routes so completely. The lusophones in New York had gradually broken into the 
business of supplying slavers to the island. In 1861, Robert Schudfeldt noted that the Azorean, 
João Alberto Machado, was helping to send slavers to Havana from his office at 75 Beaver Street 
in Manhattan.43 In 1859, Sanchez reported that the Portuguese, Antonio Augusto Botelho, was 
making frequent trips to Havana, and that some of the voyages leaving New York were now doing 
so partly at the behest of Cuban traffickers.44 In Baltimore, another Portuguese, Issac Oliver, whom 
                                                
39 Mora and Navarro had the same captain - John Peterson - deliver the Panfilia and JJ Cobb to Havana. For more 
on these vessels see, House Executive Documents, 36th Congress (Washington D.C., 1861), 373-4 (hereafter HED). 
Antelope (#4389), JJ Cobb (#4304), Panfilia (#4809).  
40 Albert Horn.doc 
41 Sanchez to Archibald enclosed in Mar. 8, 1859 Archibald to Malmesbury, FO84/1086, TNA. 
42 Ros also played this role for the same visiting slave traders in the purchase of the Orion (#4807), the Emily 
(#4908) and the Josephine (unidentified in VOYAGES). For these cases, see Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Archibald 
to Malmesbury, Mar. 8, 1859 & Dec 24, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. Sanchez actually discussed these dealings with 
Ros, who was apparently unaware that Sanchez was a spy. Archibald to FO, July 6, 1860, FO84/1111, TNA. 
Spanish-speaking merchants in other US ports were doing work similar to Ros on behalf of Cuban traffickers. On 
Prats and Pujols, see Archibald to FO, Dec. 21, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. For Poujand and Salas see Consul Bunch to 
Russell, July 28, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. See also Sanchez to Archibald in Archibald to FO, Jan. 20, 1860, 
FO84/1111, TNA. 
43 Robert Schufeldt to Truman Smith in Frederick C. Drake, “Secret History of the Slave Trade to Cuba Written By 
an American Naval Officer, Robert Wilson Schufeldt, 1861,” The Journal of Negro History 55 (1970): 221. 
44 Sanchez to Archbald, enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Mar. 8 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. 
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Solomon Beale, an American spy for the Department of the Interior, described as “smartly dressed, 
like lawyer or clergyman” and having a “reputation of being very sharp, shrewd, and keen[,]” 
bought vessels for slave traders in Matanzas.45 These new ties did not displace the Cuban-US 
Hispanic connection, but their emergence implies a merging of Cuban and New York lusophone 
interests as the trade wore on, a topic that will be explored more fully in the following section on 
voyage financing.  
 
Financing the Midcentury Slave Trade 
Investing in illegal slaving voyages was potentially lucrative, but it was also risky. On the one 
hand, rising world sugar prices boosted slave prices in Cuba and created unprecedented profit rates 
for investors.46 For the period between 1856 and 1867, David Eltis estimates average profit rates 
of 91 percent, far beyond the 10 percent common in the eighteenth-century trade.47 On the other 
hand, investors faced high risks. In addition to the traditional risks from shipboard revolt, 
shipwreck, and rampant disease, illegal voyages were in danger of capture by naval patrols. 
Interception was a serious concern. After 1850, international patrols in African and Cuban waters 
captured around 40 per cent of all transatlantic slavers.48 Voyages that beat those odds faced further 
risks and costs once they reached their destination. Many Cuban officials demanded large bribes 
in exchange for safe disembarkations, and a few colonial administrations, such as that of Captain 
General Juan de la Pezuela (1853–54), were quite effective at ‘confiscating’ newly arrived 
                                                
45 Solomon Beale to Caleb B Smith, Nov. 7, 28, Dec. 11, 1862, Misc. Letters Relating to the Suppression of the 
Slave Trade, Dec. 30, 1858-Feb 3, 1871, Records Of The Office Of The Secretary Of The Interior Relating to the 
Suppression Of The African Slave Trade And Negro Colonization, 1854-72, Publication M-160, NARA. 
46 For Cuban prices, see Laird W. Bergad, Fe Iglesias García, and María del Carmen Barcia, The Cuban slave 
market: 1790–1880 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 47–52. For slave prices on African coasts, see 
Eltis, Economic Growth, 264, tables C.3 and C.4. 
47 Eltis, Economic Growth, 161, table 10, and 269–82. 
48 Ibid., 97–101. 
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captives.49            
 The Lusophones in New York were willing to finance voyages despite these risks.50 
Although they had come to the US in part to exploit its shipping markets, their larger goal was to 
invest in voyages and make handsome returns. Their basic strategy was to purchase vessels in US 
ports and dispatch them to their correspondents in West Central Africa. Their allies would then 
force the captives aboard and send the slaver on to Cuba. The key merit of this plan was that it 
combined strengths: the New Yorkers’ access to fast, US-flagged ships, and the West Central 
Africans’ expertize in supplying captives for incoming slavers.51      
 The major problem was insecurity on the Cuban end. In general, the Lusophones in New 
York had only weak ties with the island’s planters, merchants, and officials, who controlled the 
slave disembarkation zones. The tenuousness of their position had been demonstrated in the early 
1850s, when several of the New Yorkers had attempted to establish themselves in Cuba, but were 
thrown out by Pezuela’s administration. The problem would persist. In 1855, Pezuela’s successor, 
José Concha, who was more friendly to the traffic, nonetheless issued further expulsion orders to 
his district governors and chiefs of police.52 Although Cunha Reis did move to the island in 1858, 
                                                
49 For bribes, see Francisco Serrano to Ministro de la Guerra y Ultramar, 6 September 1861, Legajo 3549/3, Archivo 
Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Ultramar, AHN. On Pezuela’s unusually robust administration, see María de los 
Ángeles Meriño Fuentes and Aisnara Perera Díaz, Contrabando de bozales en Cuba: perseguir el tráfico y mantener 
la esclavitud, 1845–1866 (Mayabeque, Cuba: Ediciones Montecallado, 2015), 104–10; Arthur Corwin, Spain and 
the Abolition of Slavery, 1817-1886 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967), 114-23. 
50 Historians have identified pieces of the post-1850 slave trade financing puzzle, but none have put them together to 
show the overall picture. Relying mostly on British suppression sources, David Eltis’ classic 1987 work identified 
Cuba as ‘the source of capital.’ During research for his PhD thesis and subsequent 2012 book, Roquinaldo Ferreira 
found that traffickers in West Central Africa and New York invested in the trade. In his 2013 dissertation Leonardo 
Marques added a little more detail to financing in New York. Also in 2013, Martín Rodrigo discovered traces of 
Spanish capital, especially from Catalonia, in the trade. See Eltis, Economic Growth, 164-204 (quote 158); Marques, 
The United States, 203-5; Roquinaldo Ferreira, Dos Sertões ao Atlântico, 137-184; Rodrigo, ‘Spanish Merchants 
and the Slave Trade: From Legality to Illegality, 1814-1870’, in Josep M. Fradera and Christopher Schmidt Nowara, 
eds., Slavery and Antislavery in Spain’s Atlantic Empire (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 176-199. 
51 The Portuguese in New York also had links with Portuguese traffickers in the Bight of Benin, though these 
connections were not as strong and Benin was a much smaller source of captives. Robin Law, Ouidah, 235-6. 
52 For Matanzas Governor’s subsequent directive to expel the Portuguese and Brazilians, see records from Archivo 
Histórico Provincial de Matanzas, digitized by Endangered Archives Program, 060/1/1/97. Available at 
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even purchasing land and slaves, few others were able to follow in his footsteps.53 In the early 
1860s, a few Portuguese and Brazilian traffickers would again attempt to establish themselves in 
Cuba, but were promptly expelled.54        
 The second major group of investors had few such problems in Cuba.  They were long-
term residents of the island and exercised impressive local power. Many were wealthy planters and 
merchants who had profited from Cuba’s nineteenth-century sugar boom and the illegal slave trade 
before 1850. One important asset was their large estates, which they used to temporarily house 
newly arrived captives and to conduct illicit slave sales.55 Another was their influence over the 
island’s officials through the distribution of bribes. These payments had been a feature of the 
Cuban slave trade for decades, but by the 1850s, traffickers and officials had developed well-honed 
systems in many parts of the island. In the western jurisdiction of Pinar del Río, for example, 
investors and lieutenant governors established a formula that determined the size of bribes based 
on the number of incoming captives.56 At a more distant remove, but no less importantly, Cuban 
slave traders also maintained strong business and political ties with Spain, offering them logistical 
and financial support for slaving operations, as well as a degree of protection from Cuban officials 
who were genuinely committed to suppression.57      
 The island’s most powerful slave trader, Julián Zulueta y Amondo, enjoyed all these 
advantages. Born into a wealthy mercantile family in Álava, in Spain’s Basque region in 1814, he 
emigrated to Cuba in 1832. A few years later, he bought his first plantation in the key sugar-
                                                
http://eap.bl.uk/database/overview_item.a4d?catId=214;r=2082. For Brazilian slave traders in Cuba see Concha to 
Ministro, Aug. 12, 1855, Legajo 3549/4, Ultramar, AHN.  
53 ‘Expediente de solicitud de Manuel Basilio Reis’, June 19, 1861, Legajo 4676/64, Ultramar, AHN. See also 
Diario de la Marina, 3 May 1861. 
54 Domingo Dulce to Ministro de Ultramar, Aug. 30, 1863, Legajo 4686/52, caja 1, Ultramar, AHN. 
55 Francisco Serrano to Ministro de la Guerra y Ultramar, Sept. 6, 1861, Legajo 3549/3, Ultramar, AHN.  
56 Joseph Crawford to Lord Clarendon, June 10, 1853, FO 84/905, TNA. 
57 For examples of these connections, see Murray, Odious Commerce, 186–7; Rodrigo, Slavery and anti-slavery, 
176–99. 
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producing province of Matanzas. Zulueta subsequently made his base along the expanding sugar 
frontier in Colon. By the 1860s, he owned four large sugar estates, which boasted highly 
sophisticated mills, complete with triple-effect vacuum evaporators, centrifuges, and gas lighting. 
Over 2,000 slaves labored upon his lands, many of whom had arrived illegally from Africa. Such 
was Zulueta’s power that his henchmen openly marched one group of captives overland from the 
coast to one of his estates. His commercial connections and standing in Cuban society permitted 
such brazen disregard for the law. By the 1860s, he was married to the niece of a powerful Spanish-
born slave trader, Salvador Samá y Martí. Later in life, after the trade had ended, he was awarded 
the titles Marques of Alava, and Viscount of Casa-Blanca, by the Spanish crown.58  
 Although the island’s investors exerted considerable local influence and developed strong 
ties with ship-suppliers in US ports, they suffered from weak ties with traffickers in Africa. This 
problem was mainly a legacy of Spain’s limited interaction with the African coast during previous 
centuries. Unlike the Portuguese, the Spanish had never developed a strong foothold in the African 
regions that fed into the slave trade. Even as other powers stepped up their slaving in the eighteenth 
century, Spain depended on other nations to supply its imperium with captives.59 By the 1830s and 
1840s, when Cuba was a major destination for captives, only a few Havana traffickers such as 
Pedro Martínez ran slaving establishments on the African coast. By the 1850s, most Cuban 
traffickers were still relying on lusophone and African merchants to organize shipments on their 
                                                
58 These details are drawn from José Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestine de esclavos (Havana: Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales, 1980), 246–9; and Laird W. Bergad, Cuban rural society in the nineteenth century: the social and 
economic history of monoculture in Matanzas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 51, 126–30. See 
also, Marques, The United States, 191-3. For more on Basque slave trade in Cuba and their international networks, 
see Barcia Paz, Manuel. “‘Fully Capable of Any Iniquity’: The Atlantic Human Trafficking Network of the 
Zangroniz Family,” The Americas, 73, 3 (2016), 303-24.  
59 Alex Borucki, David Eltis, and David Wheat, “Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,” The 
American Historical Review 120 (2015): 433-461. For Spanish reliance on the Portuguese on the African coast see 
William Gervase Clarence-Smith, “The Portuguese Contribution to the Cuban Slave and Coolie Trades in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Slavery and Abolition 5 (1984): 25-27. 
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behalf.60          
 Financial records captured by British, Portuguese, and US suppression campaigns show 
how the lusophone traffickers in New York and their counterparts in Cuba manipulated the trade’s 
investment structure to overcome their strategic disadvantages. These sources reveal financial data 
for fifteen of the approximately 359 voyages that sailed the Atlantic Ocean after 1850. This is 
clearly a small sample, but it is broadly representative of the traffic. Almost every vessel, for 
instance, embarked from US or Cuban ports, the major departure regions for the vast majority of 
post-1850 voyages. Equally, all but one slaver received captives, or intended to receive them, in 
West Central Africa, which is generally reflective of the region’s share of embarkations after 
1850.61 Furthermore, all but one of the voyages was destined for Cuba, reflecting the island’s 
dominance as a disembarkation zone. Finally, the fifteen voyages are spread widely and evenly 
across the post-1850 trade, meaning that there are at least a handful of cases to analyze from every 
half decade up to 1866 (see Table 2.4 in the appendix for more information on these voyages). 
 In thirteen of the fifteen voyages, speculators used an investment model that Emilio 
Sanchez and the American informant in Lisbon described as “freighting.”62 Under this system 
there were two ways to invest. The first was to buy shares in what traffickers called the “ship.” 
These shares funded the operating costs of the voyage such as the purchase of the vessel, repairs, 
crew wages, and provisions. The second method was investment in the “cargo.” The role of 
“cargo” investors was to purchase captives and force them aboard the slaver. After the vessel 
departed the African coast, it would carry, or “freight,” the captives to Cuba, with the “cargo” 
                                                
60 Eltis, Economic Growth, 153-4, 181. 
61 Seventy five percent or 157,000 of all 226,000 embarkations, VOYAGES: 
http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/jJtXLuGJ 
62 Sanchez memo in Archibald to Malmesbury, May 3, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA; John O’Sullivan to William L. 
Marcy, 24 August 1856, SDR, NARA. The Clotilda, which appears to have operated along the lines of the 
Restaurador, did not ‘freight’ slaves. See Table 2.4 in appendix. 
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owners continuing to own them until their arrival in the Caribbean. When the voyage had been 
completed, a consignee would receive all the captives and pay the voyage manager for the delivery, 
after deducting bribes and consignee fees. As the consignee proceeded to sell the captives to Cuban 
planters, the manager would split the profits from the voyage, allocating one half to investors in 
the “ship” and the other half to investors in the “cargo.” One variant of this model was for “cargo” 
owners to send their own captives to particular consignees in Cuba. In these instances, the various 
consignees acted for the “cargo” investors, selling the captives on their behalf, and paying fees to 
the “ship” investors who had funded the transatlantic crossing.63 In both cases, therefore, there 
were investments in the “ship” and the “cargo.” In other words, “freighting” was the norm. 
 The “freighting” model was not new to this era of the slave trade, but was ideally suited to 
it. Unlike much of the British and French trades, especially from the mid-eighteenth century 
onwards, Portuguese, Brazilian, and Spanish traffickers had “freighted” captives extensively 
during the legal era.64 Whereas the British and French funded voyages purely in the metropole and 
bartered for captives on the African coast, the “freighting” model invited traffickers in Africa to 
purchase captives for the voyage themselves. The main advantage of extending “cargo” investment 
in this way was that it translated into good organization on the African side of the trade. This 
feature of “freighting” was particularly important with anti-slavery vessels patrolling the coast. 
Because African traffickers’ capital was also at stake, they were inclined to dispatch vessels as 
quickly and securely as possible. The bartering alternative, by contrast, was slower and riskier. 
Traffickers occasionally used additional risk-limiting tactics such as splitting investments over 
                                                
63 See the case of the unnamed vessel from 1854, Table 2.4 in appendix. 
64 Joseph Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830, (Madison WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 314-378. For the British trade see Kenneth Morgan, “Remittance Procedures 
in the Eighteenth-Century British Slave Trade,” The Business History Review 79 (2005): 715-749. For the French 
trade see Robert Louis Stein, The French Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century: An Old Regime Business 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 51-94. 
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several voyages and widening investment to include small shareholders, but it seems that the key 
link during this period was between American-based and African-based traders.65    
 The case of the Restaurador indicates the importance of tying African suppliers to the 
outcome of a slaving venture. This vessel journeyed from Cuba to the New Calabar River on the 
Bight of Biafra in early 1853. Upon his arrival, the Spanish captain, Juan Coll, declared that he 
would offer no freight, but would exchange his cargo of aguardiente (sugarcane brandy) and 
Mexican gold for captives. Initially, Coll’s plan seemed to be working. He struck deals with several 
African merchants, handing over the goods and specie in return for promises that the captives 
would be delivered after twenty days. But these arrangements, which left the merchants with the 
booty in-hand and no stake in the voyage, quickly unraveled. Just a few days later, one of the 
merchants, Ammacree of New Calabar, informed local white merchants about the slaver in the 
River. Soon, the news reached the British man-of-war HMS Ferret, which was cruising off the 
coast. Two weeks into Coll’s wait for the slaves, the Ferret pounced, capturing him and the 
Restaurador. The voyage had failed completely.66        
 Debacles of this kind encouraged investors in the shipping centers of Cuba and New York 
to draw on African support via the freighting model. In some cases, Cuban “ship” investors joined 
forces with “cargo” investors in the Bight of Benin. In these instances, vessels typically arrived at 
Ouidah or Porto Novo, where Brazilians and African traffickers put their captives aboard.67 In 
other cases, Spanish-registered vessels sailed for West Central Africa. One such slaver, Dolores, 
brought 595 captives to Cuba in 1855. The “cargo” of this vessel was owned almost completely 
                                                
65 According to David Eltis, another common method of decreasing risk in the Cuba traffic was to spread ship 
investment over several voyages through large joint stock companies. Eltis, Economic Growth, 152-3. 
66 John Beecroft to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1854, FO84/950, TNA. 
67 For Domingo Mustich, a rare Spanish resident of the African coast who helped with some of these shipments and 
was himself a supplier of captives, see ibid, Benjamin Campbell to Lord Clarendon, Aug. 12, 1854, FO84/950, 
TNA, and Law, Ouidah, 222.  
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by lusophone residents of Ambriz and the colonial capital, Luanda.68 In each of these ventures, the 
Africa-based investors made sure to dispatch the slavers swiftly, while “ship” investors in Cuba 
wielded their local power to ensure the safe disembarkation and sale of captives.   
 The New York lusophones also used the freighting model. In most cases, they drew heavily 
on their strong ties with West Central Africa. The voyages of the Braman (1855), the Pierre Soulé 
(1856) and the Mary E. Smith (1856) all featured investment from both regions.69 In each of these 
examples, a handful of investors, sometimes as few as three, bought up “ship” shares and 
dispatched the vessel from the US. When the vessels reached West Central Africa, “cargo” 
investors or their managers were waiting to put the captives aboard. Similar to the Cuba-Africa 
voyages, local accomplices watched the coast for cruisers, allowing all three ships to escape out 
into the Atlantic Ocean with hundreds of captives crammed beneath their decks. 
 Despite its benefits on the African side, freighting did not erase the lusophones’ insecurity 
in Cuba. The case of the Pierre Soulé highlights their vulnerability. In this instance, several of the 
New Yorkers combined with thirty-five “cargo” investors in southern Angola to bring 467 captives 
to Cardenas (see Table 2.6 in appendix). When José Lucas Henriques da Costa, the voyage 
manager, arrived on the island, he applied for the delivery fee, but to his dismay, the Cubans paid 
far below market rates. With no recourse to the law or to powerful intermediaries on the island, he 
had to accept $85,000 for the captives. This sum, he wrote to one of the investors in Angola, caused 
“the whole business [to] suffer a loss of $48,000.”70      
 Although defrauding the lusophones was satisfying for Cuban slave dealers, such chicanery 
was ultimately counterproductive for Cuban traffickers and for the island’s sugar economy. As the 
                                                
68 TNA, FO84/995, W. Stafford Jerningham to Lord Clarendon, 8 March 1856.  
69 Sources for these voyages are listed in Table 2.4 in appendix. 
70 Lucas da Costa to João Soares, May 20, 1856, enc. in John O’Sullivan to Lewis Cass, Mar. 28, 1857, SDR, 
NARA. 
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case of the Dolores had shown, Cuban investors needed lusophone support in West Central Africa 
because a large portion of their trade was centered there. Cheating on the Cuban side would only 
harm their business prospects. Moreover, the island’s planters relied on lusophone voyages such 
as the Pierre Soulé’s to meet their growing demand for captives, especially as sugar prices soared 
in the late 1850s. Lacking both unfettered access to American ships and strong connections with 
Africa, Cuban traffickers could not satisfy that demand without outside help. The lusophones may 
even have underlined their importance to the island’s sugar economy by briefly retreating from the 
Cuba trade after the Pierre Soulé affair. In the same year, New York and West Central African 
investors made one final, futile attempt to revive the traffic to Brazil.71    
 In the late 1850s, historically high slave prices in Cuba and the promise of record returns 
on investment fostered a new spirit of cooperation among speculators in New York, Cuba, and 
West Central Africa. Other combinations may have persisted, but strikingly, all three 1858 and 
1859 voyages in the fifteen-voyage sample were funded by investors in all three regions. These 
voyages were made by the Haidee, Tacony, and William H. Stewart. Emilio Sanchez described 
investments in the first of these voyages, the Haidee, which had set sail from New York in 1858.72 
According to Sanchez, there had been six shareholders in the “ship.” Four were Portuguese slave 
traders in New York City and two were among Cuba’s wealthiest planter-merchants. One of the 
Cubans was Zulueta. On the “cargo” side of the operation, he noted some captives belonged to 
New York traffickers who maintained slave depots around the Congo River, while West Central 
African traffickers had sent the others “on freight.” In other words, the voyage enjoyed investment, 
and logistical support, on every leg of the voyage. Underlining the effectiveness of triple-region 
                                                
71 For the voyage of the Mary E Smith, see Table 2.4 in appendix 
72 For breakdown see Table 2.5, p.86. For more detail see Sanchez to Archibald, enc. in Archibald to Lord 
Malmesbury, Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. 
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funding, Sanchez noted that the Haidee had brought 903 captives to Cuba and had been a complete 
success for all the investors.73        
 Although cooperation boosted all investors’ chances of success, these partners were not 
equals. The “freighting” system had always rewarded investors in the “ship” more generously than 
investors in the “cargo.” In the case of the Pierre Soulé, “cargo” investors received returns that 
were worth little more than the Angolan value of the captives, yet the “ship” investors made a 
profit of one hundred percent.74 “Cargo” investors’ dividends would have been much greater had 
the Cubans not taken advantage of Lucas, but the relative discrepancy between ship and cargo 
profits would have remained the same. There was logic in that discrepancy. “Ship” investors did 
much of legwork in New York and Cuba, and many took on the personal risks of serving aboard 
the slave ship in managerial roles. It therefore made sense that they would be generously rewarded. 
But when the Cuban speculators joined with the New Yorkers in triple-region voyages, they 
demanded the greatest spoils while taking the fewest personal risks. In the case of the Haidee, for 
instance, the Cubans bought up lucrative shares in the “ship” without ever setting foot on the 
vessel, never mind sailing to Africa. Another example of Cuban authority, these arrangements 
demonstrate that the power players in the illegal slave trade were those who controlled the 
disembarkation zone.          
 The world of slave trade investment was therefore cooperative, but hierarchical. Pressure 
from slave trade suppression and the relative weakness of individual groups of investors 
necessitated some degree of collaboration. By the late 1850s, high prices for slaves in Cuba 
                                                
73 Ibid. Zulueta was also deeply involved in the Chinese ‘coolie’ trade to Cuba from the late 1840s. For an overview 
of this trade and Zulueta’s involvement, see Evelyn Hu-DeHart, ‘La Trata Amarilla: The “Yellow Trade” and the 
Middle Passage, 1847-1884,’ in Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Marcus Rediker, Many Middle Passages: 
Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern Word (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 166-83. 
74 For source, see Table 2.4 in appendix. 
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encouraged speculators in all three zones to pool their strengths and resources. At the same time, 
some assets were clearly more valuable than others and a hierarchy of investment emerged. Cuban 
investors such as Zulueta were at the top. They took took the least risk, but stood to make the 
largest profits. Next were the lusophones in New York, such as Botelho, who typically engaged in 
the risky business of operating voyages, but also stood to gain handsomely from shares in the 
“ship.” At the bottom were speculators in Africa, who were generally relegated to “cargo” 
shareholding. They took little risk, but earned much smaller returns on their investments.  
 
Laundering and Circulating Slave Trade Capital  
The illegal slave trade’s disparate investment sources required speculators to discreetly move large 
amounts of capital over long distances. One major transfer was the pooling of funds to cover a 
voyage’s shipping expenses. These costs were substantial and heavily concentrated in the slaver’s 
point of departure. In most cases, it took around $30,000 to get a vessel out of port.75 One of the 
largest expenses was the purchase of an appropriate vessel (Emilio Sanchez noted that slavers 
typically cost about $10,000 in New York City).76 After further payments to intermediaries who 
purchased and registered the vessel, investors prepared it for an ostensibly legal voyage. That 
involved sourcing the crew and hiring carpenters, caulkers, and others to perform repairs. It also 
meant inconspicuously purchasing and loading all the stores and equipment necessary for a 
successful slaving voyage, such as casks for water, provisions, and weapons.77    
 According to the freighting model, it was the responsibility of “ship” investors to cover 
                                                
75 Estimate from De Bow’s Review, 23, 1857, 50 in Ferreira, Dos Sertões, 173.  
76 Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. 
77 Most vessels also carried water casks, provisions, cooking equipment, weapons, a well-appointed medicine chest, 
maps, charts, nautical instruments and even lumber, which the crew used to construct a slave deck when the vessel 
was out to sea. See John O’Sullivan to William Marcy, Aug. 24, 1856, SDR, NARA; ibid, 28 March 1857. 
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these expenses. Pooling “ship” capital in an outfitting port such as New York or Havana was 
sometimes straightforward because all the relevant investors resided there, but in many cases 
“ship” investors were located in two regions. Unless traffickers retained credit with their distant 
partners, they had to send investment capital on long-distance, border-crossing journeys before it 
could be put to use.78 Moving those funds was both technically challenging and risky. On the 
technical side, speculators had to ensure they issued funds in forms that were redeemable at their 
destination. Preferably, they would also be inexpensive to transport and retentive of their value 
during transit. The major hazard was that suppression authorities would seize investors’ capital as 
it passed through their jurisdictions. With thousands of dollars on the move, steering capital into 
position was therefore a potentially complicated and high-stakes endeavor.  
 Sanchez appreciated that mix more than most observers. In 1859, he wrote to his handler, 
the British consul, Edward Archibald, describing the “ship” investments in the voyage of the 
Haidee. The 325-ton vessel had departed New York the previous year, and eventually disembarked 
nine hundred West Central Africans at Cardenas.79 According to Sanchez, there had been six 
“ship” investors in the voyage. Two of the speculators were the Basque Julián Zulueta and a 
Galician José Plá. Like Zulueta, Plá had risen to become a major sugar planter, enslaver, and 
merchant in Cuba.80 The other four investors were New York Lusophones. Between them, the six 
investors sank $27,000 into the Haidee’s voyage. Individually, the sums ranged from Zulueta’s 
$8,000 stake to Antonio Augusto Botelho’s $2,500 (see Table 2.5). 
                                                
78 Some distant investors probably had accounts running with their associates in outfitting ports and did not need to 
send capital on these journeys. Enclosure in John Morgan to Lord Clarendon, Aug. 11, 1856, FO84/995 offers some 
clues about credit that investors in West Central Africa may have held in New York. 
79 See Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086 TNA. The Haidee was 
a fast clipper ship. Before entered the slave trade it had made trips to China and the Mediterrean carrying legal 
cargos. Glenn A. Knoblock, The American Clipper Ship, 1845-1920: A Comprehensive History, with a Listing of 
Builders and their Ships (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co, 2014), 237-8. 
80 On Plá, see Juan J, Burgoa Fernández, El Marqués de Amboage, Ramón Plá Y Monge, Un Ilustre Ferrolano 
(Ferrol: Vision Libros, 2011), 30-1.  
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Investment Level (US$) 
Julián Zulueta (Cuba) 8,000 
José Plá (Cuba) 4,000 
Lima Viana (New York) 5,000 
Joaquim Miranda (New York) 5,000 
Antonio Augusto Botelho (New York) 2,500 
I. Abranches & Almeida (New York) 2,500 
                                         Total: 27,000 
 
Sanchez’s letter detailed the international odyssey of the investors’ capital. It began when 
Botelho made a trip from New York to Cuba. During his brief visit (he had been expelled from the 
island in 1854), he collected a combined $12,000 from Zulueta and Plá. The merchant-planters 
issued the funds in two forms: a $5,000 bill of exchange, and the rest in Spanish gold doubloons. 
Sanchez did not say what Botelho did with the doubloons upon his return to New York, but he 
probably used them to help purchase the Haidee, which soon became the property of Inocêncio 
Abranches, another Portuguese investor in New York. He did note that Botelho presented the bill 
of exchange to Juan M. Ceballos, a merchant-banker of Cantabrian origin. According to Sanchez, 
Ceballos readily accepted the bill and used its value to buy 1,000 barrels of flour on Botelho’s 
behalf. The Portuguese then had the flour loaded onto the Haidee, which he cleared for Cadiz. 
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When they arrived in Spain, Botelho sold the flour, and had one of the Haidee’s yardarms repaired. 
Soon they set off again for the British Crown Colony of Gibraltar, where Botelho bought large 
amounts of rice and beans. After returning once more to Cadiz for bread, water, and further fittings, 
the Haidee finally set sail for the Loango Coast, at the very northern end of West Central Africa. 
Two months later, its crew were cramming 1,100 captives beneath its decks; two hundred captives 
would perish during the transatlantic crossing to Cuba.81     
 Through these twists and turns, the Haidee investors overcame the logistical and 
suppressionist challenges of the illegal slave trade, shifting capital from the Caribbean through 
North America and Europe to Africa with apparent ease. At the beginning of the affair, Zulueta 
and Plá had issued part of their investment in gold doubloons, a form of capital that was both 
readily available to wealthy merchants in Havana and welcomed by traders in New York.82 
Similarly, the bill of exchange was safe and convenient to transport, and, in the hands of Juan 
Ceballos, a leading merchant banker in New York, not at all suspicious. By turning the bill into 
flour in New York, Ceballos hid slave trade capital in about as dull a commodity as New York 
could muster. In Cadiz, Botelho seems to have turned the flour into an innocent repair job on his 
ship. He had exposed the voyage to suspicion and the investors’ capital to seizure when he bought 
large quantities of food, but his discretion (or possibly his bribes) was sufficient to get the Haidee 
out of Europe and on its way to Africa.83        
 The Haidee investors and their allies had planned every detail carefully, but they were also 
                                                
81 Archibald to Malmesbury, Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. For background and business of Juan Miguel 
Ceballos, see NYT, Feb. 23, 1886. For an example of drafts flowing from Cuba to Baltimore to purchase slavers, see 
Solomon Beale to Caleb B Smith, Nov. 7, 28, Dec. 11, 1862, Misc. Letters Relating to the Suppression of the Slave 
Trade, Dec. 30, 1858-Feb 3, 1871. 
82 For New York merchants’ willingness to accept gold, see O’Sullivan to Marcy, Aug. 24, 1856, STD, NARA. 
83 For a damning portrait of Spanish failure to suppress the trade in Cadiz, see Alexander Graham Dunlop to 
William H. Wylde, Sept. 20, 1864, WYL/27/38-40, Durham University Archives, Wylde Papers (henceforth DUA, 
WP). 
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exploiting the opportunities offered by structural changes in Atlantic world economy during the 
nineteenth century. The most significant of those changes, the liberalization of trade, had 
effectively opened up the laundering routes. Freer trade between Spanish jurisdictions and the US 
was especially germane. When Zulueta and Plá sent their bill and gold to Ceballos, they were 
relying on a relationship built upon the booming Havana-New York sugar trade. This traffic grew 
steadily since Spain had opened Cuba to foreign commerce in the late eighteenth century. By 1858, 
when the Haidee’s voyage took place, the US had surpassed the Iberian power to become Cuba’s 
largest trading partner.84 Several of the individuals who laundered the Haidee investments – 
Zulueta, Plá, and Ceballos – were among the biggest traders plying the Havana-New York nexus. 
In fact, according to Sanchez, Ceballos was “one of the largest agents of Cuban houses” in New 
York.85 Moreover, Sanchez described him as “an intimate friend” of Zulueta and Plá.86 With such 
credentials, Ceballos was an ideal slave trade accomplice.     
 The New York-Cadiz connection was another important axis in this affair. When the 
Haidee made its journey with the barrels of flour, it was plying a relatively new and growing 
commercial route. The disintegration of Spain’s Atlantic empire in the early nineteenth century 
had ended Cadiz’s “golden era,” but it had given rise to an expansion of the port’s trade with 
foreign nations.87 The US was one of its new trading partners. When the Haidee arrived in Cadiz 
in 1858, it joined a stream of vessels from every major port east of the Mississippi River.88 New 
York merchants, including Sanchez, sent goods to Cadiz and it is likely that during his long career 
as an overseas trader, Ceballos did likewise. As a merchant of Spanish origin, he certainly would 
                                                
84 For the rise of this trade see Louis Perez, Cuba and The United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy, (Athens GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2003), 1-28. 
85 See Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Edward Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Patrick O’Flanagan, Port Cities of Atlantic Iberia, c. 1500–1900 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 112-15. 
88 Robert Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 394-5, 399. 
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have known that Cadiz was a major gateway to the Iberian Peninsula and that Bothelo would find 
a good market for American flour there.89 As his work in New York demonstrates, he had no 
scruples about assisting traffickers in their sordid work.      
 These capital transfers took place at the early stages of a voyage, but the ones that probably 
interested speculators most took place at the end. These were the all-important remittances of 
dividends. As the case of the Pierre Soulé shows, investors, merchants, and bankers in the US, and 
their partners abroad, all had crucial roles to play.90 In this particular case, investors had run the 
voyage along traditional “freighting” lines. The “ship” shareholders appear to have been the 
lusophones in New York, since it was one of their number, José Lucas, who managed the voyage’s 
affairs in the Americas. On the “cargo” side of the speculation were thirty-five residents of 
southern Angola, where the slaver had departed the African coast late in 1855. This pattern meant 
that returns would have to be routed through between Cuba, the US, and Angola before everyone 
would receive their share.         
 Lucas initiated the laundering-circulating process in Havana shortly after the Pierre Soulé 
arrived with its captives at Cardenas. First, he contacted Justo Mazorra, a wealthy merchant in 
Havana, who eventually agreed to pay him $85,000 in drafts and specie.91 The records from this 
case do not explain precisely how Mazorra made the payment, but they do disclose that he called 
on two Havana merchant-bankers, Martín Riera and Nicolás Martínez Valdivieso, for their help 
with the transaction. Both Riera and Martínez were influential figures in Banco Español or Spanish 
Bank, which had been established under Royal Charter in Havana the previous year.92 Riera was 
                                                
89 For Sanchez’s Cadiz trade see NYT, Oct. 21, 1851. 
90 For this case, see John O’Sullivan to Lewis Cass, Mar. 28, 1857, SDR, NARA. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Directorio de artes, comercio e industrias de la Habana, 1859 (Habana: Litografia de T. Cuesta, 1859, tercera 
parte), 8-9. 
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the bank’s subdirector, the second most senior position, while Martínez was Consejero or board 
member.93 According to the bank’s charter, two of its main roles were dealing in bills of exchange 
and issuing specie.94 In fact, it was the only institution on the island to hold the latter responsibility. 
Although it is unclear whether the Riera and Martínez used their influence in Banco Español to 
help issue Mazorra’s specie/bills payment, the bank was certainly uniquely equipped to do so. The 
island’s most senior official, Governor Domingo Dulce, certainly believed that there was a 
connection between the bank and the slave trade. In 1863 he identified several Portuguese 
traffickers who had recently taken up residence in Cuba and specifically mentioned their 
shareholdings in the bank as a point of suspicion.95       
 The specie and gold that Lucas carried back to New York was part of a broader current of 
slave trade remittances travelling north from Cuba. Several traces of this flow emerge from 
merchants’ papers, spy reports, and newspaper columns. The correspondence of New York sugar 
importer Moses Taylor shows that in 1854, Drake Bros., an Anglo-Cuban merchant house in 
Havana, issued two bills of exchange worth a total of $12,000 in favor of José Lima Vianna, a 
Portuguese trafficker with no business in Cuba except the slave trade. Vianna brought the bills to 
Henry Coit, a sugar merchant in New York, who endorsed the bills and released the funds. 
According to Emilio Sanchez, the notorious Cunha Reis travelled the same route in the winter of 
1858, carrying a massive $60,000 in drafts from the voyage of the Panchita.96   
 It was also common for traffickers to step off the Havana steamer lugging boxes of specie. 
In 1860, the New York Herald noted that Vianna had recently brought home a box of specie worth 
                                                
93 Mazorra held the lesser position of Supernumerario (supernumerary). Ibid.  
94 Ibid; Estatutos y reglamento del Banco Español de la Habana (Habana: Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitanía 
General por S.M., 1856). 
95 Given the slave trade’s dependence on large amounts of gold for remittances and that traffickers filled its highest 
posts, it is likely that the Bank had been established at least partly to service the illegal slave trade. Domingo Dulce 
to Ministro de Ultramar, Aug. 30, 1863, Legajo 4686/52, caja 1, Ultramar, AHN. 
96 Sanchez to Archibald enc. in Archibald to Lord Malmesbury, Apr. 5, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA 
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$7,650 from a recent trip from Havana.97 Incriminatingly, this list appeared right above an article 
from the paper’s Cuba correspondent wherein he claimed he was in possession of “proof strong as 
holy Writ” that from six to eight thousand Africans had arrived in the island within the last ten 
days. On other occasions, investors received remittances in commodities. In the case of the Mary 
E. Smith, the final, unsuccessful attempt to bring captives to Brazil in 1856, Cunha Reis wrote to 
shipboard manager João José Vianna, explaining: “I want to have my share [of the profits] here 
[New York], for which purpose the Isla de Cuba is to go there [Rio de Janeiro] and come with 
coffee.”98  
Havana to New York was only one leg on the journey of slave trade remittances. Slave 
trade capital flowed into New York, but it also flowed outward to investors in Africa. These 
speculators also expected their dividends. In the case of the Pierre Soulé, Lucas sent these funds 
through João Alberto Machado, the Africa trader in New York.99 In the summer of 1856, Machado 
dispatched the schooner Flying Eagle from New York to southern Angola with a legal trading 
cargo worth $30,000 and 432 gold doubloons. Machado had consigned most of the goods to João 
Soares of Novo Redondo, who had sent forty-eight captives aboard the Pierre Soulé. Two months 
later, the vessel arrived safely in Benguela. Soares was about to take his portion and distribute the 
rest to the others when the Portuguese authorities launched a surprise raid on his home. After 
searching his residence and discovering his incriminating correspondence with Lucas, they 
immediately seized the Flying Eagle’s cargo and gold. 
 
 
                                                
97 New York Herald, Nov. 30, 1860 
98 Cunha Reis to João José Vianna, Oct. 2, 1855, enc. in John Morgan to Lord Clarendon, 13 June 1856, Accounts 
and Papers of the House of Commons vol. 44, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1857), 132. 
99 John O’Sullivan to State Department, July 28, 1856 & Mar. 28, 1857, SDR, NARA 
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Figure 2.4: Capital Circuits in the Illegal Slave Trade, 1850-1863 
 
 
In most cases, however, suppression forces failed to intercept slave trade capital as it 
circulated around the Atlantic basin. Unlike the case of the Pierre Soule, slave trade capital usually 
moved around the Atlantic basin with impunity, as depicted in Figure 2.4. The African end of the 
trade seemed to be as secure as anywhere else. In 1857, John Willis, the US Consul in Luanda, 
informed the Secretary of State William Marcy that the “slave trade was flourishing” in West 
Central Africa. Supporting this traffic, he said, was “American gold,” which was “quite plenty” on 
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the Lower Congo River, “having been brought in those vessels which clear from New York.”100 




In 1863, Edward Archibald, the British consul in New York reflected on how his adopted city had 
come to play such a key role in the illegal slave trade. Writing to the Foreign Office, Archibald 
noted: “A large and populous maritime city, within a few days sail of, and in constant 
communication with, Havana, here have congregated the Spanish and Portuguese projectors of 
slaving voyages.” It was awkward prose, but it caught the essence of what had made New York a 
successful slaving port. On the one hand, certain set structures were crucial. These included the 
City’s proximity to Havana, longstanding federal law concerning the flag, New York’s immense 
mercantile facilities, and the liberalization of world trade in the nineteenth century. On the other 
hand, slave-trading merchants had exploited the opportunities they had been given. With their 
strong ties to distant slaving ports, their slave trading know-how, and their deep pockets, they had 
turned US ports into headquarters for the illegal slave trade. Inveterate border-crossers, Cunha 
Reis and his ilk were adept at moving, adapting, exploiting. Their purview was always global, and 
never paid respect to human costs.        
 These traffickers were responsible for three main US roles in the illegal slave trade between 
1851 and 1863. The clearest, to contemporaries and historians alike, was shipping. American 
vessels were vital. The vast majority of the 226,000 captives who departed African shores during 
this period, did so aboard a ship built in the US. Most of these slavers sailed under the American 
                                                
100 Willis to Marcy, Jan 9, 1857, Despatches from US Consuls in St. Paul de Loanda, 1854-1893, T430, roll 1, 
NARA, DC. 
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flag and enjoyed the protection it afforded. US ports, particularly New York City, were also 
important departure points for slave ships during this period. The second major role was voyage 
financing. Lusophone traffickers in New York were an important source of slave trade capital, 
although they often funded voyages jointly with traffickers in West Central Africa and Cuba. The 
final role was money laundering. This task was accomplished by a handful of New York’s 
merchants who specialized in receiving capital from Cuba, turning it into trade goods, and pulsing 
it out to the African coast. In combination, these roles indicate that the US played a much larger, 
more varied, and important role in the illegal slave trade than historians have acknowledged. 
             





























Transatlantic Voyages of the American Blackbird Fleet 
 
In the summer of 1856, fledgling poet Walt Whitman visited an impounded slave ship named the 
Braman at the Navy Dockyard in Brooklyn. With Leaves of Grass garnering a tepid early 
reception, Whitman had accepted a commission from Life Illustrated to describe the vessel, one of 
the few illegal slavers intercepted by US authorities before it sailed for Africa. It was a rare sight 
and Whitman took his readers through the vessel step by step. Beginning on the main deck, he 
took a “peep into the little dark forecastle, and another into the cabin at the other end.” Then, he 
crawled into the hold. Faced with a dark and empty space, Whitman conjured a scene from the 
middle passage. Explaining that the hold was “the place where the slaves are … laid together 
spoon-fashion”, he entreated his readers to “imagine … the miserable chattels, wondering to each 
other whither their white conquerors are carrying them.” “Perhaps, in desperation,” he continued, 
“they attempt to rise upon the crew, [but] are quieted … by promiscuous musket volleys fired 
down the hatchway.” Having completed what he acknowledged was a “horrible vision,” Whitman 
retreated from the Braman, and ended his exclusive tour of the would-be slaver.1  
 The following chapter compares what Whitman imagined with what actually took place. 
What were midcentury slaving voyages actually like? How closely did they resemble voyages 
from earlier periods? What made them distinctive? These matters were well-understood within the 
secretive world of the slave trade, which operated for over a decade in New York City, but they 
were not well known to outsiders like Whitman. His brief encounter with the slave trade produced 
some truths, but it was largely speculation.  
                                                
1 Life Illustrated, Aug. 2, 1856.  
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 Historians have thrown more light on the subject. Their most common approach has been 
to trace a single voyage through the worlds of the illegal slave trade. Tom Henderson Wells wrote 
the first single-voyage analysis in 1967, examining the yacht Wanderer, which journeyed from 
Georgia to West Central Africa and back in 1859. In 2006, Erik Calonius produced another study 
of the same vessel. The following year, Sylviane Diouf traced the voyage of the schooner Clotilda, 
which journeyed from Alabama to the Bight of Benin and back in 1860. These studies have 
highlighted many important features of the trade, particularly the social and political context in the 
southern US, which was the origination and end point for each of these voyages. However, among 
the 500 or so voyages that took place after 1850, these were the only two that began and ended in 
the American South. The majority of voyages originated in northern ports, took in captives in 
Africa, and disembarked them in Cuba. The southern US slave trade is therefore heavily 
represented in current scholarship, but the dynamics of the main branch of the trade are not.2    
The following chapter assesses the main features of the midcentury slave trade by 
examining the voyage of the brig Julia Moulton in 1854. This voyage was broadly typical of the 
post-1850 trade. Its course, shown in Figure 3.1, followed the regular midcentury track between 
the US, West Central Africa, and Cuba. The demographic profile of its captives and crew was also 
in keeping with the age, and like most voyages, it reached its destination as planned. The voyage 
                                                
2 Tom Henderson Wells, The Slave Ship Wanderer (Athens: University of Georgia Press: 1967); Erik Calonius, The 
Wanderer: The Last American Slave Ship and the Conspiracy that Set Its Sails (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2006); Diouf, Sylviane A. Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Slave Ship Clotilda and the Story of the Last Africans 
Brought to America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For other single-voyage analyses from earlier 
periods, see Nigel Tattersfield, The Forgotten Trade: Comprising the Log of the Daniel and Henry of 1700 and 
Accounts of the Slave Trade from the Minor Ports of England 1698-1725 (London: Pimlico, 1998); Bruce L. 
Mouser, ed., A Slaving Voyage to Africa and Jamaica: The Log of the Sandown, 1793- 1794 (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2002); Robert Harms, The Diligent: A Voyage Through the Worlds Of The Slave Trade 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002); James Walvin, The Zong: A Massacre, the Law and the End of Slavery (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Sean M. Kelley, The Voyage of the Slave Ship Hare: A Journey into 
Captivity from Sierra Leone to South Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016); 
Marcus Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion:  An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom (New York: Viking, 2012); 
Zeuske, Michael. Amistad: A Hidden Network of Slavers and Merchants. Translated by Steven Rendell. (Princeton, 
N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2014). 
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is also unusually well documented in British, US, and Cuban archives. This wealth of information 
is largely because the captives were intercepted in Cuba after landing, and the Captain, James 
Smith, was eventually arraigned in New York and put on trial in a federal court. Several of the 
crew testified about the voyage during his trial and Smith himself gave a remarkably candid 
interview to the newspaper, the New York Evangelist. Although these sources certainly do not 
give an unvarnished picture of the voyage, many details can be corroborated from other sources.3  
 
Figure 3.1. Voyage of the Julia Moulton, Jan.-June, 1854 
 
                                                
3 Historians Warren Howard and Leonardo Marques have used several of these documents to analyze the trial, 
although they have said little about the voyage itself. Howard, American Slavers, 192-6; Marques, The US, 209-10. 
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The chapter is split into four sequential parts, roughly following the course of the Julia 
Moulton’s voyage. The first section examines how midcentury slave trading merchants purchased, 
manned, and cleared vessels in the Americas. The focus is on the traffic’s main shipping center, 
New York, but many of the features highlighted in this section also applied to other important 
outfitting ports in the US and Cuba, such as New Orleans and Havana. The second part focuses on 
the African origins and demographic makeup of post-1850 captives, the final victims of the 350-
year old trade. The third section analyzes captives’ experiences of the middle passage, during a 
period when voyages were under increased threat from naval suppression. The final part explores 
the outcomes of voyages and pays particular attention to the destinations of captives and their 
subsequent legal and labor status.  
Overall, the chapter shows that although illegal mid-century voyages shared features of the 
trade from previous eras – especially earlier in the century, when the trade was already outlawed 
throughout much of the Atlantic world – it was in some respects distinctive. Many of the trends 
from slaving voyages earlier in the century had grown more acute by the 1850s and 1860s. Some 
of those patterns related to the rising profitability of the trade, which encouraged slave traders to 
use larger vessels and cram more captives aboard them. Similarly, improving shipping 
technologies in the nineteenth century enabled traffickers to access larger, faster vessels. They also 
cut shipping costs and quickened voyages, which encouraged traffickers to bring captives from 
more distant regions of Africa. The most important factor, however, was international suppression. 
Anti-slave trade action, both on land and sea, affected everything from the ships traffickers used, 
to captives’ conditions during the middle passage. Most significantly, by 1850, suppression had 
shoehorned slave traders into just a few safe havens, placing historic limits on the breadth of their 
smuggling routes. The chapter begins in one of those slaving hotspots: New York City. 
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Organizing illegal voyages in the Americas 
The voyage of the Julia Moulton was jointly-organized by traffickers in the US, West Central 
Africa, and Cuba. Like many voyages after 1850, the Lusophone connection between New York 
and West Central Africa was imperative. In Manhattan, where the voyage began, the chief planner 
was José Antunes Lopes Lemos. An experienced and highly mobile trafficker, Lemos had operated 
in Brazil before the shuttering of its illegal trade in 1850. He subsequently moved to New York, 
and with the help of his fellow Portuguese and Brazilian immigrants, helped incorporate the US 
into the triangular slaving axis that dominated the trade after 1850.4 One of Lemos’ associates was 
the infamous Manoel Basilio da Cunha Reis. Another Portuguese, he was likely the second key 
player in the voyage. He was the main slave dealer near Ambrizette in West Central Africa, where 
the Julia Moulton captives boarded in the early summer of 1854. He had strong ties with the 
Portuguese in New York and would establish himself there in 1855.5  
The Cuban side of the voyage was planned by a father and son: Salvador de Castro Sr. and 
Salvador de Casto Jr. Following a well-worn path from Spain, the elder Castro hailed from Galicia 
and had risen to become a major trafficker in Cuba. He was based in Trinidad de Cuba, a coastal 
town in south-central Cuba and part of a larger jurisdiction bearing the same name. His son, Castro 
Jr., was a native Cuban. He travelled frequently between Cuba and the US to organize slaving 
                                                
4 On Lemos’ nationality, see C.H. Figanière to Joaquín César de Figanière y Morao, enc. in Figanière y Morao to 
Secretary of State Marcy, Nov. 17, 1854, M57, Roll T4, NARA. For Lemos’s movements between Cuba and the 
US, and his identification as belonging to Brazil, see passenger lists of the Black Warrior, NYT, June 3, 1854; NYT, 
Star of the West, Apr. 28, 1860; New York Passenger Lists, 1820-1957, NARA, M237, Roll 207, Line 4, List 
number 1083, Year 1859 & ibid, Line 7, List number 1148, Year 1860. Lemos was likely the “Lemus” that Emilio 
Sanchez, a British spy, described as one of the New York slaver traders involved in the voyage of the Haidee in 
1858 and a “partner” of Antonio Augusto Botelho. See, Sanchez’s ‘Memo on the Haidee Affair,’ in Archibald to 
Malmesbury, May 3, 1859, FO84/1086, TNA. In 1863, when the slave trade from New York collapsed, Lemos 
attempted to establish himself in Cuba again. See Dulce to Ministro de Ultramar, Aug. 30, 1863, Ultramar, Leg. 
4686, Exp. 52, AHN. 
5 See chapter 2 for more on Cunha Reis’s background. 
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voyages in conjunction with the Portuguese.6 The Castros were a major force in the Cuban slave 
trade during the early 1850s. Together, they helped raise slave imports to Trinidad from 1,465 to 
2,690 between 1853 and 1854. These numbers represented a small, but growing share of total 
arrivals to the island; 8 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively.7 
 In the fall of 1853, Castro Jr. met Lemos in New York to plan the latest voyage to Trinidad. 
One of the first matters at hand was purchasing a vessel. Slave traders had particular preferences, 
some of which had not changed significantly since the 1830s, when the trade became illegal 
throughout the Atlantic world. Traffickers continued to favor US ships, for instance, the superior 
craft built in the Americas. Fast models with barque, brig, brigantine, and schooner rigging still 
appealed because they quickened crossings and could potentially outrun patrols. On the other hand, 
the tightening noose of international suppression after 1850 encouraged traffickers to cut costs and 
use older vessels. During the 1830s and 1840s, slave traders, especially in Cuba, had ordered new 
vessels built specifically for the trade, often from Baltimore shipyards.8 After 1850, they shifted 
to well-worn, cheaper vessels, sourced from the open market in US ports. Another change was 
scale. In general, traffickers used much larger slavers after 1850 than before. During the 1840s, 
the average slaver weighed 151 tons, but after 1850, it rose to 234 tons.9 This trend seems to have 
                                                
6 For more on the Castros, see Gefaturia principal de policía to Gobr Supr Civil, 1 Feb. 1854, Leg. 427, no. 20575, 
gobierno general, ANC. See also New York Passenger Lists, 1820-1957, NARA, M237, Roll 136, List number 112, 
Year 1854; Meriño Fuentes and Perera Díaz, Contrabando de bozales, 165; Ferreira, Dos Sertões, 223. For the 
Castros’ involvement in the voyage of Cobra, see G. Jose da Silva Correa to Capt Madalena, Aug. 26, 1852, ADM 
123/177, TNA. For an introduction to Trinidad and adjacent jurisdictions, see Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The 
Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760-1860 (Cedric Belfrage trans., New York, NY: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976), 66-70. 
7 For figures, see Voyages, http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/B7dWTyZf.  
8 On the attractions of American sailing vessels as slavers, see Howard I. Chapelle, History of American Sailing 
Ships (New York, 1982), 154-166. On their use in the illegal Cuban and Brazilian trades see Leonardo Marques, The 
United States, 126-184 & Marques, “US Shipbuilding, Atlantic Markets, and the Structures of the Contraband Slave 
Trade,” in The Rise and Demise of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Atlantic World, eds., Philip Misevich and 
Kristin Mann (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2016), 196-219. For a broader view of the “Golden 
Era” of American shipbuilding, see William H. Thiesen, Industrializing American Shipbuilding: The Transformation 
of Ship Design and Construction, 1820-1920 (Gainsville, Fl: University of Florida Press, 2006), 45-79. 
9 Voyages, http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/SlR2peJQ and http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/IpvFNDMF.  
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been largely a response to the rising profitability of the trade after 1850. Traffickers in big ports 
such as New York had access to vessels of all sizes, but chose large ones because they could carry 
more captives and earn larger returns on investment.10 
Castro and Lemos followed these principles in their selection of the Julia Moulton. Built 
by shipbuilders Tengue and Hall in Newcastle, Maine in 1846, the brig spent seven years taking 
mid-length journeys from its base in Boston, Massachusetts. The vessel’s main trade route ran 
along the eastern seaboard, around Florida and all the way to New Orleans. Sometimes the brig 
journeyed to the Caribbean for sugar and molasses. In fact, Castro Jr., who spent much of his time 
in Havana, may have identified the vessel as a potential slaver during its final sugar run to the 
colonial capital in December 1853, just before it entered the slave trade. Castro would have noted 
its qualities. As a brig, the Julia Moulton offered considerable sailing speed and good 
maneuverability, especially in light winds. In addition, at 200 tons, it was big enough to carry a 
large number of captives, and potentially, bring handsome returns to investors.11 
Having sourced a vessel, Castro and Lemos sought a crew. There were many roles to fill. 
The typical midcentury slaver departed the US with a captain, one to three mates, a supercargo, 
carpenter, cook, boatswain, and around a dozen ordinary hands. Overall, these roles were not 
markedly different than the legal US slave trade of early nineteenth century.12 The one major 
difference was the inclusion of a supercargo, who managed the business of the voyage, especially 
on the African coast. His role had been common in the South Atlantic trade to Brazil, but rare in 
the British and North American trades, in which the captain typically transacted business. In most 
                                                
10 For more on this point, see Eltis, Economic Growth, 127-131. 
11 For the sailing qualities of brigs, see Chapelle, History, 159. For the Julia Moulton’s non-slaving career, see NY 
Evening Post, Aug. 17, 1846; Times-Picayune, Aug. 26, 1846; NY Evening Post, Apr. 5, 1848; Boston Evening 
Transcript, Apr. 4, 1851; Charleston Courier, July 7, 1851; Daily Atlas (Boston), Aug. 5, 1853; Portland Weekly 
Advertiser, Oct. 25, 1853; Portland Weekly Advertiser, Dec. 6 & Jan 3, 1854. 
12 Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle, 56-7. 
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midcentury voyages the supercargo was Portuguese or Brazilian. In many cases, he had experience 
on the African coast, was a confident of the principals, and was an investor in the voyage. Perhaps 
the most prolific supercargo working out of New York, Antonio Augusto Botelho, possessed all 
these traits. The inclusion of supercargoes such as Botelho highlights the lusophone character of 
slave trade shipping and the strength of networks linking the US and the African coast in the final 
years of the trade.13   
Overall, slave ship crews were large, but contracting after 1850. Slavers had always 
required heavy manning compared to vessels in legal commerce, mainly due to concerns about 
slave revolt. After the voyage, James Smith, who became captain of the Julia Moulton noted his 
vessel could have been “manned by four men” if it had been in legal trade.14 These crews had 
grown over time, especially at the turn of the nineteenth century, as slavers and their captive cargos 
increased in size. By the early 1800s, tiny vessels such as the recently-examined Hare, which 
departed Rhode Island with 6 men in 1755, were a thing of the past.15 Indeed, between 1808, when 
the trade became illegal in the US and Britain, and 1849, an average of 23 men were serving aboard 
slavers. After 1850, this figure fell to 18, despite the fact that vessels were markedly larger and 
would carry many more captives.16 The reason for this dip appears to have been that post-1850 
vessels carried higher proportions of children, who traffickers did not perceive as threatening 
                                                
13 On the role of the supercargo in the Brazilian slave trade, see Miller, Way of Death, 371, 389-90. For the joint 
“seaman and salesman” role of Rhode Island captains during the legal slave trade, see Coughtry, Notorious, 51-2. 
On captains in the British trade, see Stephen D. Behrendt, 'The Captains in the British Slave Trade from 1785 to 
1807', Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire 140 (1990), 79-140; Stephen D. Behrendt, 
‘Human capital in the British slave trade’ in David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles eds. 
Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 66-97; and Rediker, The Slave 
Ship, 157-221. For Botelho see chapters 1 & 4.  
14 New York Evangelist in Liberator, Dec. 15, 1854. 
15 Sean M. Kelley, The Voyage of the Slave Ship Hare: A Journey into Captivity from Sierra Leone to South 
Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016) 
16 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/w7uFkvaL and http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/w6dCfQiH 
 103 
compared to adults. This trend, explored in more detail later, allowed investors to recruit fewer 
crew and therefore limit their costs.17 
The single most striking feature of midcentury crews was not their size, but their 
cosmopolitanism. The slave trade from North American ports had traditionally been composed of 
local men. As Jay Coughtry has shown, before US abolition, 95 percent of sailors boarding slavers 
in Newport were Rhode Islanders.18 The illegal slave trade, and the final phase, in particular, was 
much more varied. Naval officers frequently commented on the mix of nationalities they 
discovered when they captured slavers. One British officer, reporting a capture of the Abbot 
Devereux near Ouidah in 1857 described a “crew of Spaniards, Americans, Portuguese, and 
Brazilians.”19 The particular blend of these crews depended, in part, on the port of origin. Vessels 
departing the booming metropolis and immigrant center of New York typically included 
Americans and Europeans, with at least some Portuguese. Crews on Havana vessels, by contrast, 
often contained some Portuguese and Americans, but included more Spaniards and Cubans. 
Ultimately, the diversity of these crews reflected both the broader ranks of the local marine 
community and the outsized influence of the Portuguese over slave trade shipping after 1850.20 
The Julia Moulton boasted a typically mixed crew. Its captain, James Smith, was born in 
Hanover, Germany, and was originally named Julius Smidt. After attending navigation school in 
                                                
17 For more on this point, see Eltis, Economic Growth, 131-133. 
18 Jay Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle: Rhode Island and The African Slave Trade, 1700-1807 (Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 1981), 58-9. 
19 Text accompanying ‘Capture of a Slave Ship, African Coast,’ in The Atlantic Slave Trade and Slave Life in the 
Americas: A Visual Record, University of Virginia, 
http://slaveryimages.org/details.php?categorynum=5&categoryName=Slave%20Ships%20and%20the%20Atlantic%
20Crossing%20(Middle%20Passage)&theRecord=39&recordCount=78. Accessed Mar. 5, 2017. 
20 For the recruitment and composition of captains and crews in the legal slave trade, especially in British ports, see 
Stephen D. Behrendt, 'The Captains in the British Slave Trade from 1785 to 1807', Transactions of the Historic 
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire 140 (1990), 79-140; Stephen D. Behrendt, ‘Human capital in the British slave 
trade’ in David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles eds. Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 66-97; Emma Christopher, Slave Ship Sailors and Their Captive 
Cargoes, 1730-1807 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23-50; Rediker, The Slave Ship, 136-142, 222-
230. For colonial North America, see Coughtry, Notorious Triangle, 45-66, and Kelly, The Slave Ship Hare, 36-45. 
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Hamburg, he immigrated to New York in the 1840s, serving as first mate aboard the ship that 
carried him to the US. He was 24 years old when he captained the Julia Moulton, and spoke English 
and Portuguese in addition to his native German.21 The first mate was James Willis, a native of 
Amsterdam, who had he immigrated to the US in 1847.22 Willis spoke Dutch, German, a little 
French, and picked up some Portuguese aboard the Julia Moulton. The supercargo was a 
Portuguese named Vilela. Little else is known about him, except that he was in his twenties and 
spoke some English.23 The rest of the crew were even more obscure, but included a second mate 
named Young; common seamen: George Cooke, William Robinson, Thomas McDermot, John 
McDonald; two unnamed Portuguese; and Henry Fling, a nineteen-year-old cook and a native of 
New London, Connecticut.24 In their totality, this highly variegated mix of Europeans and 
Americans reflected the broader patterns of illegal slaving crews, particularly those departing from 
New York. 
Lemos and Castro recruited the Julia Moulton’s crew through intermediaries. Indirect 
hiring was common practice in regular trade in big ports such as New York. In most cases, 
principals hired shipping masters to man their vessels.25 In the case of the Julia Moulton, Lemos 
and Castro hired William Valentine. A ship-chandler and ship-outfitter by trade, Valentine was a 
favored middleman for the Portuguese in New York. Smith was his first recruit. Having already 
captained an illegal slave ship, The Republic, in 1853, Smith was well-known to the slave trading 
                                                
21 For biographical details on Smith, see trial testimony in NYH, Nov. 9, 1854 and NYT, Nov. 9, 1854. At 25, Smith 
was younger than the average slaving captain in the legal slave trades from Rhode Island (32), Liverpool (30), and 
Bristol (31). Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle, 58-60; Behrendt, 'The Captains’, 79-140. 
22 For biographical details on Willis, see NYH, Nov. 9, 1854 and NYT, Nov. 9, 1854.  
23 NYT, Dec. 29, 1854. This is the same Vilela mentioned in chapter 2. 
24 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854. 
25 Dorothy Denneen Volo and James M. Volo, Daily Life in the Age of Sail (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 2002), 
93-103. 
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community and an obvious target.26 Once Valentine had engaged his captain, the pair worked 
together. First they approached Willis outside Valentine’s store in Lower Manhattan. Willis had 
never been on a slaving voyage before, but readily accepted the position of first mate. Valentine 
and Smith then sought out the seamen, including Fling, Cooke, and Robinson. The records do not 
explain who recruited Vilela and the Portuguese sailors, but this was likely done directly through 
their fellow Portuguese, Lemos.27   
Many, if not all, the crew were recruited on the understanding they were going on an illegal 
slaving voyage. The senior officers and Vilela certainly knew what they were doing; Smith and 
Willis made no attempt to deny the fact in court. On the other hand, the purpose of the voyage was 
likely not explained directly to some seamen. After the voyage, Fling testified that Smith had given 
him the impression they were heading to the Caribbean. Cooke stated that Smith had told him and 
another seaman, Robinson, that they were heading to the Cape of Good Hope.28 These claims are 
difficult to verify, although it was common for slave trade sailors to argue they had been duped 
into serving aboard slave ships, especially in court. At the very least, the sailors must have 
questioned the size of the crew. Altogether, Smith and his friends recruited 15 men for the voyage. 
As Smith later confessed, it was an “almighty crew” for an ostensibly legal voyage.29 
The main aim of these recruits was to make money. Their wages varied in scale, were 
somewhat negotiable, and were clearly stratified by rank. They vastly exceeded what crews made 
                                                
26 On the Republic see, ‘Voyages’ #46497. On Smith’s role in the Republic, see NYT Feb 8, 1855. For other 
captains, including Jonathon Dobson, Nathaniel Gordon, and Edward Townsend, who mastered several vessels see 
the reports of Emilio Sanchez in FO84/1086, /1111, and /1138, TNA.  
27 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854, NYT, Dec. 2, 1854. NYT, Dec. 29, 1854.  
28 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854 
29 New York Evangelist in The Liberator, Dec. 15, 1854. The US consul in Luanda noted that most legal US 
merchantmen on the African coast had 4 to 6 crewmen and were composed mostly of Americans. John Willis to Sec. 
of State Marcy, Nov. 16, 1854, Despatches from US Consuls in St. Paul de Loanda, 1854-1893, T430, roll 1, 
NARA.  
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in previous generations, when the traffic was less legally risky and much less profitable.30 Slaving 
captains were always paid the most. Smith’s wages are unknown, but captains were usually paid 
about $5000. Captain J. W. Delano, for example, accepted that figure to captain the Braman, the 
vessel visited by Whitman in 1855.31 Other captains bought shares in voyages, a potentially 
lucrative option given the potential returns. The prolific New York captain Jonathon Dobson, for 
instance, invested around $3,000 in shares in the voyage of the Isla de Cuba in 1858.32 These large 
sums reflected the particular risks that captains were taking. In addition to sailing the vessel, which 
exposed them to capture at sea and prosecution, many captains further exposed themselves by 
purchasing the slaver on behalf of the principals. In the case of the Julia Moulton, Smith travelled 
to Boston, where the brig was based, bought the vessel, sailed it back to New York, and registered 
it at the custom house under his own name. In these scenarios, the captain took nearly all the risk; 
the principals were invisible.33  
After the captain, the first mate was next on the pay scale. After haggling with Smith, Willis 
signed up for $40 per month for the outbound voyage to Africa and a flat $2,000 for the return 
voyage to Cuba.34 This extraordinary differential took account of risk; being caught with captives 
was much more incriminating, and therefore more dangerous, than being caught without them. It 
also encouraged Willis to stay the course. Smith made the point when Willis requested the $2,000 
upfront. Smith’s reply, paraphrased by Willis, was that “this was not customary, as I might change 
my mind when I get to Africa.”35 The same principle applied to the other crew. Smith, having 
                                                
30 Stephen D. Behrendt, ‘Human capital’, 66-97; Coughtry, Notorious, 66-70. 
31 NY Daily Tribune, July 15, 1856. 
32 See Sanchez’s Memo on Panchita, Apr. 5, 1859, FO84/1086. Smith also had the chance to purchase slaves on the 
African coast and sell them in Cuba on his own account in Cuba. The opportunity to invest in the ‘cargo’ in this way 
was generally limited to officers and though it was never as lucrative as investing in the ‘ship,’ it was still potentially 
highly remunerative. For Smith’s purchase of a young boy in Africa, see, NYT, Nov. 7, 1854. 
33 NYT, Feb 9, 1854.  
34 NYT, Nov. 7, 1854. 
35 NYT, Nov. 7, 1854. 
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agreed to pay the cook, Henry Fling, $13 per month for the fictional legal voyage to West Indies, 
gave him $340 in gold pieces on the African coast, just before they departed for Cuba. At this 
point, he also promised to pay the crews’ passages back to the US from Cuba, after the voyage had 
been completed.36  
With the vessel and crew secured, Lemos and Castro outfitted the Julia Moulton for its 
transatlantic voyage. The outfit was strongly shaped by suppression. Unlike legal slaving voyages, 
midcentury slavers could not afford to carry obvious slaving equipment such as shackles or chains. 
In most cases, they also dispensed with trading cargos since suppression necessitated short stays 
on the African coast and quick loading, rather than protracted bargaining. Fast turnarounds also 
meant there was little time to purchase or load provisions for the middle passage. As a result, 
illegal slavers often brought large stores of food and water from their port of departure. A final 
distinction was the vast quantities of lumber. Since it was far too risky to build a slave deck before 
leaving port, traffickers brought long planks and scantlings to construct it on the outward passage.  
Lemos and Castro equipped the Julia Moulton on these principles, drawing on New York’s vast 
resources. They bought 72 casks and had them filled with water and placed in the brig’s hold. They 
also sent 4 barrels of wine and rum, 70 of beans, 30 of flour, 8 of pork, 2 of beef, 10 of rice, and 
14 barrels of pails from which captives would eat using wooden spoons. In addition, the vessel 
contained scantlings and planks for the construction of a slave deck, as well as three medicine 
chests to be used for sickly captives and crew. The brig also shipped at least some firearms, maps 
and charts, as well as a chronometer that permitted Smith to accurately tell the vessel’s longitude 
during the voyage. Finally, the vessel probably carried large boilers, which were necessary for 
cooking large quantities for food and common in the midcentury trade. In the words of District  
                                                
36 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854; NYT, Nov. 7, 1854. For a comparison between slave ship officers’ and seamen’s wages in the 




Figure 3.2. “Plan of the Hold of the barque Isla de Cuba”  
Note the four coppers or boilers, marked ‘C’, the barrels containing food and water, and 
the loose lumber for the slave deck. 
 
 
Source: TNA  
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Attorney John McKeon, who prosecuted Smith after the voyage, the brig “had on board everything 
necessary to fit her at sea for the transportation of slaves.”37 The vessel would have looked much 
like the slaver Isla de Cuba, which was captured without slaves and sketched by a British naval 
officer in 1858 (see Figure 3.2). 
The final step was clearing the vessel from port. Smith, who was not only the captain of 
the vessel, but also, ostensibly, its owner, went to New York’s Custom House to clear the vessel 
himself. He handed over ship’s manifest, which listed only the food and an oblique reference to 
woodenware. He also took oaths that he was an American citizen and the true owner of the vessel, 
thereby earning the vessel the right to fly the US flag, which, theoretically, protected the voyage 
from British interference. Smith further claimed he was going on a legal voyage to Cape Town, a 
less conspicuous choice than West Central Africa.38 All of these falsehoods proved satisfactory to 
the clearance clerk, who approved the Julia Moulton’s departure, apparently, without reservation. 
Wasting little time, the crew piled aboard the brig. The next morning, Lemos and Castro gathered 






During the next 65 days, the Julia Moulton journeyed to Africa. Tracking prevailing winds and 
Ocean currents, the brig followed a clockwise arc around the North Atlantic before dipping down 
to the Cape Verde Islands and the continental mainland. Aboard the vessel, the crew were busy 
refitting. Forty days into the voyage, they began laying lumber over the casks in the hold, making 
                                                
37 NYT, Nov. 7, 1854; NYH, Nov. 9, 1854. 
38 NYT, Nov. 7, 1854, NYT, Feb 13, 1854. 
39 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854. 
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a crude slave deck for the middle passage. They also fixed gratings to the hatchways on the main 
deck, creating a prison for captives below. Finally, they hung an awning between the main mast 
and the galley door to shield the deck and its occupants from the equatorial sun. The Julia Moulton 
was now ready to receive it captives.40   
Figure 3.3. Northern West Central Africa, c.1870 * 
 
                                                
40 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854. 
* From Herlin, “Brazil and the Commercialization of Kongo”, 260 
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By the time these preparations were complete, the slaver was nearing West Central Africa. 
The traffic had come under attack in this region by the Portuguese and British in the late 1840s 
and early 1850s, but remained robust, thanks partly to imperial tension between the two powers in 
the Lower Congo and Loango Coast as well as to support from African societies that remained 
deeply attached to the trade and worked with coastal traffickers.41 By the 1850s, many Brazilian 
and Portuguese slave traders, including Guilherme Correia, who had moved their operations to the 
Lower Congo River basin. They developed important slave exportation points at Ambriz and 
Ambrizette, which lay to the south of the Congo River; Cabeça de Cobra, near its mouth; and 
Cabinda on the Loango Coast. Some captives also embarked incoming slavers at remote beaches 
or even in the Congo River itself (see Figure 3.3).42 
The slave trade from these and other minor exportation points in Angola dominated the 
midcentury slave trade on the African coast. As Table 3.1 shows, around 156,000 captives boarded 
slave ships on the coasts of West Central Africa between 1851 and 1866. This figure accounted 
for almost seventy percent of all captives – two in every three – who boarded slave ships during 
this period; up from forty six percent during the entire history of the trade.43 The other main 
                                                
41 For these tensions, see FO 96/31/4, FO 881/553, TNA. Also, see Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Macmillan, 1962); Ferreira, Roquinaldo, 'The conquest of Ambriz: Colonial expansion 
and imperial competition in Central Africa' Mulemba: Revista Angolana de Ciências Sociais, 5, no. 9 (May 2015): 
221-242; Martin, The External Trade, 147-8. 
42 Roquinaldo Ferreira, ‘The suppression of the slave trade and slave departures from Angola, 1830s-1860s’, in Eltis 
and Richardson, Extending, 313-34. Roquinaldo Ferreira, A Transnational History of the Abolition of the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade in Central Africa (Forthcoming, 2017, CUP). 
43 http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/kcggRPA5. Martin, Phyllis. The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-
1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango (Oxford University Press 
1972); Miller, Joseph. Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Candido, Mariana. An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela 
and Its Hinterland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Robert Harms, River of Wealth, River of 
Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the era of the slave and ivory trade, 1500-1891 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1981); Susan J. Herlin, “Brazil and the Commercialization of the Kongo, 1840-1870” in José C. 
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exportation regions after 1850 – the Bight of Benin, and South-east Africa – fell far behind; 
accounting for 15 and 13 percent respectively. 
 
Table 3.1. African Embarkation Zones, 1851-1866 
Embarkation region Total no. Captives Percentage of Total 
Sierra Leone 4,795 2.1 
Bight of Benin 33,867 15 
West Central Africa 156,779 69.5 
South-east Africa and Indian Ocean islands 30,166 13.4 
 225,607 100 
 
Source: ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/kcggRPA5. 
Two captives embarked in the Bight of Biafra, but are not included in this table. 
 
 
Slave traders in the interior of West Central Africa forced these captives to the shore. 
Historian Daniel Domingues da Silva has performed the most in-depth research on the origins of 
captives departing this region in the nineteenth century. Using records of West Central Africans 
intercepted by the British and Portuguese authorities, Domingues contends that most captives 
embarking from this region between 1831 and 1855 originated less than 400 km inland, a distance 
considerably shorter than historians have traditionally associated with the region’s supply lines. 
Figure 3.4, which is replicated from Domingues’ work, identifies the origination points. As the 
map indicates, almost all captives came from the South side of the Congo River. All belonged to 
the Kikongo linguistic group, which dominated the immediate interior. Although their ethnicities 
were diverse, a large majority were Nsundi and were connected to the Kingdom of Kongo, which 
lay close to the south bank of the Congo River.44  
 
                                                
44 Domingues, “Crossroads” 90-116. 
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Most of these captives were sent into the slave trade from their own societies, rather than 
through warfare or kidnapping, which had been common throughout the traffic for centuries. 
According to historian Norm Schrag, legal systems in the key provenance zone of Kingdom of 
Kongo were increasingly corrupted in the nineteenth century to accommodate the slave trade. 
Gradually, he contends, lineage heads began selling peoples who were previously considered 
ineligible for export, including free men and slaves who had already been assimilated into 
                                                
* From Domingues, “Crossroads” 108. 
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lineages.45 Another historian, Jelmer Vos, has found similar patterns in his analysis of West Central 
Africans purchased by the French in the 1850s. This French emigration scheme, which was 
ostensibly designed to supply the Antilles with ‘free’ laborers, was small in scale and lasted for 
only a few years, but drew on the same interior sources as the slave trade. According to Vos, many 
captives entering this traffic were originally sold for what were previously considered 
“misdemeanors” in their societies, such theft or sexual misconduct. In many cases, they were 
expelled by kin without committing a crime at all.46 
The demographic profile of these midcentury captives skewed young and male. According 
to Domingues, the proportion of children departing West Central Africa rose dramatically from 15 
percent to 53 percent between 1806-1830 and 1831-1855. Between 1856 and 1867 the proportion 
dipped to 36 percent, although this figure should be treated cautiously since there are only a 
handful of cases.47 The proportion of males was also rising. According to Domingues, the 
percentage of males departing West Central African ports rose from 63 percent to 74 percent 
between 1806-1830 and 1831-1867. Among embarkations in northern West Central Africa, the 
proportion of males was even higher; 81 percent, compared to 76 percent at Luanda, and 62 percent 
from southern ports between 1831 and 1855.48  
                                                
45 Norm Schrag, “Mboma and the Lower Zaire: a Socioeconomic Study of a Kongo Trading Community, c.1785-
1885” (Ph.D., Bloomington: Indiana University, 1985)  
46 Vos, Jelmer. ‘“Without the Slave Trade, No Recruitment”: From Slave Trading to ‘Migrant Recruitment’ in the 
Lower Congo, 1830-90,’ Benjamin N. Lawrance and Richard L. Roberts eds. Trafficking in Slavery’s Wake: Law 
and the Experience of Women and Children (Athens, GA: Ohio University Press, 2012), 45-64. For British officer, 
Richard Burton’s assessment of the French emigration scheme in 1863, see FO 881/1294, TNA.  
47 Domingues, “Crossroads”, 139-40. For a discussion of the methodological complications created by the term 
‘children’, especially in the West Central African context, see Domingues, “Crossroads”, 132-7. For children in the 
eighteenth-century slave trades, see Sowande’ M. Mustakeem, Slavery at Sea: Terror, Sex, and Sickness in the 
Middle Passage (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 167-9. For a broader look at child slavery, see Anna 
Mae Duane ed. Child Slavery Before and Africa Emancipation: An Argument for Child-Centered Slavery Studies 
(forthcoming, 2017, Cambridge University Press) 
48 Domingues, “Crossroads”, 127-128. 
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The demographic changes of West Central African captives can partly be explained by 
regional factors.49 The rising proportion of men, Domingues has argued, was largely due to the 
fact that the societies supplying increasing proportions of slaves were matrilineal. In these 
communities, retaining female, rather than male, slaves was an important way of holding and 
increasing wealth and status.50 Women were also highly valued because they took a leading role 
in labor, especially in relation to food production. João Monteiro, a Portuguese traveler who visited 
Boma, on the Lower Congo River, in 1876, noted the gendered labor distinctions. “[A] male slave,” 
he wrote, “cannot be made by his master to cultivate the ground, which is women's work, and the 
mistress and her slaves till the ground together.”51 The rising proportion of children, on the other 
hand, can perhaps be explained by changing norms governing eligibility for exportation in states 
such as Kongo. Children, who maintained lowly status with kinship groups, would have been 
particularly vulnerable to sale.   
Slave trade suppression was a second, and perhaps more important, factor. If an analysis 
of demographic data is expanded to the entire African continent, a revealing uniformity emerges: 
in each exportation region – from Senegambia to South East Africa – the number of child-captives 
doubled between the early and mid-nineteenth centuries.52 Although local and regional African 
factors likely shaped the exact demographics of captives departing each zone, the uniform increase 
across each of these culturally distinct regions suggests the broader influence of suppression. One 
of these influences was an overall decline in slave exports, which would likely have overloaded 
                                                
49 Most scholars have roundly dismissed American explanations. In general, Brazilian and Cuban planters valued 
adults more than children. Reproductive females were in unusually high demand due to the imminent threats of 
slave trade suppression. For on this discussion, see Domingues, “Crossroads”, 
50 Domingues, “Crossroads”, 130-1. 
51 Monteiro, Angola, 33; Domingues, “Crossroads”, 128-130. For the powerful influence of gendered 
understandings of labor on the slave trade from the Bight of Biafra, see, G. Ugo Nwokeji, The Slave Trade and 
Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in the Atlantic World (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
52 Eltis and Richardson, Atlas, 166. 
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internal slave markets, leaving children particularly vulnerable to exportation. Suppression also 
created practical slave trading reasons for enslaving children. As historian Benjamin Lawrence has 
noted, enslaved African children were more “coercible” than adults.53 As a result, traffickers were 
able to move them more easily along the coast and onto the slave ship, an imperative in an era of 
coastal patrols. Furthermore, traffickers likely welcomed children aboard their vessels because 
they did not require shackling, meaning the ship could dispense with the tell-tale slaving 
equipment.  
Information on the origins and demographic profiles of the Julia Moulton captives is 
limited, but they appear to have fit within broader patterns. No records identify exactly where they 
entered the slave trade, but their coastal embarkation point, Ambrizette, offers a basic guide. 
Located on the coast between Ambriz and the Congo River, Ambrizette was closely tied to the 
supply zones of northern West Central Africa. It is therefore likely that many of the captives came 
from the Kingdom on Kongo, the chief source of captives during this period, and that many were 
Nsundi. Almost all of the captives would have been members of the Kikongo linguistic group and 
could therefore have communicated with each other in some form during their ordeal.  
The demographics of the captives are more certain. In total, 664 captives boarded the Julia 
Moulton in April 1854, a large figure that will be examined more closely in the next section. After 
the voyage, sailor Henry Fling recalled that among the 664, there were “40 women, the rest were 
men and boys.”54 Fling did not mention girls, perhaps counting them among the “40 women.” If 
so, females formed only 6 percent of captives who boarded the Julia Moulton at Ambrizette. 
Although females typically formed a minority of captives in the nineteenth century, this proportion 
                                                
53 Benjamin N. Lawrence, Amistad’s Orphans: An Atlantic Story of Children, Slavery, and Smuggling (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), 36-7. 
54 NYH, Nov. 9, 1854 
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was particularly low. Only one other voyage after 1850 carried less than 10 percent females – the 
Zeldina, which departed the Loango Coast in late February 1857.55 One possible explanation is 
seasonality. In Kikongo territories, January to April marked the beginning and end of an 
agricultural cycle. Since the Julia Moulton arrived on the coast in April, inland slave traders may 
have preferred to retain women to gather the harvest rather than send them to export markets.56 
Although the proportion of children who ended up aboard the Julia Moulton is not revealed 
in the sources, the distribution of captives around the brig suggests it was within the common 30 
to 50 percent range. According to Smith, he and the crew put the “boys and women” above deck, 
while they put the “men” below. It is unclear how Smith defined “boys”, but if children had formed 
a majority of captives, the traffickers would likely have put some of the “boys” in the hold, leaving 
more space on deck. On the other hand, the space limitations of the hold suggest there were more 
than a just a few children. If there had been a very small number of children, the slave deck would 
have struggled to accommodate the remaining 500 or so adult males, notwithstanding the ‘tight 
packing’ aboard illegal slavers. 
These largely male and young captives likely journeyed from the interior on foot and by 
water. Having been sold to external markets they would have come under the authority of 
pombeiros, itinerant traders who brought goods to the interior and sold slaves to the coast. Using 
the natural aid of the Congo River, pombeiros brought many of the region’s captives to the coast 
in dug-out canoes.57 Heading downstream, many slaves arrived at Boma, the main slave market 
                                                
55 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/mHdx88LY. Zeldina # 4229, carried 91 percent males. 
56 For seasons, see Domingues, ‘Crossroads’ 85-7. For the influence of seasons on the trade see, Stephen D. 
Behrendt, ‘Ecology, Seasonality and the Transatlantic Slave Trade,' in Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault, eds., 
Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830 (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 44-85. 
57 On transporters and caravans, see Miller, Way of Death, 189-206. David Livingstone identified transporters in 
northern Angola as carregadores. See David Livingstone to Edmund Gabriel, Oct. 28, 1854, Add. MS. 37410, 
British Library. 
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on the Congo. Laying 50 miles from the coast, Boma was the gateway to the Atlantic Ocean. The 
slave market at Boma was controlled by powerful rulers who levied fees on slave sales and captives 
passing through their jurisdiction.58 As they journeyed through the town, perhaps having been 
separated from kin, the captives would have journeyed towards the mouth of the Congo. Here the 
path split in several directions. Some captives remained on the lower reaches of the River, where 
slavers increasingly embarked their captives in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Others were 
transported by boat, out into the Atlantic and around the coast to embarkation points at Ambrizette, 
Ambriz, or the Loango Coast. Still others travelled to these places by land or via the Lower 
Congo’s dense network of creeks.59 
When captives neared the coast, they entered ramshackle pens known as ‘factories’ or 
barracoons while they awaited shipment. Andrew Wilson, an American sailor who deserted the 
slave ship Mary E. Smith in 1855, spent two and a half months at a barracoon near Cape Padron, 
at mouth of the Congo. The captives, he observed, were “kept chained in gangs of from eight to 
twelve” and branded on the chest, arm, back or thighs a few days after they arrived. Adding to the 
brutality of this scene, Wilson said the superintendent at his barracoon, “went heavily armed, and 
… shot one negro dead for disobedience of his orders.”60 Slave traders described similarly violent 
episodes in their correspondence. After one voyage in 1856, a West Central African trafficker, 
João Soares, wrote to a ‘cargo’ investor, Bento Pacheco dos Santos, informing him that “one [of 
                                                
58 On Boma, see Schrag, “Mboma”, 62-5. For British descriptions of Boma, see FO 925/488&489, FO 881/1294, 
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his slaves] came off from the shore dead from blows given by [another trafficker,] Luiz, on the 
eve of embarking, so that on board he was never able to rise.”61  
When the coast was clear of cruisers and it was finally time to board, a fast loading process 
began. The threat of capture encouraged slave traders to embark captives as quickly as possible; 
often within a few hours. By contrast, in the legal slave trade, captives often boarded over several 
months and even in different locations along the coast. As in previous eras, the transfer of captives 
from the shore was typically conducted by local boatmen. Hired by coastal agents such as Cunha 
Reis, they were knowledgeable about the local surf and could transfer the captives quickly. In the 
case of the Julia Moulton, the boatmen of Ambrizette delivered the captives to the brig, a mile 
offshore, by dugout canoe and lighter. The process was probably a more chaotic version of Figure 
3.5, which depicts Ambrizette boatmen transferring men from British cruisers back to their ship in 
1855. In the case of the Julia Moulton, when the captives arrived, Smith and Willis hauled them 
up ladders and aboard the brig. The whole process lasted about two or three hours.62  
Figure 3.5. “Kroo-canoe going over the surf at Ambrizette, W. C. Africa” July 15, 1855, NMM. 
 
                                                
61 João Soares, May 20, 1856, enc. in John O’Sullivan to Lewis Cass, Mar. 28, 1857, SDR, NARA. 
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Captive Africans were not the only people to board illegal slavers on the coast. 
Jurisdictional disputes and confusion between suppression powers occasionally led to the capture 
and release of slave trade crews during the nineteenth century. In late 1853, for instance, the 
American cruiser USS Perry had captured the New York schooner Glamorgan, near Ambriz. The 
captain of the Perry, Lieutenant Richard Page, had sent the Glamorgan’s American captain to the 
US for trial, but uncertain about American jurisdiction over the foreigners among the crew, he had 
released five Portuguese sailors on the shore. The Portuguese had subsequently taken refuge on 
the shore, perhaps with Cunha Reis. The stranded sailors eventually found a path home, however, 
when the Julia Moulton appeared at Ambrizette, a few months later. In exchange for the journey 
back to the Americas, they agreed to serve aboard the brig, thereby bolstering its crew to 23.63  
With the arrival of the Portuguese sailors, the brig was fully populated. Despite the 
evidentiary limits, the overall picture of its occupants is relatively clear. Following the main 
patterns of the age, the captives came from several hundred miles of West Central Africa’s northern 
coast and belonged to the Kikongo linguistic group. There were more children and males than 
previous eras, even during earlier decades of the illegal slave trade. When these captives boarded 
the Julia Moulton, they came under the authority of a diverse group of slave traders born in the 
US, Portugal, Germany, and the Netherlands. With the addition of reinforcements from the African 
coast, the crew was much larger than was common during the legal era and slightly larger than the 
average midcentury crew. In total, there were 685 people aboard the vessel. Now, they raced away 
from shore and into the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
                                                
63 NYT, Dec. 2, 1854; NYT, Jan 26, 1855. For the Glamorgan, see ‘Voyages’ #4924. For jurisdictional issues over 
sailors on captured slavers, see Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 175. 
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Illegal Middle Passages  
After captives boarded illegal slavers, crews forced them into position around the ship. In general, 
the distribution of captives was not strongly influenced by traffickers’ wishes to keep captives out 
of sight, hidden from the prying eyes of naval officers and their crews. In fact, the distribution 
largely mirrored patterns from the legal slave trade, in which many captives were always 
positioned below deck and others were sometimes found above. On the illegal slaver Echo in 1858, 
all captives were confined below the deck, with the men imprisoned in one hold and the women 
and children in another.64 Aboard other vessels, captives were located both above and below the 
deck. On the Julia Moulton, Henry Fling later recalled: “the women and boys were put on deck, 
and the men were passed below.”65 Similarly, on the Thomas Acorn, in 1860, the men were 
confined to the hold, while the women were held above in a poop-deck.66 In 1854, the crew of the 
Grey Eagle put the children in the vessel’s long boat, which sat on the deck hatch.67 Captives could 
therefore often be found both above and below the deck; the only rule was that men remained 
below. 
Slave traders’ longstanding concerns about security and space determined these patterns 
rather than special concerns about cruisers. The placement of men below deck was a security 
measure, both before and after abolition. Captain Smith described the rationale: “The boys and 
women we kept on the upper deck. But all that strong men-those giant Africans that might make 
us trouble-we put below on the slave deck.”68 Underscoring his concerns, Smith also had the Julia 
Moulton’s crew secure the hatches on the main deck so “that a man could not crawl up through the 
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open places.”69 At the same time, the distribution of captives on all slavers was influenced by the 
availability of space. Slave ships came in various shapes and sizes, and captives varied by age and 
sex. Although men always remained below, the precise location of women and children varied 
according to these variables. Holds, cabins, and long boats were all possibilities.  
Nevertheless, suppression did alter the occupation of space during voyages. Many illegal 
slave traders opted to keep captives below deck while they were near the African coast and in the 
Caribbean, where cruisers were also active. Then, when the slaver was in open water, they would 
bring the captives above. In the early twentieth century, Cudjo Lewis, who had been a captive 
aboard the Clotilda in 1860, said that slaves aboard his vessel were kept below for thirteen days 
after leaving the Bight of Benin, but thereafter spent much time on deck.70 At the same time, crews 
also moved captives in the opposite direction, often at short notice, to avoid detection. After his 
voyage aboard the Grey Eagle, 17-year-old sailor Joseph Town recalled that during a chase, the 
crew took the women and children from the deck “so they might not be seen.”71 According to 
Smith, his own approach in such a scenario was to “put them all below deck, and nail down our 
hatches.”72  
Traffickers packed captives into horribly tight spaces aboard illegal slavers, especially 
beneath the deck. Henry Fling and Captain Smith explained the ‘spoon’ formation aboard the Julia 
Moulton. “In the day time we had them sitting on each other’s legs[,]” Fling recalled.73 At night, 
Smith added, “they lie down upon the deck, on their sides, body to body.”74 This pattern, depicted 
in Figure 3.6, was common on midcentury slavers. Edward Manning, who had been a sailor aboard 
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the Thomas Acorn, described the same formation: “Commencing forward, we made the first man 
lie down … the knees slightly drawn toward the chin. Another one was placed alongside with his 
breast touching the back of the first and his knees bent at a similar angle. In this manner we stowed 
them, in tiers, the length and width of the hold.”75  
Figure 3.6. “Slaves packed below and on deck.” Illustrated London News, June 20, 1857 
 
The dimensions of the Julia Moulton suggest its men were terribly confined beneath the 
deck. At its largest extent, the vessel measured 92’10” in length and 24’ in breadth.76 Multiplying 
these figures gives a rough square footage of the main deck: 2208 sq. ft. Given the inward curve 
of the vessel, the slave deck of Julia Moulton would have been smaller; perhaps around 2000 sq. 
ft. The number of captives occupying this space was probably close to 400, given that there were 
624 males and taking into account the likely proportion of children (around 35 percent). When the 
number of men is divided into the available space, the result, 5 sq. ft., is a rough estimation of the 
horizontal space afforded each man under the deck. The height, or headspace, in the hold is more 
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difficult to estimate. The Julia Moulton’s hold measured 10’ from top to bottom.77 Casks 
containing provisions lay at its base, with the slave deck positioned somewhere above. The 
traffickers would likely have left themselves adequate room to gain access to the provisions, 
meaning the slave deck was probably located close to the main deck. The observations of George 
McHenry, a British doctor, offers a guide. McHenry encountered many midcentury slavers while 
he lived in the South Atlantic island of St. Helena. In 1862, he summarized what he had seen of 
their holds: “the space between the water-barrels and the deck [does not] exceed four feet.” “The 
slaves,” he added, “unable to stand erect, or even to sit upright are compelled to preserve 
continually a recumbent position.”78 A British officer who seized the Abbot Devereux off Ouidah 
in 1857, offered a similar assessment. In this case, he said, the slave deck was 3’ 6” in height, “just 
room enough, to clear the top of [the slaves’] heads when they are in a sitting position.”79 A 
depiction of this slaver, showing the cramped conditions of the its captives, was subsequently 
published in the Illustrated London News (see Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7. “Sections of the slaver ‘Abbot Devereux.” Illustrated London News, Sept. 19, 1857 
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Did captives face ‘tighter packing’ aboard illegal slavers compared to legal ones? Evidence 
from the Julia Moulton, McHenry, and the British officer, albeit roughly calculated and limited in 
scope, supports this supposition, at least in the hold. In his study of Liverpool slave ships between 
1782 and 1807, Nicholas Radburn has shown that captives occupied an average horizontal space 
of between 5 and 9 sq. ft.80 This range compares favorably to the 5 sq. ft. for the Julia Moulton. 
Radburn also found that head room varied between 4’7” and 5’4”, exceeding the observations of 
McHenry and the captor of the Abbot Devereux.81 One possible mitigating factor may have been 
higher number of children aboard illegal slavers and thus the smaller body sizes of captives. Yet, 
as we have seen, not all traffickers put children under the deck. In addition, the absence of shackles 
on illegal slavers, especially after 1850, suggests extreme packing. Radburn has shown that in the 
legal British slave trade, men were afforded more space than women because they were shackled.82 
When Smith was asked by an interviewer after his voyage whether they had “chained or 
handcuffed” the men, he replied: “No, never; they would die.”83 The implication is that the absence 
of shackles in the illegal slave ships allowed for tighter packing beneath the deck. Ultimately, the 
only relief from these extreme conditions came from the death of fellow captives, who crews 
removed from the hold and tossed overboard.84 
Extreme packing was ultimately driven by slave traders’ greed and inhumanity, but 
ironically, abolition and suppression offered some encouragement. Tight packing had been a focal 
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point of the British abolitionist campaign, captured in the famous depiction of the slave ship 
Brookes. Parliament had responded with Dolben’s Act (1788), which required slave ships to 
increase the ratio of tons to captives, thereby enlarging the space available to each slave. However, 
as slave trading nations including Britain abolished the trade, they surrendered control over these 
issues. Now, instead of observing laws such as Britain’s Dolben’s Act, slave traders were free to 
pack as many captives onto a slaver as they could.85 Moreover, as abolitionism and suppression 
gradually took hold in many parts of the Atlantic world, the prices for captives fell in Africa. As 
Radburn has shown, slave traders always responded to low prices by cramming more captives onto 
their vessels.86 In the mid-nineteenth century, traffickers carried more captives than ever. The 
average slaver contained 603 captives; almost double the average for the trade as a whole (310).87 
In some ways, therefore, suppression gave impetus to the traffic and made conditions for captives 
even more extreme.  
These conditions were naturally associated with sickness and death. McHenry described 
horrific scenes aboard captured slavers arriving at St. Helena:  
“Some [captives] exhibit … thick crusts, formed from the drying of the humours of the 
craw-craw, a loathsome cutaneous eruption. A few, still able to crawl, may be remarked 
with the incipient pustules of the smallpox. Among the throng, are to be found a few unable 
to move, from the rack of rheumatism, the stab of pleurisy, or the tortures of a broken bone; 
or in the last stage of emaciation, oozing out their lives with the constant flux of dysentery; 
or perhaps just dead.”88 
 
Another observer describing the arrival of two intercepted slavers in Monrovia, Liberia, noted: 
“most of [the Africans] are nothing but skeletons, and so weak that at present they are unable to 
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stand.”89 In June 1860, an American reporter describing another intercepted slaver, Wildfire, noted 
that of the 510 Africans still alive, “about a hundred … showed decided evidences of suffering 
from inanition, exhaustion, and disease.” “Dysentery” he added, “was the principal disease.”90 
The Julia Moulton’s captives endured similar hardships. After the voyage, Smith 
acknowledged in a disturbingly offhand manner: “I lost a good many the last cruise-more than ever 
before.”91 In fact, 150 of the original 664 captives – 23 percent – died during the middle passage. 
Smith did not describe the symptoms of the dead, but they were likely among those mentioned by 
McHenry. He did locate the disease center: under the deck, amongst the men. When his crew 
discovered the sick, above or below, they laid them on the deck, presumably for better air, more 
space, and possibly some form of treatment. Supercargoes were typically charged with taking care 
of the sick. In this instance, however, Vilela, had also fallen ill and died about a week after leaving 
the coast.92 Another Portuguese, Caetano, who had joined the vessel in Africa, took his place. 
Caetano had been the supercargo of the Glamorgan, and according to Willis, he became “Doctor” 
to the slaves.93 Caetano’s strategies to heal the sick are not mentioned in the sources, but with a 
death rate of three per day, they were clearly inadequate.  
The mortality rate aboard among the Julia Moulton captives was slightly higher than most 
voyages after 1850. According to the ‘Voyages’ database, mortality rates along the West Central 
Africa-Cuba nexus averaged 16.5 percent between 1851 and 1866, compared to 23 percent on the 
brig.94 In general, mortality was higher after 1850 than before; between 1810 and 1850, mortality 
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rates on the same route averaged 11.7 percent.95 The rising mortality rate is puzzling for a few 
reasons. First, voyage length, which historians have correlated with mortality, was becoming 
shorter. The average voyage along the West Central Africa-Cuba route decreased from 66 days to 
47 days during the timespans mentioned above (the Julia Moulton made the crossing in 45 days).96 
Secondly, historians have not found that mortality rates increased with tighter packing, which 
seems to have increased as the nineteenth century wore on. 97 Thirdly, the proportion of children, 
who may have been more susceptible to diseases found aboard illegal slavers, was not much higher 
after 1850 than before. On the West Central Africa–Cuba route, the percentage of children rose 
from 27 percent to 31 percent between 1810-1850 and 1851-1866.98 
The rising mortality rate was likely related to growing suppression activity on the African 
coast. David Eltis has contended that epidemiological conditions prior to boarding were the main 
determinant of shipboard mortality rates.99 These conditions likely worsened during midcentury, 
as suppression tightened. One impact of these measures was that traffickers moved to more remote 
parts of the coast, where they erected barracoons for slaves awaiting shipment. The 
epidemiological conditions in barracoons were likely worse than the slave pens of Luanda and 
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Benguela in earlier generations. Many barracoons, for instance, were far from food and water. The 
American sailor Andrew Wilson noted “the nearest water was three miles off” from his barracoon, 
and “it was no small labor to bring the necessary water for drink.”100 Moreover, the British naval 
officer Charles Wise suggested that “insufficient diet” contributed to “fatal diseases” such as 
dysentry, in barracoons.101 In many cases, captives spent long periods in these conditions. Wilson, 
for instance, waited two and a half months in a barracoon before catching the next slave ship back 
to the Americas.102 In 1857, William McBlair, the captain of an American cruiser, USS Dale, noted 
that some slaves on the Loango Coast had “been detained from shipment for eight months.” “Eight 
hundred of these poor persecuted creatures,” he wrote to his wife, “have subsisted upon only one 
plantain a day each for that time.”103 In 1860, the captain of an American cruiser USS Saratoga 
made a direct connection between time spent at barracoons and mortality rates. He had recently 
intercepted the slaver Nightingale near the Congo Rover and had witnessed the subsequent deaths 
of 150 Africans under his own jurisdiction. In his view, the deceased’s “long confinement in the 
barracoons, was of itself sufficient to account for the many deaths.”104 
 A final distinctive feature of midcentury voyages was provisioning. During the legal slave 
trade of the early nineteenth century, and later, when it was only weakly policed, slavers typically 
brought some food from their outfitting port and picked up plenty of provisions on the African 
coast. Indeed, for some Africa societies, provisioning slavers was an important offshoot of the 
traffic itself.105 The presence of cruisers, however, made provisioning on the African coast more 
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difficult, especially as patrolling became more focused in the 1840s. Captain Smith strongly 
appreciated the perils of re-stocking on the African coast. On a previous voyage, he had been 
captured by a British cruiser having put into land for water. He had only escaped by running the 
ship into shore and making off with the help of allies on the coast.106 
Such close shaves encouraged traffickers to shift provisioning away from Africa to the 
main outfitting ports in the Americas and Europe. The Julia Moulton was one of many vessels to 
load with rice, beans, and pork in New York. The Augusta did likewise in 1860. In another case in 
1855, West Central African trafficker Guilherme Correa wrote to Lima Vianna in New York 
instructing him to “fit [the next vessel] out with everything except beef.”107 In other cases, slavers 
stopped in Europe for provisions. In 1858, the Haidee sailed from New York to Alicante, Spain, 
picked up rice and beans and journeyed onward to the Loango Coast in 1858.108 Certainly, some 
vessels continued to take in some food and water on the coast, especially fish and water from the 
Congo River, but by the mid-nineteenth century, provisioning had largely shifted from Africa to 
the Americas and Europe.109  
Slave traders’ changing provisioning strategies had several implications for captives. 
Unlike earlier periods of the traffic, captives were exposed to a largely new diet during the middle 
passage. Illegal slavers carried mainly carbohydrates and proteins – usually rice and beans – to 
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Africa. Rice, in particular, was not grown widely in West Central Africa, the main provenance 
zone for captives. The biscuit and beef aboard the Julia Moulton would likewise have been foreign 
(Correa ultimately used local fish, instead of beef in 1855). The effect of these new foods is hard 
to determine, but they presumably contributed to the gastrointestinal problems that were common 
on illegal slavers. Perhaps more significantly, captives were highly vulnerable to slave traders’ 
greed as well as the inaccuracy of their calculations. Illegal slave traders regularly squeezed more 
captives aboard than they had provisions for.110 Lack of water, in particular, was a serious problem, 
especially since stopping for fresh supplies was out of the question. Cudjo Lewis, who sailed 
aboard the Clotilda in 1860, remembered: “They geeve us little water-one swallow twice each 
day.”111 Some traffickers made the connection between the lack of water and death. John McCarthy 
a sailor on the Huntress, which sailed from West Central Africa to Cuba in 1863 and lost 250 
captives said the “voyage was full of hardships and suffering, and there was a great scarcity of 
water.”112  
Africans responded to the physical conditions of the illegal middle passage much as they 
had done in previous eras. Some resisted violently. In 1853, an unnamed slaver arrived in Cuba 
from southeast Africa. According to the New York Tribune a large number of the captives had 
been as “maimed” during a violent, but ultimately failed, uprising.113 In an even more striking 
case, in 1859, another slaver arrived in Cuba having lost almost its entire compliment of over 1,000 
captives from insurrection and disease.114 Largescale rebellions were nevertheless rare. There are 
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only three known cases of insurrections after 1850; less than one percent of the total number of 
voyages.115 This percentage is far below the ten percent average for the entire history of the trade. 
One factor may have been the concentration of captives coming from West Central Africa. 
Captives embarking from this region had always been statistically less likely to rebel than those 
originating elsewhere. Other factors may well have been the shorter voyages and large proportion 
of children.116 Whatever the cause, the historically low ratio of crew to captives during this period 
was rarely a major problem for the traffickers. 
Instead of attempting to physically overcome their captors, most captives’ survival 
strategies centered on attempting to forge bonds with shipmates. Some historians have argued that 
midcentury captives were able to recreate social ties aboard slavers. In the case of the Clotilda, 
one of the few slavers to arrive on US shores, Sylviane Diouf, has suggested captives formed a 
“special connection” based on shared experience, “not unlike their experience of communal 
suffering during initiation.”117 In a similar vein, Sharla Fett has contended that survivors of the 
middle passage had already recreated “powerful social bonds” soon after their arrival in the 
Americas.118 Although evidence for these connections is limited, the concentration of Kikongo 
speakers aboard illegal slavers may have allowed captives to begin the rebuilding process during 
the middle passage. By shoehorning the slave trade into relatively tight provenance zones, the 
suppression of the slave trade may therefore have provided at least some succor to captives.  
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The Destinations of Midcentury Captives 
Captives who survived the middle passage faced an unusual set of possible destinations. On the 
one hand, suppression had narrowed the smuggling routes substantially. During most of the 
transatlantic slave trade, enslaved Africans arrived in many parts of the Americas. By the late 
eighteenth century, captives were disembarking from the Chesapeake to Rio de la Plata and almost 
everywhere in between. The number of destinations fell significantly with the widespread abolition 
of the trade in the early nineteenth century, although captives continued to arrive illegally in Brazil, 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other minor importation zones. When Brazil suppressed the slave trade to 
its shores in 1850, however, Cuba became the only major importer of enslaved Africans. About 20 
slavers did arrive in Brazil in the early 1850s, and two vessels brought captives to the US in 1859 
and 1860, but these numbers were dwarfed by the Cuban figures. Between 1851 and 1866, around 
500 slavers arrived on the island’s shores, bringing about 165,000 captives.119 It was for this reason 
that many observers simply dubbed the slave trade, the ‘Cuban’ slave trade, after 1850. 
Despite narrowing the smuggling routes, suppression in some ways diversified the range 
of destinations for Africans. Nineteenth century naval patrols resulted in the interception of 
hundreds of slavers in the nineteenth century. About a third were carrying captives whom the 
British and American authorities referred to as ‘liberated’ or ‘recaptured’ Africans. Overall, around 
181,000 Africans were intercepted by cruisers between 1800 and 1863.120 Between 1851 and 1863, 
the figure was 26,748; a fairly large share of the total considering the much smaller scale of the 
traffic during this timeframe.121 According to David Eltis, about 85 percent of all interceptions 
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took place in African waters, where the naval suppression effort was more vigorous than in the 
Americas.122 This pattern was repeated during the final phase of the trade, with particular 
concentrations near West Central Africa and the Bight of Benin. The remaining captives were 
intercepted in the Americas, especially in the Gulf of Mexico in the late 1850s and early 1860s.  
The final destinations for these Africans depended on the authority that intercepted them. 
Britain interdicted the vast majority of captives after 1850; 16,608, or 52 percent of the total.123 In 
most cases, British cruisers escorted slavers and their captives (where they existed) to the nearest 
British Vice-Admiralty Court (VACs). These Courts were widely dispersed across the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans. Of the total 130 cases adjudicated at VACs, the Court at Sierra Leone heard 
69; St. Helena, 65; and Jamaica, Antigua, Mauritius, and Lagos a few each. Overall, the VACs 
courts heard 31 cases involving captives.124 In the vast majority of these cases, whether slaves had 
been found aboard or not, the VAC judge condemned the ship. If Africans were involved, he 
typically placed them under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office.125  
The subsequent fate of Africans ‘liberated’ by British suppression was strongly influenced 
by the growing demands of West Indian planters. Until the 1830s, Britain had sent most Africans 
to its West African colony, Sierra Leone, to serve as unpaid apprentices. This pattern shifted in the 
aftermath of the British Emancipation Act in 1833 and the expiration of the apprenticeship period 
in 1838. Complaining bitterly of labor shortages, Caribbean planters urged the Colonial office to 
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send the liberated Africans to them. The Colonial Office acquiesced, and by the mid-1840s, the 
transshipment of Africans to the West Indies became what historian Rosanne Adderley describes 
as “standard British policy.”126 By the 1850s, two in every three intercepted Africans were passing 
through the VAC at St. Helena, on their way to British Guiana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. Upon their 
arrival in the West Indies, they began three to five year indentures, after which they became legally 
unbound and eligible for paid work.127 
Captives intercepted by American cruisers had a different experience. In total, the US Navy 
intercepted 6,452 Africans after 1850.128 In a new policy devised in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the American government sent these Africans to Liberia, West Africa. This policy emerged from 
the maelstrom of racial politics in the US and the historical connection between the US and Liberia. 
With the status of free blacks roiling American politics in the early nineteenth century, an 
emigration movement headed by the American Colonization Society (ACS) encouraged free 
African Americans to resettle in the newly founded Republic of Liberia. Although widely 
unpopular among American blacks and largely unsuccessful, the colonization movement offered 
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Congress an opening for how to deal with the intercepted Africans in the mid-nineteenth century. 
With the US already bitterly divided over the future of slavery, and the permanent settlement of 
Africans on American soil therefore out of the question, the Liberian option proved a convenient 
solution to the ‘problem’ of intercepted Africans. Sensing the opportunity, Congress authorized, 
and paid, the ACS to oversee the transport and settlement of the Africans in Liberia. Upon their 
arrival, they became apprentices, mainly to African American emigrants, for seven to fourteen 
years. 129  
The Spanish were the final major contributor to the interception figures. Although the 
Spanish Navy failed to interdict any captives in Cuban waters after 1850, the colonial authorities 
did intercept 5,000 newly-arrived Africans, or bozales, on land.130 Under the terms of treaties made 
with British governments in 1817 and 1835, these Africans were declared emancipados 
(emancipated slaves). According to the treaties, emancipados were meant to serve as apprentices 
for five to seven years and then become completely free. During their indentures, however, most 
planters employed them like slaves, forcing them to work the cane fields and treating them in the 
same fashion. Moreover, in most cases, the Cuban authorities permitted planters to continue 
apprenticeships well after five years. Many Africans endured decades of apprenticeship and never 
became free, working effectively as slaves for the rest of their lives, or until large scale Cuban 
emancipation, which began in the 1870s. In fact, the situation was in some respects worse for 
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emancipados; as ‘liberated’ Africans they were denied the traditional right of Cuban slaves to 
coartación – the right to purchase their own freedom.131  
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the foregoing information. Table 3.2 outlines the broad 
outcomes for all captives boarding slave ships in Africa after 1850. The vast majority – almost 7 
in every 10 – were enslaved in Cuba. Much smaller numbers died during the middle passage and 
were intercepted on land and sea. The most distinctive feature of these figures is the very large 
proportion of captives going to a single destination. At the same time, although the proportion of 
Africans who died or were intercepted during the middle passage was broadly similar to earlier 
periods of the illegal trade, it represents a much larger proportion of captives who did not complete 
their voyage as their captors intended compared to the legal trade, when interception was not a 
concern. 
Table 3.2. Outcomes for all captives embarking aboard slavers in Africa, 1851-1866132 
Slavery in Cuba  159,967 69.6% 
Death during the middle passage 38,114 16.6% 
Intercepted on land or sea 31,748 13.8% 
 229,829 100.0% 
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Table 3.3 indicates the outcomes for intercepted Africans by destination and by legal status. 
These Africans faced a kaleidoscope of possible destinations, ranging from South America, the 
British and Spanish Caribbean, to Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa. The concentrations in 
the British West Indies and Liberia, however, were distinctive of the mid-nineteenth century. The 
legal status of intercepted Africans was fairly uniform throughout the Atlantic basin. Yet there 
were distinctions on the ground. For many, particularly Cuban emancipados, life as a ‘liberated’ 
African was not materially different than slavery in Cuba. At the same time, as Daniel Domingues 
and others have pointed out, Africans who ended up in Liberia typically faced shorter indentures 
and conditions quite different to slavery in Cuba.133 In any case, having been shuttled into another 
new, and often brutal world, ‘liberation’ was hardly a panacea for liberated Africans.134  
 
 
Table 3.3. Outcomes for intercepted Africans, 1851-1866 
Intercepted by the British Navy and sent to British West Indies or Sierra Leone 16,608 52.3% 
Intercepted by the US Navy and sent to Liberia 6,452 20.3% 
Intercepted by Spain and remained in Cuba as emancipados 5,000 15.7% 
Intercepted by Brazil and became apprentices in Brazil 3,116 9.8% 
Intercepted by Portuguese Navy and became apprentices in Angola 572 1.8% 
 31,748 99.9% 
 
 
The Julia Moulton captives were among the 14 percent of Africans who were intercepted 
en route to Cuba. Having made a relatively speedy Atlantic crossing, the brig approached Trinidad 
de Cuba in mid-June, 1854. Following detailed instructions like given to him by Correa in New 
                                                
133 Domingues da Silva, Daniel; Eltis, David; Misevich, Philip; Ojo, Olatunji, ‘The diaspora of Africans liberated 
from slave ships in the nineteenth century’ Journal of African History, 55 (2014): 347-69 
134 Brazil captured 8 vessels after 1850, carrying 3,116 captives. http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/KpCtwz3j. The 
Portuguese intercepted 5 vessels after 1850, carrying 572 captives. http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/LSj4tSG3. For 
more on these captures see Roque Ferreira (forthcoming), ‘The Broken Paths of Freedom’ website: 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/spatialhistory/cgi-bin/site/project.php?id=1069, da Silva et al. 
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York, Captain Smith sailed to a specific latitude and longitude between Cayo Blanco and Cayo 
Zarzo, just east of Trinidad. Coming to a halt, the crew made a signal to the shore using a white 
and red flag. Receiving this cue, Cuban traffickers immediately came off the coast in three 
launches. After some discussion, they ferried the captives ashore. When everyone had reached 
land, the Cubans forced the Africans to walk to a farm a few miles distant. Some, who were too 
sick to walk, were carried by other captives. Meanwhile, back on the water, one of the Cubans ran 
the Julia Moulton into shore and burned it. Battered, filthy, and worth very little, the brig followed 
the fate of most midcentury slavers after its work was done.135 
Up to this point, the voyage had gone to plan, but now it began to disintegrate. The winds 
of suppression had temporarily shifted in the Spanish empire. In 1853, the Spanish government in 
Madrid was particularly concerned about the growing threat of Cuban annexation from the US. 
But to stave off the Americans, Spain needed British support, and the price of British support was 
tougher action against the slave trade. In this context, the metropolitan government dispatched 
Juan de la Pezuela to Cuba as the new captain general. Pezuela was much more committed to 
suppression of the slave trade than his predecessors, and with support from Madrid, he got to work 
immediately. In early 1854 he removed several corrupt officials throughout the island, and in May 
he granted Cuban authorities permission to enter estates to search for bozales, a right they had been 
denied since 1845.136  
The Julia Moulton captives were intercepted in the midst of this crackdown. In June 1854, 
Pezuela sent a trusted deputy, Brigadier Juan Rodriguez de la Torre, to lead an assault on the slave 
                                                
135 NYT, Nov. 7, 1854; NYH, Nov. 9, 1854. 
136 Murray, Odious Commerce, 233-9. For the rising power of the captain general over the island’s affairs in the 
nineteenth century, see Josep M. Fradera, Colonias para después de un imperio (Barcelona, Ediciones Bellaterra, 
2005), 183-326. 
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trade in Trinidad and Sancti Spíritus.137 Within a few weeks, the lieutenant governors of both 
jurisdictions, Juan Martin and Santiago Gurrea, had been suspended from office, and the regions’ 
leading traffickers, Salvador de Castro Sr., Pedro Choperano, and Mariano Borrell, had been 
arrested and imprisoned in Havana.138 By September, over 806 bozales had been intercepted in the 
two jurisdictions.139 According to John Backhouse, the British commissioner at the Court of Mixed 
Commission in Havana, 490 of this number had “landed from Julia [Moulton] at a place called 
San Carlos at a sugar estate not far from Trinidad.”140 This estate, laying in Trinidad’s valley of 
ingenios (sugar mills), was the second biggest sugar producing estate in the jurisdiction and lay a 
dozen miles from the coast.141 
After the Cuban authorities intercepted the Julia Moulton Africans at San Carlos, they 
transferred them to the deposito de emancipados in Havana. In July 1854, the Cuban government 
made an announcement in its official paper, Gaceta, inviting a list of “persons favored” to come 
to the deposito.142 The listed parties, who included men and women, Cuban officials, as well as 
the government itself, had applied for a certain number of apprentices well before the landings in 
Trinidad and Sancti Spíritus had occurred. Now they had their chance to select their labor. In a 
process that closely resembled a slave auction, the Africans were paraded and the buyers decided 
who to take on. Prices were set by age and sex, and buyers made their choices carefully. One man, 
who had signed up for five emancipados, selected two boys for $84 in total, a 22-year-old woman 
                                                
137 Crawford to FO, July 14, 1854, FO84/937, TNA. 
138 Crawford to FO, July 6 & July 14, 1854, FO84/937, TNA. 
139 Crawford to FO, Sept. 27, 1854, FO84/937, TNA. 
140 Backhouse to FO, Jan. 1, 1855, FO84/959, TNA. 
141 Carlos Rebello, Ingenios de Cuba (1860), jurisdicción de Trinidad (I). It is possible the estate was San Carlos in 
Sancti Spíritus, which was owned by the Conde de casa Brunet, a relation of Mariano Borrell. See ibid, 
jurisdicción de Sancti Spíritus. 
. For further details on the crackdown in the summer of 1854, see GG, Leg. 427, no. 20579, ANC.  
142 Enclosed in Backhouse to Clarendon, Aug. 3, 1854, FO84/959, TNA. 
 141 
for $48, and a 17-year-old girl for $38 dollars, but discarded his fifth option because he didn’t like 
the deal.143  
The distribution and subsequent fate of the Julia Moulton Africans is unclear, but 
apprenticeship offered little to emancipados. The money paid by the buyers was meant to be given 
to Africans for their first four months of labor, but in many cases emancipados were never paid. 
Similarly, although the apprenticeships were to last five years, with emancipados retaining the 
right to seek reassignment each year, these terms were often broken by buyers and ignored by the 
Cuban government. Moreover, although the Gaceta announcement reminded consignees to “fulfill 
the duties which religion, morality, and the existing regulations impose upon them,” this meant 
little in practice. By the fall of 1854, the threat of American annexation had subsided and the 
Spanish government recalled Pezuela. A new governor, José de la Concha, took his place. He was 
more closely connected to Cuban slave traders and gave little regard to emancipados. Soon, the 
‘Cuban’ slave trade picked up again.144  
     
Conclusion 
The voyage of the Julia Moulton illustrates how the mid-nineteenth century slave trade was similar 
to, and distinctive from, pervious eras of the traffic. On the one hand, some broad features of the 
traffic were similar to earlier periods, especially to the illegal slave trade of previous decades. 
Many of the trends highlighted in this chapter, such as larger vessels; bigger and more diverse 
crews; more captives per voyage; a higher proportion of children; quicker voyages; the narrowing 
destinations for the enslaved; and the possibility of interception, had begun in the early nineteenth 
century. On the other hand, many of these features had become much more acute by 1850. For 
                                                
143 Backhouse to Clarendon, Aug. 3, 1854, FO84/959, TNA. 
144 Roldán, ‘On the Blurred Boundaries’ 144-6; Murray, Odious Commerce, 238. 
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example, few illegal slavers during the 1830s and 1840s were as large or carried as many captives 
as the Julia Moulton. But perhaps the most distinctive feature of the midcentury trade was the 
pathways travelled by slavers and their captives. After 1850, the vast majority of vessels travelled 
a single route, beginning in the US, running to West Central Africa (often via Cuba), and finally 
reaching the ‘Pearl of the Antilles.’ At the same time, the minority of Africans who were 
intercepted on land and sea faced a variety of indentures in a largely distinctive array of 
destinations.  
 Three factors were particularly important in determining these trends. One was the growing 
profitability of the trade, which was ultimately a function of burgeoning American and European 
demand for slave-produced sugar in Cuba. These record profits encouraged slave traders to 
purchase larger vessels and to jam more captives aboard them in ever-tightening formations. A 
second issue was technological innovation, which put these large, fast vessels on the market. It 
also lowered shipping costs, which invited distant parts of the African coast into the trade. Yet, 
suppression was by far the most important factor. Suppression powerfully shaped the routes taken 
by ships and their captives, as well as captives’ environments prior to embarkation and aboard the 
slaver. It also determined the lifeways of the 32,000 Africans intercepted on land and sea after 
1850.  
 Although suppression strongly shaped the slave trade during the mid-nineteenth century, it 
did not succeed in its ultimate goal of ending the trade until 1866. In the wake of the Julia Moulton, 
the battle between slave traders and their adversaries continued in many parts of the Atlantic basin. 
In 1855, a year after the Julia Moulton’s voyage, one of the key players in the illegal slave trade, 
Cunha Reis, left West Central Africa and immigrated to New York. His arrival heralded a new era 
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of intensive slave trading from the US. The following chapter analyzes the international effort to 




















British Spies and the Challenge of Suppression in New York and the Atlantic World 
 
In March 1860, the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston wrote to his Foreign Secretary, John 
Russell suggesting a plan for suppressing the illegal slave trade to Cuba. The island was the only 
major remaining market for enslaved Africans, and the previous year, an all-time record 32,379 
captives disembarked on its shores.1 Noting that traffickers were paying handsome bribes to Cuban 
officials to ignore, or even abet these arrivals, Palmerston mused whether “it would be but fair to 
fight the slave traders with their own weapons.”2 What he meant was that the Foreign Office hire 
local spies to report on the traffic. Palmerston envisaged these informants reporting on all kinds of 
industry secrets (including the complicity of officials), but what he really valued was intelligence 
on the movements of slave ships. This information, he believed, could be crucial in helping 
Britain’s navy interdict slavers at sea. It might even help bring the trade to an end. Paying spies, 
he wrote, was a way “to kill [the] trade with ‘silver lances.’”3 
Palmerston was actually suggesting an extension to a preexisting strategy. As Foreign 
Secretary, he had authorized the hire of Britain’s first major spy in 1849. This informant, Joaquim 
Alcoforado, was the captain of a coastal steamer that plied the waters around Rio de Janeiro, the 
largest slaving port in the Americas at the time.4 His work impressed Palmerston. Reflecting on 
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the dramatic collapse of the Brazilian trade in 1850, he told Russell it had been Alcoforado who 
had “brought the slave trade there to an end.”5 Although Palmerston exaggerated, eliding other 
forms of British pressure and growing anti-slave trade sentiment in Brazil, his comment showed 
that the highest officials in the British government believed spying could work. The Foreign Office 
underlined the point after 1850, when it expanded its intelligence-gathering operations. As the 
traffic shifted to new axes linking the US, Iberia, the Bight of Benin, West Central Africa, and 
Cuba, Britain hired new informants to match it. By 1860, when Palmerston penned his note to 
Russell, the Foreign Office was already receiving intelligence from every major slaving zone in 
the Atlantic basin. In total, about a dozen informants reported to the British government between 
1850 and the end of the trade in 1866.6 It even retained some Cuban spies until the late 1860s to 
guard against a resurgence of the trade.7  
 Britain was not alone in valuing ‘insider’ information. Although many other nations’ 
governments were not committed to suppression for long periods of the nineteenth century, those 
that were, typically paid informants. The Brazilian government, for instance, followed up the 
closure of its trade in 1850 by hiring the same Alcoforado to help keep it down.8 Seemingly a 
unique example, Alcoforado served two masters for much of 1850s. In Cuba, governors who were 
genuinely committed to suppression also gathered information from unofficial sources. Captain 
General Pezuela (1853-54) was one prominent example.9 The US actually enshrined slave trade 
                                                
5 Palmerton to Russell, Mar. 14, 1860, PRO/32/22/21, Russell Papers, TNA. 
6 Because Foreign Office staff did not keep a central record of informants or their pay scales, it is difficult to say 
exactly how many informants Britain had. They did, however, make direct and indirect references to about a dozen 
informants. The following are mentioned by name: Emilio Sanchez (New York); Joaquim Alcoforado (Rio); Brito 
(Brazil); Francisco Rovirosa (Havana), Laureano Thomes (Bahia Honda); José Barreto (Ouidah). 
7 For the continued use of slave trade informants in Cuba, see Consul General John V. Crawford to Clarendon, Sept. 
30, 1869, FO84/1303. 
8 Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 351-2; Alcoforado, “História sobre o infame,” 219-29. 





spying into federal legislation. The Act of 1819 invited “any citizens, or other person” to report 
illegal disembarkations on American soil, and promised $50 in return for every intercepted 
captive.10 Although paying for intelligence seems to have tailed off in the US as the century wore 
on and slave imports declined, it made a resurgence in 1862, when the federal government finally 
clamped down on slave ship outfitting in its ports. In that year, district attorneys in New York paid 
dockworkers, traffickers’ cellmates, and other insiders for slave trade intelligence.11  
Despite the widespread use of spies, Britain’s engagement with them was distinctive. 
Britain, for instance, used informants more widely and systematically than other powers. While 
most other nations hired spies sporadically and in piecemeal fashion, after 1849, Britain ran a far-
reaching spy program, complete with standardized pay scales for the best informants. Another 
distinction was the variety and invasiveness of Britain’s intelligence network. Whereas other 
powers generally hired spies only within their national boundaries, Britain typically hired foreign 
nationals based in other states.12 As a result, Britain was not only penetrating the slave traders’ 
world, but also the jurisdictions of other powers. A final difference was that Britain’s spy network 
was uniquely connected to a wider apparatus of international suppression. Much of the intelligence 
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gathered by their spies passed through London and ended up aboard British cruisers off the African 
coast. Thus, although spying was widespread, Britain used it most aggressively and most globally. 
 Despite being a common feature of suppression, spying has not been closely examined by 
historians. Although a few scholars, including María de los Ángeles Meriño Fuentes and Aisnara 
Perera Díaz, Leslie Bethell, David Eltis, Richard Huzzey, and Leonardo Marques, have noted the 
presence of some spies during the nineteenth century, especially those who worked for the British, 
spies typically appear as minor characters in larger synthetic works.13 As a result, the full extent 
of spying, as well as the motives, work, and effectiveness of spies themselves remain unclear. This 
chapter offers the first sustained analysis of informants, revealing the scale, dynamics and larger 
meanings of slave trade spying.14  
 The role of one British spy, Emilio Sanchez y Dolz, is the focus of this chapter. Sanchez 
was a Cuban-born shipbroker and commission merchant based in New York, the key slave ship 
market in the Atlantic Basin after 1850. He was a British informant from February 1859 to May 
1862. During that time, he devoted almost his entire time to the job. Using his regular occupation 
as a cover, he stalked the merchant district of Lower Manhattan, gleaning information from 
seafarers and dockworkers, and following the slave traders around their favorite haunts. In total, 
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he wrote at least 178 missives on the traffic to his handler, Edward Archibald, the British consul 
in New York. These notes were generally 2-3 pages in length and included all kinds of information, 
including ship clearances, the whereabouts of prominent slave traders, and traffickers’ 
international networks. His reports represent the single best source on the workings of US traffic 
in the mid-nineteenth century.15 
 Sanchez is a particularly useful case study. He is the only informant whose intelligence is 
recorded in bulk in the British national archives. Sanchez’s extensive correspondence with 
Archibald contrasts with the slivers of intelligence that have survived from other spies, such as 
Alcoforado. In addition, Sanchez was greatly valued by the British government. In total, the 
Foreign Office paid him £1,400, or about $7,000.16 Only Alcoforado received more (about double), 
and that would probably not have been the case had British cruisers been positioned outside New 
York, as they were at Rio.17 Sanchez is also a good case study because he was Britain’s longest-
serving fulltime informant. Britain did pay Alcoforado over a longer period, but the traffic ended 
two years into his contract, and his information seems to have dried up quickly. Sanchez by 
contrast, gave at least weekly intelligence for 3 years and 4 months. His tenure began as New 
York’s slave trade reached its peak in 1859, and ended in 1862, when the traffic finally shifted 
away from the US.  
 Sanchez’s career as a spy suggests new ways of thinking about the nature, effectiveness, 
and limitations of slave trade suppression. Britain’s role in tackling the trade rightfully looms large 
in historiography, but it was only partly British. Foreign nationals, including Sanchez, were a key 
component of its campaign. Moreover, these informants came to the task for the own reasons, 
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many of which were not in line with those of their masters or the British public. British suppression 
was therefore powered by an eclectic mix of British-centered impulses and the priorities of secret 
overseas agents, at least in mid-century. The role of Sanchez and other spies also shows how slave 
trade ports were not unregulated places where traffickers ran amok, as commonly depicted in 
existing literature.18 By hiring spies, Britain turned them into marketplaces for information and 
battlegrounds over the trade. Although spies were invisible to most observers – including slave 
traders – they were striking real blows against the traffic. Finally, spying helps explain what it took 
to finally bring the slave trade to an end in the US and across the Atlantic basin. Britain used spies 
to operate an impressively global suppression campaign, but what could it achieve in a world where 
anti-slave trade sentiment had not yet been globalized? The case of Sanchez shows what could and 
could not be achieved in this context. 
 The following chapter develops these points over four sections. The first explains how and 
why Britain developed a large network of slave trade spies in the mid-nineteenth century. It shows 
that Britain was uniquely equipped, both in ideological and practical terms, to do so. The second 
section highlights the many reasons why Sanchez, and other spies, joined this network. The third 
closely examines Sanchez’s work in New York. It also shows how he used professional and 
familial connections to expand his reportage to the slave trade in his native Cuba. The final section 
analyzes Sanchez’s contribution to slave trade suppression, both off the African coast and in New 
York. The chapter concludes by showing that although Britain’s global suppression campaign put 
a dent in the US trade, it could not kill the traffic without support from the federal government. 
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The rise of spying in British suppression  
Britain’s use of slave trade spies was rooted in frustration with the ineffectiveness of its 
suppression efforts. By the 1840s, Britain was pursuing a wide-ranging suppression campaign, 
spearheaded by a large deployment off the African coast and in Brazilian waters, and supported 
by a network of anti-slave trade treaties with a large number of states on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean. In terms of direct costs, British governments spent between 0.2 and 1.3 percent of total 
annual expenditure on slave trade suppression from 1815 to 1865.19 Yet the traffic continued in 
very large scale, especially in the South Atlantic, but also in West Africa and the Caribbean. The 
major obstacle was that national and colonial governments in these regions were unwilling to take 
vigorous action against the trade. As Richard Huzzey has noted, British efforts were also 
complicated by its unwillingness to overtly violate the sovereignty of European and American 
powers, such as Portugal and Spain, whose colonies, Angola and Cuba, were deeply involved in 
the traffic, as well as the US. The British government was also concerned, albeit to lesser degree, 
with Brazilian sovereignty.20 A final complication was US designs on Cuba. Britain was wary of 
America’s growing influence in the Caribbean and was alarmed by attempts by the US government 
and creole exiles to purchase or even annex Cuba from Spain in the 1840s and 1850s. London was 
therefore anxious not to weaken the Iberian power by pushing them too hard on suppression.21  
These constraints frustrated Britain’s activist foreign policy leaders and helped guide them 
towards subtle, but penetrating methods of suppression from the 1830s.22 Palmerston, who was 
Foreign Secretary (1830-34, 1835-41, 1846-51) and later Prime Minister, (1855-58, 1859-65), 
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dominated British slave trade policy for a generation. An anti-slavery zealot, he authorized the 
Lagos bombing and was determined to act forcefully against the trade, despite the geopolitical 
complications.23 His views were largely supported by the Foreign Office’s two senior staff, the 
Permanent and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, who was 
John Wodehouse for much the 1850s, was largely responsible for slave trade matters, although the 
instinctively Palmerstonian Edmund Hammond was always part of slave trade deliberations in his 
capacity as Permanent Under-Secretary (1854-1873).24 William Henry Wylde, who was senior 
clerk of the Foreign Office’s Slave Trade Department (1855-1880), also had strong suppressionist 
credentials. Wylde was typically the strongest advocate of the spy system during high-level 
discussions at the Foreign Office.25  
These officials needed to operate free from outside scrutiny to act on their interventionist 
inclinations. Confidentiality was essential, not only to prevent the international disputes that could 
stem from covert operations that were later exposed, but also because parliament and the press 
were already casting a more critical eye on British suppression policies in the 1840s. The naval 
campaign, especially, was under fire for being costly and ineffective.26 It was ironic, then, that 
parliament unwittingly sponsored the Foreign Office’s new tactics through its annual provision of 
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the Secret Service Fund (SSF). Established by parliament in the 1820s, the Fund was intended to 
allow the Foreign Office to carry out secret operations free from parliamentary oversight and 
public knowledge. The annual allowance ranged from £25,000 to over £50,000, and was 
administered by the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary.27 Although Under-Secretary 
Hammond destroyed many SSF documents during his tenure, the surviving records show the 
Foreign Office supported a wide cast of informants and agents across the globe.28 It hired some 
for clear political purposes. In 1858, it recruited a spy through Edward Archibald, the British 
consul in New York.29 The Foreign Office charged the agent, who is unnamed in the sources, with 
infiltrating local “Irish clubs.” His job was to report on what the Foreign Office called the 
“disaffected Irish” who were joining the Fenian Brotherhood, a newly-founded Irish independence 
organization in New York.30 Although it is unclear how this infiltrator performed, it was the SSF 
that had given the Foreign Office the resources, and confidentiality, it needed to make the hire. 
The adoption of new suppression methods was also aided by the growth of British official 
representation across the Atlantic basin. As the case from New York indicated, the Foreign Office 
required help from its overseas representatives to handle its distant agents. These officials, 
including ministers and the more junior consuls and unpaid vice-consuls, answered directly to the 
Foreign Office. Charged mainly with facilitating trade and migration, their ranks had swollen over 
the course of the nineteenth century as British commerce penetrated global markets.31 By 
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midcentury, British representatives were spread throughout the Atlantic basin and in all the major 
slaving zones. There were ministers or consuls in each of the key departure ports: Rio, New York, 
Havana, and Cadiz. British officials were much thinner on the ground in the African embarkation 
zones, but there were consuls in several key slaving ports along the West African coast and also at 
Luanda, in West Central Africa. Britain also had seven consuls or vice consuls located along 
Cuba’s long shores.32  
By the mid-nineteenth century, these officials were more tightly connected to the Foreign 
Office than ever before. Widening and thickening patterns of global trade and migration aided 
integration. As goods and people moved across the Atlantic basin in increasing scale, ships carried 
dispatches to and from the Foreign Office with greater frequency. In 1852, for example, a new 
monthly mail service opened between Liverpool and Fernando Po in response to Britain’s growing 
palm oil trade with West Africa. The Foreign Office used this steamer to correspond with its 
African consuls. Revolutions in transportation and communication technologies also helped. By 
midcentury, steamships were replacing sail, cutting the length of transatlantic voyages by up to a 
half. These innovations, which underpinned what C.A. Bayly has called the global “great 
acceleration” in the nineteenth century, drew disparate consulates closer to London.33 Meanwhile, 
within Britain, Foreign Office mails travelled on the nation’s rail network, the most developed in 
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the world. By the 1860s, the Slave Trade Department was even receiving and transmitting 
messages, almost instantaneously, via telegram. The significance of these developments was that 
the Foreign Office could draw on a vast and increasingly connected network of antislavery agents 
to help execute its new strategies. 
The Foreign Office put these strategies into effect beginning in the 1830s. Alongside 
spying, the other main tactic involved Secret Service payments to Brazilian nationals to encourage 
them to take anti-slave trade positions. As David Eltis has highlighted, one of the early recipients 
was the Brazilian foreign minister, Caetano Mario Lopez Gama, who was in charge of slave trade 
treaty negotiations with Britain in the 1830s.34 Another was Leopoldo de Câmara, the port captain 
of Rio de Janeiro, who was in the pay of British government in 1849. Under Palmerston’s 
instructions, the Foreign Office also funded anti-slave trade newspapers in Brazil, including the 
Brazilian anti-slave trade society’s paper O Philantropo, and the Rio daily, Correio Mercantil. As 
Palmerston explained to James Hudson, the British Minister in Rio, these payments were designed 
to secure “the promotion of anti Slave Trade and anti Slavery principles in Brazil.”35 Playing the 
role of Consul Archibald in New York, Hudson made the payments to the papers and ensured they 
were printing what they promised. 
The British government supplemented their attack on the Brazilian trade by hiring slave 
trade spies. The Foreign Office paid informants in Rio and Pernambuco in the 1830s, but the first 
spy to produce big results was Alcoforado in Rio in the 1840s. The captain of a coasting steamer, 
Alcoforado claimed to know when slavers were due to leave port and when they would return from 
Africa. Well aware that Britain would value this information, in the early 1840s, he had already 
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occasionally reported directly to the British Navy patrolling the Brazilian coast and received small 
payments in return.36 After several years out of the business, the Foreign Office hired him on a 
more formal basis in 1849. This time, Hudson played the middle-man, passing Alcoforado’s 
intelligence to the Navy. In return, the Foreign Office promised him fixed rates for captures based 
on his information. These were £5.10 per ton of the slaver if it was empty, or £5 per ton plus £1.10 
per captive if it was not. These rates amounted to ten percent of the total bounties the British 
government paid its seamen for captured slavers.37  
Although his notes to Hudson have not survived, Alcoforado was clearly an impressive 
informant. Commander Grey Skipwith regularly received his intelligence while patrolling the 
Brazilian coast. In 1850, Skipwith reported to the Admiralty, “[Alcoforado] knows almost to a day 
when a full vessel is expected on the coast of Brazils and where she will land her cargo, also when 
and where from, any vessel fitted for slave trading will leave for the Coast of Africa.”38 In total, 
the Foreign Office attributed 18 British captures to his information and paid him a total of £2659 
(about $13,000), in bounties.39 Since over 170 slavers successfully departed Rio de Janeiro 
between 1849 and 1851, Alcoforado had not ended the trade as Palmerston later stated to Lord 
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Russell, but by raising slave traders’ risk and leaving a light footprint, Alcoforado had shown that 
spying could be an effective and diplomatically sensitive tool of suppression.40   
Buoyed by Alcoforado’s success, the Foreign Office considered applying the spy strategy 
to the highly robust slave trade to Cuba after 1850. One of the biggest problems Britain faced in 
this traffic was the slave traders’ use of the American flag. Intercepting slavers off the Brazilian 
coast had been relatively straightforward because most vessels sailed under Brazilian or 
Portuguese colors, which Britain was permitted to police by treaty. By contrast, the vast majority 
of voyages to Cuba took place aboard American vessels, which Britain was not permitted to detain. 
To Wylde, at the Slave Trade Department, spies offered a way around the problem. Recognizing 
the real owners of the slavers were typically not US citizens, but Cubans or Portuguese, he argued 
American law did not entitle them to the US flag. The vessels were, in his view, pirates, and as 
such, were subject to seizure by any nation. Thus, he wrote to his colleagues, “if we can ascertain 
on good authority that [the vessel] has been actually sold to the Cuban [or other non-US] Slave 
Traders, our own cruisers can deal with her.”41 Predicting objections from the American 
government to such seizures, Wylde also suggested the WAS pass spies’ intelligence to the US 
Navy, which could intercept the slavers itself. In these ways, he believed, “the money paid for the 
information would be well spent.” In fact, he estimated, “a few thousand pounds spent [on spies] 
would not amount to a third of the annual cost of one cruiser, and would be more effective than 
half a dozen.”42 
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The success of Wylde’s ambitious plan depended, however, on the ability of the Foreign 
Office to hire good informants such as Alcoforado. Although Britain never advertised the job, its 
well-known stance against the slave trade seems to have had the same effect. One of the 
prospective hires was James Groth in New York. Groth had been born in England and was the 
former owner of a secondhand furniture store in Manhattan. In 1858, he presented himself to 
Archibald alleging that several slavers were about to set sail from New York. Groth’s rather lame 
pitch was that he had supplied a slaver with a medicine chest several years ago. Surmising that 
Groth actually knew very little about New York’s booming trade, Archibald advised the Foreign 
Office against the hire. In his view, Groth’s information was “founded in a great measure on very 
insufficient information, if not on mere suspicion.”43 The British-born Charles Edwards, who was 
legal counsel to the British consulate in New York, described another problem to Archibald: Groth 
was currently unemployed and lived “in the neighborhood of the lowest class of Catholic Irish.”44 
Edwards’ comment suggested British officials screened candidates, at least in part, by their own 
perceptions of their social status. His impression of Groth would likely have been endorsed in 
London, where underlying assumptions about the unreliability of the poor ran deep. According to 
an 1850 Treasury Committee report, the Foreign Office specifically excluded lower classes from 
clerkships because of their perceived propensity to share state secrets.45  
The issue of trust was made even more thorny by the fact that many prospective informants 
were closely tied to the slave trade. The steamer captain, Alcoforado, was one example. Both 
before and during his tenure as a spy, Brazilian traffickers hired him to transport newly arrived 
captives along the coast near Rio. José Barreto, a Portuguese informant to Consul Benjamin 
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Campbell in Ouidah, also worked for local traffickers. Francisco Rovirosa, a Spaniard living in 
Cuba, was one of the island’s principal traffickers when he offered intelligence to Consul Joseph 
Crawford in Havana in the 1860s. The continued involvement of many spies in the slave trade, 
even during their tenure as spies, created uneasiness, and even disgust, amongst British officials. 
Aside from the offense it caused to British officials steeped in anti-slavery ideology, it called into 
question their basic allegiances. It may have been why Hudson wrote to Wylde in 1859, saying, 
“informers, as we all know, are an abominable race.”46 Yet, the Foreign Office also recognized 
that these individuals were effective precisely because they were immersed in the trade. Even 
Hudson, who never trusted informers, believed that the slave trade could not be crushed “save thro 
efficient informers.”47 In many cases, the Foreign Office simply held its nose and took the 
intelligence. 
After the Foreign Office applied its filters, it made financial offers to successful applicants. 
To spies it believed would provide good intelligence on a consistent basis, it offered formal 
contracts that linked pay to performance. Sanchez (New York), Alcoforado (Rio), and Rovirosa 
(Havana), all secured these contracts. They amounted to 10 percent on every slaver captured on 
their information. To make up for the uncertainty of cruisers actually capturing the vessels in 
question, the Foreign Office also promised annual retaining fees of £400. This sum would serve 
as a minimum salary. The Foreign Office also determined to renew contracts annually, meaning it 
could terminate them if the trade subsided. The Foreign Office did retain Alcoforado, and a second 
Rio spy named Brito, however, on a combined annual salary of £600-700 throughout the 1850s, 
in case the Brazilian trade made a resurgence.48 Aside from these formal contracts, the Foreign 
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Office also offered large sums for good information on particular voyages. Before Palmerston 
instructed Crawford to offer the 10 percent rate to Rovirosa, the consul gave him $799 for specific 
information about a recent voyage.49 The Foreign Office also gave smaller cash payments to 
informants where the trade was less intense. In Santander, in the Basque Country, Lt. Leopold 
March, the British vice-consul, paid informants from an £100 spy budget in the late 1850s.50  
 
Figure 4.1. Locations of major British slave trade spies, 1849-1866 
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As the Foreign Office extended these offers, its spy network gradually expanded to include 
every slaving zone in the Atlantic basin (see Figure 4.1). In the main disembarkation zone, Cuba, 
Britain had a least three spies after 1850. They included Rovirosa in Havana, Laureano Thomes, a 
school teacher in Bahia Honda, and an unnamed informant in Pinar del Río, in the far west of the 
island.51 Britain also had spies in the trade’s shipping hub, New York. In the early 1850s, when 
the first Portuguese slave traders started arriving in Manhattan, consul Anthony Barclay wasted no 
time in hiring a spy to tail them.52 In 1859, his successor, Archibald, hired Sanchez, the most 
prolific of all British spies. Coverage was not quite as impressive in Africa. Edmund Gabriel, the 
British consul in Luanda, took occasional soundings from informants on the large West Central 
African trade, although his efforts were limited by his location, hundreds of miles from the major 
embarkation zone near the Congo River.53 On the other hand, in the Bight of Benin, the 
embarkation zone for 13 percent of captives after 1850, Consul Campbell occasionally received 
intelligence from Barreto and another Portuguese, Carvalho, a decade later.54 In Europe, the 
Foreign Office paid spies in the Basque Country and Cadiz when their ports became major 
outfitting centers in the late 1850s and early 1860s. In Brazil, Alcoforado and Brito remained on 
standby.55 As the number and spread of these informants show, spying had become a major tool 
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Emilio Sanchez and the motives of a spy 
 
Britain’s most effective spy, Emilio Sanchez, was born in Havana in 1821. His family had deep 
and distinguished Cuban roots.56 In the sixteenth century, his forbearer, Mateo Sanchez, arrived in 
Havana from Yucatan, where he had been governor. By the late seventeenth century, the core of 
the family had relocated three hundred miles east of Havana to the small regional city of Puerto 
Príncipe (see Figure 4.2). Although it had been one of the first places sighted and settled by Old 
World migrants, this part of Cuba remained relatively underpopulated and isolated in the 
eighteenth century compared to the Havana region. The Sanchezes were nevertheless one of its 
more prominent families. Two of Emilio’s ancestors were mayors of Puerto Príncipe.57 His 
grandfather, Pedro Sanchez y Boza, was Postmaster.58 His father, another Bernabé, was a Second 
Lieutenant in the Royal Guards and was decorated for his service in the Peninsular War in Spain 
(1808-1814). In 1813, he was considered worthy of marrying Joaquina Dolz, a well-heeled 
daughter of an elite Havana family.59  
 As Joaquina and Bernabé welcomed Emilio into the world, sugar production was 
transforming Cuba’s economy and society. Up to the mid-eighteenth century, the island’s economy 
depended on tobacco cultivation, ranching, and subsistence farming. Its population was 
predominantly of European descent, although there were large minorities of African and Afro- 
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Figure 4.2 Map of Cuba, 1860, by department and jurisdiction. 
Nuevitas (22) and Puerto Principe (23) were the two largest jurisdictions in the island’s Eastern 
Department. Matanzas (12) was the most intensive sugar producing region of Cuba. 
 
 
Source: Franklin Knight, Slave Society in Cuba, 4. 
 
Cuban slaves and free people of color. These patterns began to change in the late eighteenth 
century as Cuban planters, merchants, and the colonial administration capitalized on the island’s 
abundance of fertile land and the collapse of sugar production in San Domingue by slowly turning 
the island over to slave-grown sugar.60 To support their endeavors, slave ships brought thousands 
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of African captives to the cane fields each year. The influx continued unabated after Spain’s formal 
abolition of the trade in 1820 and it was largely thanks to this traffic that Cuba became the world’s 
leading sugar producer later that decade.61 By then, sugar production was already deeply 
entrenched in much of western Cuba, and by midcentury, it had encroached on the eastern portion 
of the island.62 Puerto Príncipe and its neighbor, Nuevitas, were the jurisdictions touched least by 
the sugar boom, but they were still effected in important ways. Many new ingenios appeared in 
both jurisdictions and previously small slave populations grew substantially. Meanwhile, railroad-
building and maritime commerce expanded, helping connect the region’s sugar, molasses, and rum 
to markets home and abroad.63 
Although the sugar boom never fully took hold in their home region, the Sanchezes grasped 
the opportunities it offered. In the 1840s, the eldest of Emilio’s three brothers, Pedro, became a 
major stockholder in a railroad line that connected the towns of Puerto Príncipe and Nuevitas, the 
jurisdiction’s main port.64 He was also one of the region’s major landholders and slave owners, 
owning 200 slaves by 1869. Many of these slaves labored on his sugar estate, Desengaños, in 
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Nuevitas.65 Pedro was also a merchant who focused on foreign markets. Reflecting the growing 
trading links between Cuba and the US, his brig, the Pedro Sanchez Dolz, carried staples, lumber, 
and manufactured goods between Nuevitas and New York.66 A second brother, José, also 
capitalized on the growing Cuba-America trade. In 1843, he briefly secured the US consular post 
at Nuevitas and oversaw American commerce on behalf of the State Department.67 A third brother, 
Adolfo, was also strongly tied to the US. He too was a merchant. He lived in Philadelphia during 
the 1840s and became a US citizen in New York 1854. By the late nineteenth century, he was US 
Deputy Consul in Havana. 68  
Emilio Sanchez equaled his brothers’ mobility, enterprise, and trading acumen. He 
immigrated to the US as a boy, and in 1843, at the age of 22, he was naturalized as an American 
citizen in New Orleans.69 He began his career as an overseas merchant in New Orleans in the 
1840s, before moving to New York in 1850.70 Operating from an office in the shipping district of 
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Lower Manhattan, he established himself as a shipbroker and a commission merchant focusing on 
the hispanic markets of Cuba, Mexico, and Spain. The latter task entailed linking distant buyers 
and sellers and earning a small percentage on their transactions.71 These labors yielded a moderate 
income. By 1859, Sanchez was earning $3,000 a year; more than most New Yorkers, but far less 
than Manhattan’s big Cuba traders such as Moses Taylor, who owned and operated their own 
vessels.72 Sanchez’s home reflected his income and status. He lived with his Massachusetts-born 
wife, Susan, and their two young girls in a brick house in New York’s twentieth ward. Their 
neighbors were lawyers, grocers, shoemakers, and physicians.73 Like Emilio, many were 
immigrants, and were trying to make their way in the largest, busiest, and most ethnically diverse 
city in the US.74 
When Sanchez approached Archibald in the early spring of 1859, he brought many 
qualities that marked him as a useful spy. He first made contact through an intermediary whom 
Archibald described only as an “estimable English gentleman.”75 Sanchez likely used an 
intermediary mainly to hide his identity from local slave traders – something he guarded fiercely 
                                                
71 See, for example, his clearing vessels for Barcelona and Cadiz and his intermediary role between the Mexican 
government and the Dupont firm of Delaware in NYT, Oct. 21, 1851 and Sanchez to E. I. Dupont de Nemours, Aug. 
20, 1849 and July 25, 1851, Hagley Digital Archives.  
72 For his income, see Sanchez to Archibald, July 12, 1859, FO84/1086. I have used 
http://www.measuringworth.com/exchangeglobal/ to convert from dollar to pounds. For Moses Taylor, see Roland 
Taylor Ely, “From Counting-House to Cane Field: Moses Taylor and the Cuban Sugar Planter in the Reign of Isabel 
II, 1833-1868,” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1958). 
73 The marriage took place Mar. 14, 1851 in Boston. See Massachusetts Town and Vital Records, 1620-1988. Susan 
Farley was a daughter of the Ipswich, Massachusetts Farley family, which had traded between New England and the 
Caribbean for several generations. For an overview of the Farley family see the University of Michigan Library’s 
Farley Papers finding aid: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/clementsmss/umich-wcl-M-2813far?view=text. Emilio and 
Susan’s daughters, Panchita and Emilia, were born in 1852, and 1855, in New York City. See New York State 
Census, 1855, New York City, Ward 20, E.D. 2. 
74 For their neighbors, see ibid. For New York immigration, especially the huge midcentury influx of Irish and 
Germans, see Robert Ernst, Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825-1863 (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1949). 
For a detailed overview of New York during this period, see Burrows and Wallace, Gotham: A History of New York 
City to 1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 620-1039. 





throughout his tenure as a spy – but his choice of go-between may have carried a certain gravitas. 
That Sanchez held a steady and respectable job was also in his favor, given the prejudices of the 
Foreign Office. His best assets, however, were his knowledge of New York’s merchant community 
and his ties with Cuba. He displayed them during his initial meetings with Archibald. In March 
1859, the consul reported glowingly to the Foreign Office: “through his connections and 
correspondents in Cuba as well as from his acquaintance with parties engaged in the trade with 
Spain and Cuba, [Sanchez] possesses peculiar facilities for obtaining information [about] the slave 
trade.”76  
Sanchez and his fellow spies were always preoccupied by security. Speaking on his behalf 
to the Foreign Office, Archibald said Sanchez would be at “great risk [from slave traders] should 
he be discovered.”77 It was a common concern for spies throughout the Atlantic basin. In 1854, 
the Ouidah spy, Barreto, reported to Consul Campbell that he was now being “looked on as a spy.” 
Sensing that his life was now in “peril” he fled the town.78 Consul Dunlop in Cadiz was more 
explicit about the perceived threats. In 1865, he complained that spies were unwilling to come 
forward because they were “all afraid of being stabbed.”79 In some regions, the connections 
between the slave traders and government officials were such that it was hard to tell who was the 
greater threat to British informants. In Bahia Honda, the school teacher, Laureano Thomes, had 
the misfortune of having his spy letters intercepted by the colonial government. According to 
Consul Crawford, he was then thrown in prison for seven months “upon a false charge of some 
offense against the government.” When he emerged from jail, he “begg[ed]” Crawford to get him 
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“to Mexico where he said he had some relatives, as his prospects had been ruined.” Crawford paid 
his ticket to Veracruz and gave him $20 to help him on his way.80 
Archibald and Sanchez devised many strategies to keep his work confidential. One ploy 
was for Sanchez to write to Archibald anonymously and mainly in cipher. This strategy meant that 
his notes could be understood only by staff at the New York consulate. To prevent any obvious 
association with the consulate, Sanchez would send these missives through trusted intermediaries. 
For his part, Archibald committed not to mention Sanchez’s name in his correspondence with the 
Foreign Office. He did so only on one occasion, when he recommended Sanchez for hire. He also 
promised Sanchez that his intelligence would never be used in evidence against slave traders. As 
an added precaution, he kept Sanchezes’ correspondence at his home, rather than at his office in 
the consulate.81   
Sanchez never explained why he took on the risky job of being a spy in his extensive 
correspondence with Archibald, but three reasons are particularly compelling. The most immediate 
motive was revenge for the tumultuous Haidee affair.82 The saga had begun in 1857 when Sanchez 
was approached by Juan Ceballos, a wealthy and respected sugar importer in New York. Ceballos 
proposed Sanchez purchase a ship, the Haidee, from a Portuguese merchant, Inocêncio Abranches, 
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and then accept a request from another Portuguese, Antonio Botelho, to charter it. According to 
Ceballos, Botelho would take the Haidee to Spain, and sell its cargo, along with vessel. Sanchez, 
who was in line to receive a commission on the cargo and a profit from the sale of his ship, agreed 
to the proposal, and Botelho departed for Spain. When Botelho arrived, however, he refitted the 
Haidee and proceeded on a slaving voyage, heading first to the Loango Coast of West Central 
Africa and then to Cuba. A few months later, news of the voyage reached District Attorney John 
McKeon in New York, and Sanchez was indicted by a grand jury for violating the anti-slave trade 
Act of 1820. No American had ever been executed on this charge, but a conviction technically 
carried the death penalty. Fortunately for Sanchez, the jury acquitted him, although it was no 
thanks to Botelho, who was long-gone from New York, or to Ceballos, who refused to help 
Sanchez during the trial. Ceballos even told the beleaguered Sanchez he had “rejoiced” at the good 
fortune of the Haidee investors. Sanchez made his own views clear to Archibald, branding Botelho 
and his friends “scoundrels” for attaching “disgrace” to his name and causing him “great distress 
of mind.”83   
Although Sanchez presented himself as an innocent, duped merchant, this portrayal is 
questionable. There is a certainly a chance Sanchez knew what he was getting himself into when 
he chartered the vessel to Botelho. Several Portuguese merchants, including the notorious Cunha 
Reis, had recently been charged with slave trade offenses in New York and although the charges 
were always dropped, or the defendant was found not guilty, the association between the traffic 
and New York’s small Portuguese merchant community was clear.84 Sanchez, an active merchant 
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in Lower Manhattan, would probably have made the connection. He certainly would not have been 
the first US citizen in New York to knowingly dabble in the trade. The shipbroker J.B. Gagner and 
the Cuban-born merchants, Mora brothers, also chartered their vessels to slave traders, and 
probably received large fees for their services.85 On the other hand, New York was an extremely 
large port by midcentury and Sanchez could not have known everyone, especially recent arrivals 
such as Botelho. Moreover, Ceballos, a respected merchant, had vouched for him. Furthermore, 
there was nothing intrinsically peculiar about the transaction. Trading vessels internationally was 
commonplace in the Atlantic basin, and as a shipbroker, Sanchez did it on a regular basis. 
Certainly, Archibald seemed to accept Sanchez’s innocence. After grilling him about the incident, 
he reported to the Foreign Office “[Sanchez] has impressed me very favourably as to his 
character.”86  
Whether Sanchez had knowingly participated in the slave trade or not, many prospective 
agents shared his desire to get even. In June 1859, a Rhode Island slave ship captain, Edward 
Townsend, approached Archibald with a startling offer. His plan was to take command of a slaver 
in New York, sail it to the African coast, and give it up to a British cruiser. Townsend’s apparent 
change of heart was linked to the voyage of the slaver Echo, which he had captained the previous 
year. Near the end of this voyage, the US Navy had intercepted the vessel and put Townsend on 
trial in Key West. Although he was acquitted of all charges, he was angry at the voyage investors. 
According to Archibald, his new scheme was driven not by “shame[,] but from a sense of injury 
done by the principals who had abandoned him during [his] trial.”87 Another slave trader, Rovirosa, 
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was also out for revenge. In 1864, John V. Crawford, the Acting British Consul in Havana, wrote 
to the Foreign Office about Rovirosa’s motives. “Philanthropy is all out of the question,” he said, 
“[Rovirosa] is actuated by motives of private vengeance.”88 Although the Foreign Office rejected 
Townsend’s suggestion on the grounds it was unworkable, it accepted Rovirosa as a spy.  
Sanchez’s second motive was plainly financial. Although most, if not all, informants 
expected to be paid, Sanchez’s pecuniary requirements were especially pressing. The Haidee affair 
had jeopardized his financial standing. He had purchased the ship for $20,000 in 1857, and his 
plan to make a profit by selling it in Spain fell apart when the slave traders had forgone the sale. 
They had even sunk the Haidee near Montauk, New York, after the voyage took place, so there 
was no chance of reclaiming it. For a while, Sanchez hoped he would be informally indemnified 
by the Haidee investors, who had enjoyed impressive returns from the voyage. Julián Zulueta and 
José Plá, the main investors in Cuba, did make promises to that effect, but in the end they gave 
him nothing. As he explained to Archibald, the whole ordeal had left him “circumscribed in his 
pecuniary affairs.”89 
Spying for the Foreign Office promised to improve his position markedly. After 
Archibald’s warm recommendation in the spring of 1859, the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
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Malmesbury, offered Sanchez the following contract, based on the Alcoforado scale.90 In return 
for his information, the Foreign Office offered him a guaranteed minimum annual income of £400 
(about $2,000). This figure could rise substantially if his information led to voyages being broken 
up. The Foreign Office, which envisaged passing some of Sanchez’s information to US authorities, 
offered him £50 for every voyage disrupted in US ports or captured by the US Navy.91 For vessels 
intercepted by the British Africa Squadron, he stood to make much more: £5.10 per ton of the ship 
if it was empty, and £1.10 per ton plus £5 per captive if it was carrying slaves.92 The Foreign Office 
even drew up a typical scenario to show Sanchez how much he could make. For a British-captured 
slaver of 200 tons and with 500 slaves, he would net £280 ($1,400).93 This sum represented almost 
half his regular annual salary. Given the dozens of vessels leaving US ports in 1859, the job 
promised to pay extremely well.94  
Sanchez also had a third, political, reason for becoming a spy. His Cuban roots were key. 
Although the island’s sugar boom had benefitted many creole families, including the Sanchezes, 
some feared that the large number of Africans arriving through the slave trade increased the 
likelihood of a bloody, Haitian-style slave rebellion. At the very least, it ‘impaired’ the white 
character of the island. These creoles certainly blamed slave traders (many of whom hailed from 
Spain) for the influx of Africans, but they also criticized the Spanish government for turning a 
blind eye to the traffic. Exacerbating creole frustrations, Spain had instituted more direct control 
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over the island in the 1830s, hoping to shore up what remained of their American empire after the 
shattering revolutionary era. In doing so, it had eroded the traditional autonomy that creoles had 
enjoyed over Cuban affairs. The new dispensation was therefore marked by centralized, non-
representative rule, and by what many creoles saw as the ‘Africanization’ of the island through the 
slave trade. 
José Antonio Saco was the most prominent critic of the Spanish government. An elite 
creole from Bayamo in eastern Cuba, he was a prolific writer and was expelled from the island for 
undermining Spanish rule in 1834. In his writings, Saco depicted Spain as a corrupt overlord that 
encouraged the slave trade in order to force creoles into submission. In his view, Madrid calculated 
that creoles would cling to Spanish rule because they feared a race war against a rising population 
of Africans and Afro-Cubans. Saco could see the logic in this calculation. He believed slave 
rebellion was a very real threat and opposed abolition ostensibly because it could unleash such a 
conflict. To Saco, the best way out of the bind was to push Spain to suppress the slave traffic. Once 
suppression had been effected, the slave population would gradually ‘whiten’ over time, and 
creoles would secure greater autonomy within the Spanish empire. In other words, in Saco’s mind, 
opposition to the slave trade, support for slavery, and a commitment to creole rights, all went hand 
in hand.95 
Although the Sanchezes never openly identified with Saco’s position, their associational 
and occupational history suggest they broadly shared his views. Emilio’s father, Bernabé, is an 
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important figure in this portrait. Although not much is known about him with certainty, in the 
1820s, he appears to have lived in Philadelphia, and led an active group of creole reformers who 
originated from Puerto Príncipe and other eastern jurisdictions.96 Among these creoles was a young 
José Antonio Saco. Bernabé’s views were apparently inherited by his son, Pedro. Although a large 
slaveholder, he was fervently opposed to the slave trade. In 1856, he became the unpaid British 
Vice Consul at Nuevitas and reported on local slaving to Consul Crawford in Havana. Given 
Britain’s open and persistent criticism of the Spanish government’s role in the traffic, Pedro’s 
acceptance of this post was a very public statement both on his opposition to the slave trade and 
on the government’s role in it. The Spanish government certainly did not consider him the most 
loyal of subjects. During the Cuban War for Independence (1868-1878), Spanish officials 
suspected him of siding with creole patriots and briefly threw him in prison.97  
Although a tight connection between Sanchezes and anti-slave creole reformers is difficult 
to establish with certainty, a strong strain of creole-reformist sentiment clearly ran through other 
British spies in Cuba. In 1869, John V. Crawford, now the Consul General in Havana, made the 
point to the Foreign Office. Although the final slaving voyage had arrived on the island in 1866, 
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rumors of slave landings were still circulating. The conscientious Crawford wrote to the Foreign 
Office to say he had sent out his “creole friends” to learn if the rumors were true. The informants, 
he added, “are all opposed to the [traffic] both for political reasons as well as from personal 
motives.”98  
Sanchez’s motives appear, therefore, to have been quite mixed and distinctive from those 
of the British government. Although the Foreign Office and Sanchez shared a commitment to 
suppressing the traffic, they came to this position from very different angles. British suppression 
was rooted in ideology, markets, and world status. Its spy program was a natural extension of its 
existing campaign given the robust nature of the post-1850 trade and tools that were now at hand. 
Sanchez, by contrast, had immediate, firsthand concerns. He had debts to pay, both to his creditors 
and to his foes. He did not appear to have ethical problems with the trade. Yet, like the British 
government, he also thought in broad terms; specifically, about creole liberty in his native Cuba. 
His motives were therefore personal and distinctively creole, while his master’s were distinctively 
British and governmental. These differences did not, however, prevent an alliance. The critical 
point was that both parties opposed slave traders and were willing to work diligently against them.  
 
 
The Work of a Spy 
 
Sanchez began his new career with zeal. Seven months into his contract, Archibald summarized 
his early labors to Lord Lyons, the British Minister in Washington. According to Archibald, 
Sanchez was sending a steady stream of intelligence. “I have, since March last,” he said, “been in 
almost daily communication with my special informant.”99 Many of these missives were in cipher, 
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and Archibald’s clerks had been busy decoding them. The consulate had already sent thirty 
dispatches to London containing Sanchez’s “voluminous” reports. Archibald had also sent slithers 
of his information to US officials in New York, but they apparently did nothing with them. In fact, 
their sensitivity to “foreign interposition,” Archibald said, made his interventions “worse than 
useless” and he had given up. American inaction was particularly frustrating for Archibald 
because, as far as he could tell, Sanchez’s information was remarkably full and accurate. As he 
explained to Lyons, his notes included “the names and descriptions with, in most cases, detailed 
information of the movements of no fewer than fifty vessels.” All but a half dozen, he judged, 
were “beyond question engaged in the African Slave Trade.”100  
 Sanchez had gathered this intelligence with little guidance from Archibald or the Foreign 
Office. The British government never attempted to shape his methods throughout his tenure as a 
spy. Other informants in Cuba, Spain, and Africa, were similarly left to their own devices. The 
Foreign Office may have adopted this approach because they did not feel equipped to offer advice. 
Each spy and local context were certainly very different, and informants, after all, were supposed 
to be the experts. They may also have wished to be in a position to distance themselves from the 
spies and their labor, or simply deemed it impossible to control their agents. In any case, Britain’s 
approach was not to interfere, and as a result, spies had considerable autonomy over their work. 
Sanchez used his independence to devise three main methods of intelligence gathering. The 
first was spying on slave traders. The physical geography of Manhattan and the tight clustering of 
its mercantile community aided him in this task. New York’s merchants had always based 
themselves at Manhattan’s tip since the arrival of the Dutch in the seventeenth century. It was a 
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good location: the adjacent Hudson and the East Rivers were generously wide and deep, and the 
Bay and the Atlantic Ocean beyond were easily accessible.101 By the mid-eighteenth century, these 
assets had helped the peninsula become one of the most important trade hubs in North America. 
Commercial growth was even more impressive during the next century. By 1850, New York was 
second only to London in terms of global trade. The Rivers were filled with vessels that traded the 
world over and wharfs lined the shorelines. On land, commercial growth and massive influxes of 
European migrants were putting Lower Manhattan under unprecedented pressure. With space at a 
premium, shops, offices, and counting houses were rising to several floors. 
New York’s slave traders were deeply embedded in this increasingly crowded peninsula. 
When the Lusophone immigrants arrived in the 1850s, many joined pre-existing Portuguese 
merchant firms specializing in foreign trade. Cunha Reis, for instance, became a partner in the 
Portuguese wine-importing firm Figanière and Company in 1856. The Angolan, José da Silva Maia 
Ferreira, joined the same firm, supposedly, as a clerk.102 Using Figanière and Co. as a cover, Cunha 
Reis and Maia Ferreira were able to dispatch slave ships and launder capital relatively free from 
suspicion. Other traffickers had slightly different reasons for coming to Manhattan. Many of the 
ship suppliers, who were mainly Hispanics, had originally arrived as legal traders, and later began 
supplying slavers to Cuba. One of these merchants, José Mora, had arrived in New York in the 
early 1850s as an importer of Cuban sugar. By the end of the decade, he was still mainly engaged 
in this business, but sold vessel to traffickers in Cuba on the side.  
Sanchez was also part of Lower Manhattan’s merchant community and lived cheek by jowl 
with the slave traders. He conducted his ship-brokerage and commission business from an office 
                                                
101 For the development of New York, or New Amsterdam as it was then named, see Burrows and Wallace, Gotham: 
A History of New York City to 1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24-6, 43-6. 





at 187 Pearl Street. As Figure 4.3 shows, the slave traders were all nearby. Many were within a 
few blocks or less. One of the Portuguese, João Machado, was only a few doors down at 165 Pearl. 
Another Portuguese, Inocêncio Abranches, was a little further along at 158 Pearl. Cunha Reis and  









Maia Ferreira worked out of Figanière’s office at 40 Beaver Street. José Mora was only 400 yards 
away at 54 Exchange Place. Juan Ceballos, the Spaniard who had betrayed Sanchez in the Haidee 
affair, was nearby at 23 Broadway. Sanchez’s office was also close to the British consulate at 17 
Broadway, just a few doors down from Ceballos. All the main players were therefore tightly 
clustered in a fairly small patch of land. The major pro and anti-slave trade agents in the US were 
literally coming face to face in Lower Manhattan.103  
Sanchez watched his neighbors closely. Beginning with the Haidee offenders, he put the 
traffickers, in Archibald’s words, “under surveillance.”104 Taking advantage of his role as a 
merchant and Manhattan’s busy streets and wharfs, Sanchez followed them, keeping careful notes 
of their whereabouts. His job was harder when traffickers laid low, which was common 
immediately after voyages, when the US authorities were sometimes more alert. In 1859, Sanchez  
noted one of the Haidee investors, Antonio Almeida, was “concealed … for some time” after a 
recent voyage.105 On other occasions, however, he saw the same Almeida “boldly about” the streets 
and docks.106 Sometimes he monitored the offices of slaving trading firms. In the spring of 1859, 
he held a stakeout outside Almeida’s wine importing firm, Abranches, Almeida and Company. As 
he wrote to Archibald, he spotted the steward of the Haidee, Jose Cayetano, coming out of 
Abranches’ office, “on 1st April about 3 pm.”107 
Although surveillance helped Sanchez identify traffickers and their associations, he had to 
employ a second tactic – recruiting his own network of informants – to determine how they were 
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operating.108 The New York side of this network included dockworkers who helped prepare slavers 
for sea. Sanchez located these individuals through commercial contacts, such as a shipping master 
or sailor recruiter, named Javier.109 When he found them, Sanchez engaged his sources in what he 
called “casual conversation.”110 It was a deceiving description. Sanchez was hard at work in these 
exchanges, subtly plumbing witnesses for information on the slave trade. Many let details slip. 
Two leaky vessels were a sailmaker, Jesse Braddick, and a shipping master named Keefe. In April 
1859, both men revealed that Almeida held a stake in the voyage of the Putnam the previous 
year.111 Another unwitting informant was Pierre L. Pierce, a ship chandler, who supplied vessels 
with stores, but also took ownership of slavers on behalf of Cunha Reis on the side.112 In 1861, 
Pierce told Sanchez about the Manuel Ortiz, which had recently departed New York under the 
British flag. According to Pierce, the vessel was actually a slaver, and had only used British colors 
to “hoodwink” the US Marshal.113  
Sanchez also drew information from New York investors and slave ship crews. Jonathon 
Dobson, who captained at least two slavers in the late 1850s, was one of his best sources.114 On 
April 5, 1859, Sanchez reported: “Capt Dobson told me … the [slave ship] Tyrant was Cunha 
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Reis’s” despite being owned, ostensibly, by Matthew Lind.115 In August 1859, the seasoned slave 
ship mate, John Macomber, told Sanchez that the recently departed Brookline was a slaver. 
Macomber knew this information, he said, because he had been offered the position of first mate, 
but refused it.116 Sometimes Sanchez boldly played slave traders against each other. In December 
1859, he approached J. Lima Vianna, one of the principal slaving merchants and voyage investors 
in New York. Sanchez told him that Dobson was about to denounce him to the local authorities 
for his involvement in the voyage of the Isla de Cuba, which caused Vianna to state that Dobson 
must have “gone crazy” for he had also “invested in the affair.”117  
Sanchez was not prepared to limit his work to New York. Drawing on familial and 
commercial ties, he expanded his information network to Cuba. His brother, Pedro, was one of 
two sources on the island. The British Vice Consul for Nuevitas and the neighboring jurisdiction 
of Gibara since 1856, Pedro had already been active in reporting the local trade to Consul Joseph 
Crawford in Havana.118 In 1859, when his brother became a spy, Pedro also sent intelligence to 
him in New York. His main reason for helping Emilio was likely a sense of fraternal duty, although 
it is possible he was hoping for a cut of the bounties. In any case, unlike Emilio’s informants in 
New York, he clearly knew what he was doing. Since Emilio rarely attributed specific information 
in his letters to Archibald, it is hard to say what Pedro wrote in his notes. In the spring of 1859, 
however, Archibald remarked that he was aware that Pedro had recently sent letters to his brother 
identifying “parties engaged in the traffic … and furnishing instructive details of some of their 
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transactions.”119 Much of this information probably related to the relatively small traffic slave trade 
near Nuevitas, but it is possible that Pedro exposed aspects of the wider trade in Cuba. Emilio’s 
reports were certainly replete with reports of slave landings from all over the island. 
Sanchez’s other Cuban informant, José de Calzada, was likely the source of at least some 
of that intelligence. He was based in Havana, at the heart of the island’s traffic. Like Pedro, he was 
a merchant operating in the US-Cuba market and sent his intelligence knowingly and willingly. 
His motives for helping Emilio are hard to assess. Unlike Pedro, he had no clear obligation to help 
Sanchez or attack the traffic. He likely knew Emilio through legal trade, but since Emilio did not 
leave business or personal papers it is hard to assess the strength of this connection. Money was 
probably one factor. In 1859, Sanchez told Archibald that he had recently used “money and 
influence” to get information from Havana.120 He also stated, however, that Calzada sometimes 
volunteered intelligence.121 Whatever his motives may have been, Calzada did not share Sanchez’s 
apparent concern about ‘Africanization.’ In 1861, he petitioned Madrid for the right to carry ‘free’ 
African migrants from Fernando Po, Corisco, and Anabon to Cuba. This traffic was also pursued 
by slave traders such as Cunha Reis and almost replicated the horrors of the slave trade.122 It was 
perhaps because Sanchez and Calzada did not agree on these matters that Sanchez retained a 
healthy degree of skepticism over his reports. In one note to Archibald, he said he had “faith” in 
Calzada’s latest missive, but conceded “time alone will disclose the facts.”123 
                                                
119 Archibald to Sanchez, Mar. 8, 1859, FO84/1086. 
120 Sanchez to Archibald, May 9, 1859, FO84/1086. For Sanchez’s costs, see also, Archibald to FO, July 11, 
FO84/1086. 
121 Sanchez to Archibald, May 13, 1859, FO84/1086.  
122 Gabriel Enriquez to Captain General, July 6, 1861, Reales Ordenes y Cédulas, leg. 222, no. 428, ANC. For the 
traffic from Brass River to Fernando Po, which was perhaps connected to this scheme, see enclosures in W.G. 
Romaine to Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mar. 14, 1863. Calzada also petitioned the Spanish government to 
introduce 3,000 Colombian Indians to Cuba. See Testimonio del expediente promovido por Dn José Calzada, 
Ultramar, leg. 91, no. 2, AHN. 





Calzada was nevertheless well placed to help. His office was at 120 Obrapía street, in the 
middle of the city’s merchant district and close to the docks (see Figure 4.4). Several important 
traffickers, including Julián Zulueta’s father-in-law, Salvador Samá, were nearby.124 Like Sanchez, 
Calzada was effective at engaging slave traders on the waterfront. In the summer of 1859, he spoke 
to a slaving captain named Ruiz, who was in command of the Triton. Ruiz told him, in Archibald’s 
words, that he planned to sail to a US port, “purchase necessaries, and sail direct for the African 
coast.”125 Calzada was also effective at identifying the owners of slavers plying the US-Cuba 
nexus. In one instance, he wrote to Sanchez explaining that the Tacony, which had set sail from 
New York, was part owned by same Havana-based merchants that had been concerned in the 
voyage of the Haidee.126 
Sanchez’s third strategy – researching shipping information printed in newspapers, 
registers, and gazettes – also had local and international components.127 Much of this data 
originated in the New York Custom House, where US law required ship-owners to clear their 
vessels before heading to sea. Typically, slave traders complied with this process, sending the false 
owners, such as Pierce, to clear the vessel on their behalf. Fortunately for Sanchez, New York 
City’s Custom House passed this clearance information to major daily newspapers such as the New 
York Herald and Journal of Commerce via the Associated Press. Sanchez bought both these 
papers, knowing suspicious ‘owners’ and destinations would likely appear in their columns.128  
 
                                                
124 Directorio de artes, comercio e industrias de la Habana, 1859 (Habana, 1859), segunda parte, 26. Samá was also 
located at Obrapía, see ibid. Banco Español was located at 40 and 41 calle de Aguiar, which intersects with Obrapía, 
see tercera parte, 8. 
125 Quote from Archibald, Archibald to Foreign Office, Aug. 29, 1859, FO84/1086. Probably, Voyage #4918.  
126 Sanchez to Archibald, May 9, 1859, FO84/1086. Though Sanchez does not make it clear in his missives to 
Archibald, it is likely that many of the vessels that Sanchez noted were “purchased by parties at Havana” were 
probably first reported to him by Calzada. 
127 He listed them in Sanchez to Archibald, July 12, 1859, FO84/1086.  





Figure 4.4. Plan of Havana, 1859. 
 




Source: Havana, Cuba, from Plano de la ciudad de la Habana y estramuros para el directorio de 1859 (Librería de 
A. Granpera, Habana, 1859). 
 
 
When he found them, he typically made a cutting and sent it to Archibald, along with comments 
on the true nature of the voyage. He also scoured the pages of The American Lloyd’s Register, 
Boston Ship Lists, The New Orleans Ship List, and the Shipping and Mercantile Gazette (London), 
for descriptions of these vessels, and included them in his missives to Archibald. These details 
would help the WAS identify the vessels off the African coast.129  
                                                





Sanchez also used print sources to track slavers around the Atlantic basin. He subscribed 
to a wide variety of domestic and foreign newspapers, including The Baltimore American, The 
Charleston Courier, The Havana Weekly Report and El Diario de la Marina (also in Havana). As 
in New York, these papers contained clearance lists, meaning he could tell when suspected vessels 
left distant ports. As Figure 4.5 shows, he was able to use El Diario de la Marina to report the 
departure of the slaver Eloisa from Havana in July 1859. Foreign papers also helped Sanchez 
overcome slave traders’ ploy of clearing vessels for false destinations.130 If a suspicious vessel 
cleared from New York for an unlikely port, he could check a local paper’s “arrivals” section to 
see whether it appeared. Sanchez was thus able to note in May 1859 that the barque Antelope had 
“cleared for St Juan de los Remedios,” but there were “[n]o reports in the Cuban papers about her 
arrival.”131  
Figure 4.5. Sanchez’s Newspaper Clipping from El Diario de la Marina. 
 
Source: Clipping enclosed in Sanchez to Archibald, July 19, 1859, FO84/1086 
                                                
130 Clearing for St. Thomas was especially popular, because captains could claim their papers meant São Tomé if 
they were intercepted off the African coast. See note in Tabular Statement, Archibald to FO, Oct. 10, 1859, 
FO84/1086 





Despite Sanchez’s adoption of these wide-ranging tactics, his access to the inner world of 
the slave trade was always limited, even in New York. He never got as close to the traffickers as 
Barreto, Alcoforado, or Rovirosa, his counterparts in other slaving regions. Although he talked 
with some leading investors such as Vianna, he had no direct contact with Almeida or Botelho, the 
principals in the Haidee affair. Indeed, that episode likely made it harder to strike up “casual 
conversation” with the most promising sources. Another problem was security. Even when he did 
talk with insiders, he was always wary of exposing himself. During one conversation with an 
unnamed informant, he learned Cunha Reis was involved in the voyage of the Panchita. Rather 
than press on, however, he dropped the topic, deciding he “could procure no further particulars 
without subjecting one’s self to suspicion.”132 The New York Custom House could also be an 
unyielding source. Its clerks often failed to send full clearance information to the Associated Press, 
leaving the shipping lists without details on a vessel’s owner, captain, or destination. When 
Sanchez attempted to access the originals at the Custom House, its staff refused to open the 
books.133 In other instances, slaver traders bypassed the Custom House completely and sailed 
straight out to sea. These moonlight departures left Sanchez scrambling.  
Sanchez’s disclosures were nevertheless impressive. In total, he gave information on 171 
of all 223 voyages that took place throughout the Atlantic basin between 1859 and 1862.134 In 
other words, he reported 77 percent, or about three in four, of all voyages during his tenure. As 
these figures suggest, his intelligence was not just strong in New York, or even the US, but also in 
Cuba. On occasion, he learned snippets about the trade from Europe, where he also had ties through 
                                                
132 Sanchez to Archibald, Apr. 30, 1859, FO84/1086. 
133 Sanchez to Archibald, May 9, 1859, FO84/1086. 
134 Note on calculation: ‘Voyages’ estimates that 216 total voyages took place 1859-1862. Accepting Voyages’ 
estimation that they have accounted for 97 percent of all voyages to the Spanish Americas during this period, we can 





trade and family. His information from these regions was often superior to that offered by local 
British spies. William Wylde underscored the point when Joseph Crawford requested permission 
to hire a spy in Havana in 1860. Wylde responded by saying he “did not think that th[e] proposal 
could be sanctioned, because we now receive from New York information of the movements of 
slave vessels in Cuba, and if we employed another person in that island, we should very likely 
have to pay twice for the same information.” In terms of slave trade shipping, in other words, 
Sanchez’s knowledge was unmatched. Figure 4.6, an abbreviated list of slavers that the New York 
consulate made from his notes, shows the completeness of his intelligence. 
Figure 4.6. Sanchez’s Abbreviated List of Slavers 
 
 





Sanchez worked hard throughout his tenure, but there were variations in his output. 
Between 1859 and 1862, he sent at least 178 letters to Archibald. As Figure 4.7 indicates, these 
letters did not come in a steady stream. In the early period of his tenure, Sanchez wrote prolifically. 
In the summer of 1859, for example, he sent a letter every two or three days. Reflecting this effort, 
Archibald informed the Foreign Office that Sanchez’s “whole time is now in this business.”  
Presumably his commission and ship-brokerage business dropped off dramatically during this 
period, although it is hard to be certain without analyzing his business papers. In contrast to 
Sanchez’s earlier efforts, his efforts appear to have tailed off later in his tenure. In 1861 and 1862 
he wrote about once per week, with the length and detail of his missives remaining steady at around 
2-3 pages. At first glance, this pattern suggests a shrinking commitment to the task. However, it 
was more a reflection of the diminishing intensity of the trade. Simply put, Sanchez had less to 
report. Figure 4.8 charts Sanchez’s letter-writing and slave ship departures during his tenure. The 
rough correlation suggests Sanchez’s steady commitment to the task of spying. 
Emilio Sanchez ran a wide-ranging and committed intelligence campaign against the slave 
trade between 1859 and 1862. His headquarters were in New York, but he pressed far beyond it. 
He benefitted from his own location in Manhattan, his occupation as a merchant, and his familial 
and commercial ties with Cuba. He worked hard to press home these advantages. Indeed, he 
gambled on his ability to do so by neglecting his business, paying informants out of pocket, and 
risking his own safety. The Foreign Office had left it up to Sanchez to make his mark as a spy and 
he had grasped it with both hands. He failed to penetrate every corner of slave trade shipping in 







Figure 4.7. Monthly Stream of Sanchez’s 178 Letters from New York to London, 1859-62 
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The Value of Intelligence  
With little help from American officials in New York, the British government had to send 
Sanchez’s intelligence pulsing around the Atlantic basin before they could put it to use. The main 
flow followed a vast arc running from New York to London and from London to British cruisers 
off the African coast.135 Slave traders, however, were running international networks of their own. 
Like Sanchez’s notes, the great majority of their vessels began their journeys in the Americas and 
ended up in African waters. As a result, the slave trade and suppression networks broadly mirrored 
and competed with each other. The following section begins by examining that competition 
through the voyage and interception of the Pamphylia in 1859 (see Tables 4.1 & 4.2).136 
 
Tables 4.1 & 4.2. The Competing Networks of the Pamphylia. 
The Slave Trading Network 
 
Pamphylia departs New York  August 1859 
Pamphylia departs Havana Sept. 23, 1859 
Pamphylia arrives in West Central Africa Dec. 1859   (circa 10 week passage*) 
                                              






                                                
135 This circuit was thick with data. In 1858, before the Foreign Office hired Sanchez, Archibald had sent only seven 
dispatches to London marked “Slave Trade”. In 1859 and 1860, he sent 43 “Slave Trade” dispatches, all containing 
Sanchez’s copious notes. In fact, in 1860, Archibald sent almost as many “Slave Trade” dispatches to London as 
“Regular” ones, about commerce, migration, and other business (43 “Slave Trade” dispatches vs. to 49 “Regular” 
dispatches). See, Archibald to FO, December 31, 1860, FO5/697; Archibald to FO, December 31, 1860, FO5/697.  
136 “Voyages” #4809. For further examples of the flow of intelligence around Britain’s anti-slavery network, see 
FO84/1096, for FO-Admiralty correspondence in 1859 and ADM 123/176 for Admiralty-Africa Squadron 
correspondence. 
* Records do not show when the Pamphylia arrived on the coast. Without stops, Cuba-Africa voyages averaged eight 







The Suppression Network 
 
Sanchez passes intelligence to Archibald Sept. 29, 1859 
Slave Trade 31 departs New York Oct. 10, 1859 
ST 31 arrives at the Foreign Office Oct. 25, 1859    (2 week passage) 
ST 31 arrives at the Admiralty Nov. 4, 1859 
ST 31 leaves Liverpool Nov. 24, 1859  
ST 31 arrives Fernando Po Dec. 30, 1859   (5 week passage) 
                                          




Like many midcentury slave ships, the Pamphylia entered the traffic through the sugar 
nexus linking New York and Havana. Built in Brewer, Maine, in 1851, the vessel was a barque, 
like the slaver Orion, depicted in Figure 4.9.137 For many years, the Pamphylia was owned by a 
Boston merchant named Sewell, who had no apparent connection with the slave trade.138 In 1858, 
it was purchased by Mora Bros. and Navarro, a Cuban sugar-importing firm with offices in New 
York and Havana.139 Initially, Mora Bros. operated the barque in the sugar trade with Cuba.140 In 
June 1859 it sailed to Havana, and in July, it was back in New York undergoing repairs.141 In 
August it was in Havana again. On this occasion, however, it was chartered by the notorious Cuban 
slave-trading firm Ximenes, Martinez, and Lafitte. These parties put a new Spanish and Cuban 
                                                
137 New-York Marine Register 1857, 105 
138 New-York Marine Register 1857, 105 
139 New-York Marine Register 1858, 113 
140 See voyages to Nuevitas recorded in Boston Courier, Apr. 18, May 26, 1859. 





crew aboard the vessel, and on September 21, they cleared it for Omoa, Honduras, under the 
American flag.142 
 
Figure 4.9. Capture of the Orion 
The Pamphylia was a barque, similar to the Orion (left), here being intercepted by a British 




Source: The Illustrated London News, Apr. 28, 1860. 
  
Sanchez had been keeping an eye on the Pamphylia since the early summer. He first 
reported on the ship during its visit to Havana in June. At that point, he noted it had been sold to 
                                                
142 Sanchez to Archibald, Oct. 21, 1859, FO84/1086; US Consul John Appleton to Assistant Secretary of State, 





Cuban traffickers and would eventually sail for the African coast. He also gave its description from 
American Lloyd’s Register.143 He did not mention the vessel again until it had been repaired in 
New York in July and had returned to Havana. On September 29, a week after the Pamphylia 
cleared Havana, he confirmed to Archibald that the vessel was a slaver.144 In a series of October 
missives, he reported it had set sail for the African coast. He also confirmed that the barque was 
“ostensibly under charter” but had actually been sold in Havana for $9,500.145 In other words, he 
was sure the Pamphylia was no longer a bona-fide American vessel. It was exactly the information 
the WAS required. 
With the vital information confirmed, Archibald prepared Sanchez’s intelligence for its 
long journey around the Atlantic basin. Typically, his dispatches contained copies of Sanchez’s 
notes, accompanied by a cover letter. It was six months into Sanchez’s contract, however, and 
Archibald wanted to take stock of the work so far. He instructed a clerk to draw up a comprehensive 
list of all the slavers Sanchez had already reported. When news of the Pamphylia arrived, the clerk 
added it to the list, along with details on its sale in Havana, its departure, flag, rigging, and tonnage. 
On October 10, the list was ready. Archibald wrote a cover letter introducing it and enclosed a few 
of Sanchez’s latest missives. He then bundled all the documents and labeled them Slave Trade No. 
31. It was the thirty-first “Slave Trade” dispatch of the year. He then sent Slave Trade 31 to New 
York harbor, where the mail steamer, Asia, was about to depart for England.146 
 After a two-week passage across the North Atlantic aboard the Asia, Slave Trade 31 began 
the European leg of its journey. On October 25, it arrived at the Foreign Office in Downing Street, 
                                                
143 For details of this report, see Sanchez to Archibald, Sept. 29, 1859, FO84/1086, and the list of slavers in 
Archibald to FO, Oct. 10, 1859, FO84/1086. 
144 Sanchez to Archibald, Sept. 29, 1859, FO84/1086. 
145 See list of slavers in Archibald to FO, Oct. 10, 1859 & Sanchez to Archibald, Oct. 21, 1859, FO84/1086. 





London.147 Archibald had addressed Slave Trade 31 to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, but it 
was common practice for the relevant head clerks and undersecretaries, in this case, Wylde and 
Hammond, to read dispatches.148 Recognizing the value of Sanchez’s information, these senior 
figures had a junior clerk make a copy of the dispatch and send it to the Admiralty, a few streets 
away at Whitehall, on the north bank of the Thames.149 On November 4, William Romaine, the 
Second Secretary of the Admiralty, reviewed Sanchez’s list and decided it should go to the WAS. 
Composing a cover letter addressed to Frederick Grey, the Commander of the WAS, Romaine 
explained it contained “information respecting vessels which have from time to time been 
denounced by Her Majesty’s Consul at New York.”150 Then, the Admiralty sent the list aboard a 
train to Liverpool, 250 miles northwest of London. When it arrived, it was transferred to a mail 
steamer, Cleopatra, which was due to leave for West Africa. It departed Liverpool on November 
24.151  
 The Cleopatra brought Sanchez’s information into the African phase of its journey. On 
December 30, five weeks after leaving Liverpool, the steamer arrived at its final destination, the 
Spanish colony of Fernando Po. Like many islands off mainland Africa, Fernando Po was an 
important waystation for passing vessels and during the mid-nineteenth century, British and 
American cruisers stopped there for coals and provisions. They also came to receive mail from 
home. Thanks to the scheduling certainty introduced by steam, they could expect the mail on 
                                                
147 Jones, The Administration of the Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office, 11.  
148 See Jones, The Administration of the Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office, 20-1, 149-150. 
149 See notes on cover of Archibald to FO, Oct. 10, 1859, FO84/1096. On the mechanical role of junior clerks, see 
Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary, 8. See also, Jones, The Administration of the Nineteenth-Century Foreign 
Office, 22-40. 
150 Romaine to Grey, Nov. 4, 1859, ADM123/179. 





specific days each month.152 Typically, one cruiser from each squadron collected the mail and 
headed south to their respective bases in Luanda.153 In the case of the December 1860 mail, the 
name of the British runner is unclear, but the American warship, USS Sumpter, can be used as a 
proxy.154 This vessel picked up the mail in Fernando Po on December 30 and spent the next week 
journeying to Luanda. As the Sumpter headed south towards the coast of West Central Africa, its 
crew passed dispatches and news to their counterparts aboard passing American cruisers. It must 
have been during the British version of these exchanges that Sanchez’s list arrived in the hands of 
British officers and word of the Pamphylia spread among the fleet.155  
Sanchez’s intelligence had arrived with the WAS just in time. On January 9, Lieutenant 
Burton, captain of HMS Triton, spotted a barque matching the Pamphylia’s description standing 
off Landano about 30 miles north of the Congo River.156 It was not showing colors. Burton order 
his crew to fire a blank, and the strange vessel raised the US flag to deter British intervention. Yet 
Burton was armed with Sanchez’s information, and he approached the barque with confidence. 
Realizing they were about to be captured, the Pamphylia’s 30-strong crew hauled down the 
American flag, tossed the vessel’s papers overboard, and surrendered. When Burton and his men 
arrived, they clambered aboard and arraigned the crew. Dealing with the crew was legally 
complicated, however, because they had initially claimed US protection. Neither Burton nor the 
Admiralty wanted to deal with potential American objections to the capture. Burton and his men 
                                                
152 US mails also came via Liverpool. See, C. Herbert Gilliland, USS Constellation on the Dismal Coast: Willie 
Leonard’s Journal, 1859-1861 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2013), 40. 
153 For more on this system, see Donald Canney, Africa Squadron, 214; Gilliland, USS Constellation on the Dismal 
Coast, 30, 40.  
154 For USS Sumpter at Fernando Po see, London Times, March 13, 1860. For more on the Sumpter and its stops at 
Fernando Po, see, George E. Belknap ed., Letters of Capt. Geo. Hamilton Perkins, U. S. N. (Ira C. Evans: Concord 
NH, 1886), 222-3. 
155 For arrival of Sumpter in Luanda on January 5, see Log of HMS Pluto, ADM53/6499, TNA. 
156 Burton had been communicating frequently with other British cruisers during early January. See Log of HMS 





would also have known their bounties on the capture were secure, regardless of whether they took 
the traffickers into custody.157 Under these influences, they decided to simply dump the crew 
ashore at Cabinda, near the mouth of the Congo River. 
When Burton and his men had boarded the Pamphylia, they also discovered 600 sickly 
captives beneath the deck.158 Burton decided to bring 200 of the Africans aboard the Triton and to 
leave the remainder aboard the Pamphylia. The two vessels then journeyed to the island of St. 
Helena, where a British Vice Admiralty Court held jurisdiction over flagless vessels. On February 
13, 1860, the Court condemned the barque, broke it up, and sold it to the highest bidder. The 
Africans, meanwhile, spent several months at cramped barracks in Rupert’s Valley.159 In 
accordance with Britain’s policy on ‘recaptives,’ in the spring of 1860, ships originating in Asia 
took the surviving Pamphylia Africans to Demerara, Trinidad, and other parts of the British 
Caribbean to serve apprenticeships.160  
Sanchez’s information was decisive in this instance, but was this a typical case? One way 
to assess his overall effectiveness is to analyze his pay. The Foreign Office had agreed to reward 
Sanchez for vessels captured on his information and guaranteed him £400, annually, even if they 
captured none. Although the large number of slavers operating between 1859-1862 made this 
formula potentially lucrative, Sanchez did not do especially well from it. Despite laboring earnestly 
                                                
157 For payout for the Pamphylia capture, which totaled £2930, see High Court of Admiralty, and Supreme Court of 
Judicature, High Court of Justice, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division: Admiralty Miscellanea; Naval prize 
account register, vol 1, 1855-1862, no. 16, in HCA30/988, TNA. 
158 Lt. Burton to Admiralty, Jan. 9, 1860, in Correspondence, 149.  
159 Judge Wilde to Lord Russell, Feb. 28, 1860, FO84/121. For St. Helena’s place in the slave trade suppression, see 
Andrew Pearson, Distant Freedom: St Helena and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1840-1872 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2016) 
160 E.H. Drummond Hay to Duke of Newcastle, Feb. 29, 1860, CO247/93. I am indebted to Andrew Pearson for 
sharing this source. For more on the flow of ‘recaptives’ especially to Trinidad and the Bahamas, see Rosanne 
Marion Adderley, “New Negroes from Africa”: Slave Trade Abolition and Free African Settlement in the Nineteenth 





throughout his career and reporting on the vast majority of slavers, the Foreign Office never paid 
him more than his guaranteed annual salary. His total pay over the course of his 3-year 4-month 
tenure was £1,400; a sum that included the annual £400 payments, plus £100 retrospectively 
awarded in 1863. In fact, the Foreign Office only accepted that his information had been 
instrumental in the capture of 4 vessels: Ardennes, Orion, Stephen H Townsend, and Lillie Mills. 
Taking these payouts at face value, Sanchez’s information appears either to have been of little use, 
or handled inefficiently by Britain’s suppression network.161  
Sanchez’s poor returns seem to have stemmed, however, from Foreign Office parsimony. 
From the beginning of his tenure, the Foreign Office was committed to squeezing the most 
information out of him for the least amount of money. Its first pitch in 1859 included a £100 annual 
minimum, which Sanchez immediately protested as too low. He also decried its terms on captures 
as “couched in vague language.”162 Initially, senior figures at the Foreign Office were 
unsympathetic. Lord Wodehouse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, noted in an internal memo: 
“very possibly if [Sanchez] finds we won’t bid higher, he will accept our terms.” Lord Russell, 
who had the final word on the matter, simply instructed Archibald to “refuse more.”163 Sanchez 
did manage to secure the £400 rate, but only after Wylde pointed out to Russell “the considerable 
risks” his job entailed.164  
The Foreign Office’s good faith on captures was put to the test when positive news arrived 
from the African coast. A year into Sanchez’s service, Commodore William Edmonstone, reported 
                                                
161 The Foreign Office renewed Sanchez’s contract annually in the spring. For a final three-month renewal in 1862, 
see Wylde Memo, Feb 20, 1862, FO84/1172. The Foreign Office paid £100 on the capture of the Stephen H 
Townsend and Lillie Mills retrospectively, in 1863. For the payments on the four vessels, see FO to Archibald, Aug. 
5, 1859, FO84/1086 and Admiralty Letter, May 14, 1863, FO84/1208. 
162 Sanchez to Archibald, July 12, 1859, FO84/1086. 
163 Wodehouse Memo, July 26, 1859, FO84/1082. 





glowingly about his intelligence. Summarizing Edmonstone’s report for Wodehouse and Russell, 
Wylde noted that a single cruiser, HMS Archer, had captured the “Stephen H Townsend, Laura, 
Lillie Mills and Eloisa in consequence of information received from the Foreign Office.”165 
Edmonstone had also said British cruisers had intercepted the Orion, the Tavernier, and Pamphylia 
on Sanchez’s intelligence.166 In addition, he mentioned that British officers were passing 
information directly to American officers, and that “several other vessels” had been detained as 
result.167 Although Edmonstone did not say exactly how many vessels had been captured on 
Sanchez’s intelligence, he clearly regarded it as valuable. According to Wylde, Edmonstone was 
“decidedly of the opinion that the information has been frequently the cause of vessels being 
captured which perhaps otherwise would not have been boarded.”168 Edmonstone’s successor, 
Commodore Frederick Grey, agreed. In 1860, he told the Foreign Office, “I have no doubt that the 
traffic has been considerable impeded [through Sanchez’s information] & that a great advantage 
has resulted from it.”169 
Despite these favorable reports, the Foreign Office failed to pay Sanchez what they owed 
him. Edmonstone named seven vessels that had been captured on Sanchez’s intelligence in his 
1860 report, but the Foreign Office wrote to Archibald only acknowledging three. It was not that 
                                                
165 Edmonstone note, June 18, 1860, enclosed in Wylde Memo, Feb. 1, 1861, FO84/1138. 
166 Ibid; British officers had presented the Orion to the US cruiser, USS Marion. R. H. Burton to Secretary of the 
Admiralty, Apr. 24, 1859, in Correspondence with the British Commissioners (Harrison and Sons: London, 1860), 
104. 
167 Edmonstone, June 18, 1860 in Wylde Memo, Feb. 1, 1861, FO84/1138.  
168 Edmonstone, June 18, 1860 in Wylde Memo, Feb. 1, 1861, FO84/1138.  
169 Grey to Secretary of Admiralty, May 18, 1860, enclosed in Romaine to Wodehouse, June 28, 1860, FO84/1123. 
Edmonstone’s predecessor, Commodore Wise, made similar remarks. During his command, Wise had sent a memo 
to British vessels instructing them to pass Sanchez’s lists to US cruisers. See Wise Memo, Fall 1859, FO84/1100. In 
October 1862, at the end of Sanchez’s tenure, Edmonstone reported that 88 vessels had been engaged in the slave 
trade on the African coast between during the previous twelve months. Of those vessels, he said “no less than 68 
vessels are actually mentioned on the suspected list which I have from time to time received from the Secretary of 





senior figures at the Foreign Office disputed the accuracy of Edmonstone’s report, but rather they 
did not consider it necessary to pass this information to Sanchez. Although Wylde wrote to 
Wodehouse and Russell in 1862 acknowledging that Sanchez’s intelligence had “led to a 
considerable number of captures being made by our own cruisers and Americans also,” the Foreign 
Office only informed Sanchez that one other slaver, the Ardennes, had been captured through his 
intelligence.170 As a result, his pay never rose above the guaranteed £400 each year. The Foreign 
Office seemed to consider that sum a maximum, as well as a minimum.  
The Foreign Office’s unscrupulous approach to Sanchez’s pay was probably guided by 
financial constraints. The Foreign Office was paying Sanchez and its other informants from a 
shrinking Secret Service budget. During Sanchez’s tenure, Parliament approved the SSF at 
£25,000 annually. This sum was down from over £50,000 earlier in the century.171 The reduced 
allowance coincided with the expansion of British influence in the world and the Foreign Office’s 
increasing use of undercover agents, especially in the slave trade. Making the budgetary situation 
worse, the Foreign Office paid many of its spies and their families substantial allowances from the 
SSF, even after they had retired.172 The Foreign Office was wary of dispensing with the pensions. 
When Under-Secretary Hammond expressed his alarm at the state of the SSF in May 1858, 
Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, replied instructing him not to trim the pensions. He may have 
been concerned unpaid pensioners would turn against their former masters. In the same note, he 
remarked that his major concern was “the unveiling [of] the Secret Service system to the public.”173  
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Although the Foreign Office’s approach to Sanchez’s pay makes an assessment of his 
effectiveness difficult, it is possible to give rough estimates of the number of ships and captives 
intercepted on his intelligence. These estimates can be reached by extending Edmonstone’s one-
year assessment over the entire length of Sanchez’s career and adjusting for his slightly 
diminishing reportage over time. That calculation produces a total of 30 slavers captured on his 
information between 1859 and 1862.174 This figure is about a third of the total number of British 
and US captures off the African coast during these years.175 In broader terms, it also represents 13 
percent of all 223 slavers that set sail between 1859 and 1862. To estimate how many captives 
traffickers would have been forced across the Atlantic basin on these ships, the 30 slavers can be 
multiplied by 696, the average number of captives carried aboard slavers between 1859 and 
1862.176 That calculation produces a figure of 20,880. This number represents almost a quarter of 
the total number of captives who boarded slavers during these years.177 Although it is difficult to 
calculate the extra risk that Sanchez’s information created for slave traders, his intelligence 
presumably reduced their willingness to send more vessels, and thus prevented even more Africans 
from entering the traffic. Therefore, although Sanchez’s information failed to end the trade, it made 
a real contribution to naval suppression and to the lives of thousands of Africans.  
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Sanchez was aware his information was making an important impact. By scouring his long 
list of newspapers, he learned that British and US cruisers were intercepting many of vessels that 
he had reported. In the spring of 1860, he wrote angrily to Archibald: “When the writer accepted 
the terms offered by the F.O. he was under the impression that he would be paid according to the 
contract.” Indeed, he contended that the Foreign Office was guilty of “nonfulfillment of their part 
of the contract” and was “thereby keeping him in a false position.”178 Archibald sent Sanchez’s 
complaints to the Foreign Office, but Wylde replied denying any wrong-doing and instructed 
Archibald not to pay Sanchez any more than the £400 rate.179 Yet Sanchez did not drop the topic. 
In December 1860, he wrote to Archibald enclosing a “memorandum of captures.” It listed the 
vessels on which he believed he was entitled to payment. The memo, shown in Figure 4.10, 
included 16 slavers, and indicated arrears of £2305. Archibald sent Sanchez’s latest petition to 
London, but the Foreign Office refused to pay up.180  
Despite Sanchez’s frustrations, he kept working for the British government. Although he 
continued his quest for fair pay until 1863 (after his final contract expired), he does not appear to 
have considered quitting his job. On several occasions, he wrote to Archibald asking if the Foreign 
Office planned to extend his contract for another year. They agreed twice, and on both occasions, 
he took the offer. It was perhaps surprising that he did not request any amendments to the contract 
on either occasion, although by this point, he may have presumed that the Foreign Office would 
never agree to them, given their approach to his pay. He continued working on the same terms as 
before. His ongoing dedication to the task, despite the diminishing prospects of large payouts, the 
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personal risks, and the detrimental effect to his own business, suggests he was deeply committed 
to suppressing the traffic. 
 
Figure 4.10. Sanchez’s Claims on Sixteen Vessels 
 
 
Source: Sanchez to Archibald, Dec. 4, 1860, FO84/1111, TNA 
 
Sanchez underlined this point in the summer of 1860, when he presented portions of his 
intelligence to the New York press. Between July and September, he wrote a series of detailed 





hint at his credentials, he wrote under the pseudonym “South Street,” a main thoroughfare in Lower 
Manhattan, where the trade was active. In one of his early notes, he declared that he was 
determined to break up the slave trade in New York “single handed.”181 In another, he denounced 
several vessels as slavers and explained that 20 local firms were directly or indirectly involved in 
the trade.182 On August 1, “South Street” appeared again, presenting a list of 85 slavers that had 
sailed “under the American flag” since February 1859.183 The list, which included the names of 
the vessels’ true owners, was one of the most detailed and accurate slave trade exposés ever 
published in the US. Unprepared to stop there, “South Street” then attacked officials he thought 
were abetting the trade. In early August, he accused a clearance clerk at New York’s Custom 
House James De Graw of knowingly clearing slavers and not passing full information to the 
Associated Press.184  
Sanchez’s stunning foray into the public sphere was unauthorized by the British 
government. He had not discussed his new tactic with Archibald. Indeed, the articles took the 
consul completely by surprise. As Archibald reported to the Foreign Office, it was only while he 
was reading “South Street’s” list of 85 vessels in the Post, that it dawned on him the information 
was “substantially the same as that already communicated by me [to London].”185 Sanchez did not 
say why he had embarked on this mission without telling Archibald. Perhaps he felt Britain might 
try to curtail him or maybe he simply thought Britain had no right to interfere. In any case, 
Archibald or his superiors had few concerns about Sanchez’s new tactic. The Foreign Office had 
financed the anti-slavery trade press in Rio and it was not about to stop Sanchez attacking the 
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traffic in New York for free. When Sanchez admitted that he was, indeed, “South Street”, 
Archibald gave him his blessing, and he continued to publish in the Post.186 
Sanchez’s newspaper articles temporarily put New York traffickers and their accomplices 
under a new level of public scrutiny. They forced some individuals into the public sphere to defend 
themselves. One anonymous writer used the Evening Post to ask “South Street” why he included 
the Louisa in his list of slavers and “what proof” he had “that the owner is a foreigner.”187 Sanchez 
declined to substantiate his case, perhaps sensing this was an attempt to goad him into revealing 
his sources and thereby reveal himself. He had, however, given notice to New York’s slave traders 
that he had the power to expose them publically. His articles even forced officials to publically 
protest their innocence. The clearance clerk, De Graw, wrote to both the Evening Post and another 
New York paper, The World, denying he was suppressing information on slavers.188 Sanchez 
responded by dismissing De Graw’s defense as “twaddle”, and presenting even more accusations 
against him.189  
Although Sanchez’s letters were always aimed at specific individuals, such as De Graw, 
they quickly became wrapped up in national political debates. His notes got a lot of attention from 
a wide range of New York newspapers.190 The topic of the illegal slave trade was attractive not 
just because it was secret and salacious, but because New York’s press, and the nation more 
broadly, was deeply divided over the question of domestic slavery. The slave trade was a useful 
proxy for debates about the issue. On the one hand, Republican papers such as the Post opposed 
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the expansion of domestic slavery and blamed southern-friendly Democrats for abetting the slave 
trade from the US. On August 7, the Post supported “South Street,” and referring to the presidential 
election in the fall, warned New York’s slave traders that their time was “[al]most up.”191 On the 
other hand, some papers, which were more tied to mercantile interests, slavery, and the Democratic 
platform, were openly skeptical of “South Street’s” exposés. The Journal of Commerce, for 
instance, slammed the “black Republican journals” for printing Sanchez’s accusations and 
demanded “South Street” unveil himself.192 The proslavery Evening Express, meanwhile, mocked 
“South Street”, saying the trade was growing “the more he writes.”193  
Neither Sanchez nor the Post could win their respective battles in the summer of 1860. The 
Express had been incorrect to say the slave trade was growing; it actually fell marginally in the 
summer and fall. Yet the traffic was still taking place at a robust scale and Sanchez would be busy 
reporting departures from New York for another two years. In fact, US officials in New York do 
not appear to have been any more active in the summer of 1860, when Sanchez was writing, than 
in previous months. The mainly Portuguese and Cuban traffickers mentioned in Sanchez’s list 
remained at large. De Graw, meanwhile, not only retained his job at the Custom House, but 
convinced the US government to allow him to start a suit against the Post to discover the identity 
of “South Street.”194 This development may have ushered Sanchez out of the pages of the Post in 
September 1860. 
As Sanchez’s failed campaign indicated, the demise of the slave trade in New York would 
ultimately come when the internal political circumstances changed in the US. Those changes led 
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to the election of a Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, in 1861. His government would finally 
root out the slave traders from New York in 1862 and make a steadfast treaty allowing British 
cruisers to intercept American vessels. Ironically, as it did so, the British government found little 
use for Sanchez. In the spring of 1862, as the traffic faded from New York, Britain renewed his 
contract for only 3 months. When the contract elapsed at the end of May 1862, Sanchez’s career 
as a spy was over. He had failed to break the slave trade, as he had promised the readers of the 
Post, but he had, at least, witnessed its demise.  
 
Conclusion 
Emilio Sanchez was an important member of an expansive British spy network that emerged in 
the 1830s and flourished in the 1850s. Confronting robust slaving axes in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Britain embraced spying as a subtle, but effective mode of suppression. After 1850, the 
Foreign Office gradually built up a small, yet effective network of informants that extended to 
every major slaving zone in the Atlantic basin. The alliances Britain forged with these spies were 
rarely based on shared values. Although Britain was ideologically opposed to the trade, many 
informants were out for revenge and money. Few wanted to suppress the trade completely, unless 
it meant destroying a foe. These differences did not, however, prevent Britain and spies working 
together. In the final phase of the trade, these complex alliances were an important feature of 
British suppression.  
Britain’s spy network could not have operated without broader global changes in the mid-
nineteenth century. As British trade pushed further into distant markets, especially in the Americas 
and in Africa, it established an ever-growing network of ministers, consuls, and vice-consuls. By 





information. The intelligence network was also undergirded by marked technological 
developments in the mid-nineteenth century. Steamships and railways, in particular, brought 
London in closer contact with its distant informants and cruisers. These technologies led to regular 
schedules, around which the network could revolve. Britain’s interception of slavers such as the 
Pamphylia were not down to good intelligence alone – the information had to arrive on time.  
What really mattered, however, was the globalization of anti-slave trade sentiment. By 
1860, most nations had taken serious action to suppress the traffic, but Spain, the US, and several 
African polities had not. As long as these powers failed to earnestly tackle the traffic, slave traders 
continued to operate within their jurisdictions, despite the efforts of Britain and its spies. Although 
Sanchez had helped turn New York into a battleground over the trade, it was not a war that he 
could win without robust support from the US government. Sanchez may have grasped that point 
in 1860, when he began writing exposés about the traffic in the Post. These missives played a small 
part in stirring the ongoing and fractious national debate about the future of slavery in the US. 
Ultimately, it was the deep fissures over that question that moved the US towards Civil War and 

















The Federal Government and the Suppression of the Slave Trade 
 
On February 21, 1862, almost a year into the American Civil War, Nathaniel Gordon made his 
way to a specially erected scaffold at the Tombs, the notorious city jail in New York. Gordon, a 
veteran slave trading captain, had completed at least four illegal voyages during the past decade, 
reputedly earning him the nickname ‘Lucky Nat’ amongst his fellow traffickers in Manhattan. In 
1860, however, Gordon’s luck had run out. Upon exiting the Congo River aboard his ship the Erie, 
with almost 900 slaves, he was caught by a US cruiser. After the Navy returned him to New York, 
Gordon was prosecuted under the federal Act of 1820 by a vigorous and effective district attorney, 
Delafield Smith. Gordon was subsequently convicted by jury and sentenced to death. Despite pleas 
for mercy from scores of petitioners, including Gordon’s wife, who were shocked by the severity 
of the sentence, President Abraham Lincoln, declined to grant a pardon.  
The crowd that gathered to witness Gordon’s final moments reflected how seriously the 
state was taking the case. As a sketch in Harper’s Weekly shows, the execution yard was packed 
full (see Figure 5.1). The Chief Marshal, Robert Murray, the lead federal officer in New York, and 
his deputy, Adolphus Borst, were in charge of proceedings, and were in full uniform. Two state 
governors were also present, as was a judge and the superintendent of police. Outside the Tombs, 
policemen guarded the streets, while inside, 84 Marines blocked the approach to the yard. 
Although groggy from ingesting poison the night before (a failed last-minute suicide attempt), 
Gordon used his last words to damn the federal government for pursuing him, giving special 
mention to the district attorney, Smith. After he settled down, the executioner covered his head 





suspended in air. Gordon had just become the first, and last, slave trader to be executed under 
American law.1 
 
        Figure 5.1. “The Execution of Gordon – The Slave Trader” 
 
Source: Harper’s Weekly, Mar. 2, 1862 
 
Gordon’s career reflected the nature of suppression in the US during the mid-nineteenth 
century. When the Maine native first got into the business around 1850, the US was becoming 
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more deeply involved in the illegal slave trade. Migrant traffickers from all over the Atlantic basin 
came to New York and other US ports to set up their business. Gradually, American vessels, such 
as the Erie, and American captains, such as Gordon, became vital components of the wider Atlantic 
illegal slave trade to Cuba. As this traffic grew, US suppression remained tepid at best, with some 
of the most effective work being done undercover by Sanchez on behalf of the British, rather than 
the American government itself. In this context, the traffic grew to unprecedented levels from New 
York and elsewhere. By 1862, however, when Gordon was executed by the US authorities, 
American suppression efforts had improved markedly. Shortly after his death, US participation in 
the slave trade ended for good. 
 Several historians have explored the connections between federal suppression and the 
stunning rise and fall of the American slave trade in the 1850s and 1860s. A century ago, W.E.B. 
Du Bois contended that proslavery interests in the South had conspired to forestall suppression in 
order to import large numbers of captives into their region, only to be overtaken by the Civil War, 
during which antislavery Republicans ended the slave trade and slavery in one fell swoop. More 
recently, Warren Howard and Don Fehrenbacher, rightly noting that the great majority of the US 
slave trade was based in northern ports and directed to Cuba, not the South, saw less a conspiracy 
than apathy both from the American government and the American people. In their view, final 
suppression came about mainly because Lincoln’s administration sought diplomatic support from 
Britain during the Civil War. Most recently, Leonardo Marques has argued that during the 1850s, 
Democrats had little interest in suppressing the traffic because to do so would entail conceding the 
Right of Search to the British. Serious action on the slave trade only came, Marques contends, 





extremists, and then finally, after secession, when they were in power and could act on their 
antislavery inclinations.2  
 The following chapter builds on existing work, especially by Du Bois and Marques, to 
show that slave trade suppression was deeply tied to the domestic politics of slavery. During the 
mid-nineteenth century, the central issue in American politics was the future of slavery at home. 
The nation was shaken by several crises over this question, from the Compromise of 1850 right up 
to the final sectional split in 1861. These flashpoints typically occurred when the question of 
slavery expansion or restriction was at hand. Proslavery agitators, typically supported by the 
Democratic Party, saw the expansion of slavery as necessary for its survival, while the antislavery 
party, the Republicans, sought to restrict slavery by way of eventually killing the ‘peculiar 
institution.’3 The slave trade issue intersected with the question of slavery expansion in important 
ways. On the one hand, Democrats, who sought to acquire Cuba as a slave state, blamed Spain for 
the traffic, rather than themselves, in order to bolster their case for taking the island. This narrative 
deemphasized the US role in the trade and put suppression on the back burner. By contrast, 
Republicans viewed the presence of the slave trade in US ports and the small, but much-reported, 
efforts to reopen the slave trade to the South as heralding a future wherein slavery expanded 
unchecked throughout the US. Party positions on the critical question of slavery’s expansion or 
restriction was, in other words, the major issue shaping suppression at the federal level. Under 
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these conditions, it was no surprise that suppression proved weak during the 1850s under 
Democratic administrations and strong under Lincoln’s Republican government from 1861. 
The foregoing argument is made in four sections. The first shows how suppression was 
ultimately in the hands of the federal government and examines the scope and limits of the 
American suppression effort during midcentury, both at home and aboard. The second part 
explores the prevailing view of the slave trade from the Democratic party, the main legislative and 
executive force at the federal level up to the late 1850s. It also shows how that view powerfully 
shaped federal approaches to suppression. The third section analyses the view of the slave trade 
from the other major force in American politics during midcentury, the Republican Party. The final 
part assesses the impact of the Democratic and Republican administrations’ assaults on the slave 
trade from 1859 to 1864. The latter was much more robust than the former, and resulted in the 
final elimination of US participation in the trade. 
 
The scope and limits of US suppression 
 
The federal government held ultimate legal responsibility for suppressing American participation 
in the illegal slave trade. Although several states took action against the traffic in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, federal statutes took precedence over state law. These federal Acts 
dated back to the Early Republic, and included the Act of 1808, which outlawed the traffic, and 
the most recent law, the Act of 1820, which declared the trade piracy. In combination, these laws 
prohibited Americans from participating in a wide range of slaving trading activity, such as 
investing in voyages, owning slavers, and serving aboard them. They also stipulated punishments 





When Congress created federal anti-slave trade law, therefore, it was fairly broadly conceived, and 
in theory at least, had real teeth. 
Several federal departments shared the work of enforcing these laws. The Department of 
the Interior took the lead, although the departments of State, Navy, and Treasury, as well as the 
Attorney General’s office, all played important roles. At the local level, much of the legwork fell 
to US marshals who policed the trade in American ports and district attorneys who argued cases 
in federal courts. These cases typically involved criminal convictions against suspected slave 
traders or libel actions against slave trading vessels. The former cases were heard by juries; the 
latter were adjudicated by federal judges. Both kinds of cases were usually heard in the jurisdiction 
where the offence had allegedly taken place, meaning the Southern District of New York heard by 
far the most cases. Further afield, the Navy tackled the US slave trade on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean, while US diplomats were responsible for helping check American slaving in foreign 
jurisdictions.4 
 Despite enjoying considerable early success, this remarkably diffuse suppression campaign 
was struggling by the mid-nineteenth century. US participation in the slave trade had been minimal 
during the 1820s and early 1830s, when few Americans were directly involved in the traffic and 
only a small number of vessels brought captives to US shores. By the 1840s, however, American 
ships and the American flag frequently appeared in the much larger illegal trades to Brazil and 
Cuba. Although the Brazilian traffic collapsed in 1850, the US subsequently took on an enlarged 
role in the traffic to Cuba. Over the next decade or so, New York and New Orleans emerged as 
major outfitting ports and financial hubs, largely due to the efforts of Portuguese and Spanish 
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immigrants. Meanwhile, slave traders’ use of American vessels and the US flag grew substantially 
and American citizens began serving aboard slavers in greater numbers. Although only two vessels 
brought captives to American shores after 1850, overall, the US was playing a bigger and more 
varied role in the illegal slave trade that at any time since the Act of 1820.5  
 As US connections to the trade increased after 1850, several problems with federal 
suppression became increasingly apparent. One accusation, leveled by several American 
newspapers and at least one US Senator, Henry Wilson, from Massachusetts, was that federal 
marshals in US ports were deeply complicit in the trade.6 These charges were given credence in 
the spring of 1860 when two deputy marshals in New York, Theodore Rynders and Henry Munn, 
were impeached and discharged for gross misconduct. The pair were found guilty of accepting a 
$1,500 bribe from slave traders on the East River in exchange for letting the slaver Storm King sail 
safely out of port, bound for Africa.7 The episode caused a sensation in the New York press and 
caused several newspapers to call for a general inquisition into the local marshals’ office.8  
Meanwhile, Rynders’ brother, Isaiah Rynders, the chief marshal in New York, also came 
under the scrutiny of the press. In late 1860, Rynders was implicated in the escape of a suspected 
slave trader, Morgan Fredericks, from custody. Fredericks had been first mate aboard the Cora, a 
slaver that had been captured by an American cruiser near the Congo River in the fall. After the 
interception, the Navy dispatched the vessel and crew to New York for adjudication and trial. Upon 
their arrival, Rynders held the crew aboard the Cora in the federal Navy Yard, but late one 
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December night Fredericks escaped and promptly disappeared. Rynders’ implausible explanation 
was that Fredericks must have escaped by leaping into the ice-laden waters and swimming several 
hundred yards to shore. A subsequent investigation indicated, however, that a boat had actually 
run alongside the Cora and spirited Fredericks away. Sensing a deeper conspiracy, the New York 
Times called for Rynders’ “instant removal” from office. 9 Rynders survived, however, and 
completed his five-year tenure as chief marshal the following year.10 
Other functionaries also faced accusations of corruption, negligence, or incompetence. In 
early 1861, the New York Times assailed New York District Attorney, James Roosevelt, for 
botching the prosecution of traffickers by filing flawed indictments.11 On one famous occasion, 
Roosevelt had even encouraged a jury to convict a defendant under the Act of 1820 on the basis 
that the president at the time, James Buchanan, would probably commute the death sentence. 
Although probably true, this entreaty not only smacked of desperation, but suggested that the 
federal government believed its own laws were overly severe.12 The episode led New York lawyer 
George Templeton Strong to question in his diary: “is Judge Roosevelt more deficient in common 
sense or moral sense?”13 Meanwhile, the New York Tribune accused judges, especially Samuel 
Betts in New York, of blocking the confiscation of slaving vessels and the conviction of slave 
traders because he was sympathetic to the traffickers.14 Others observers, including Emilio 
Sanchez, the well-informed British spy in New York, accused clearance clerks in the City’s 
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Custom House of deliberately concealing information about when slavers were leaving port. These 
omissions, he argued, were made at the behest of local traffickers and prevented marshals from 
stopping vessels and their men before they left port.15 
 Although some officials did fail to execute their duties honestly or adroitly, they were also 
struggling with the shortcomings of the laws against the trade. As Don Fehrenbacher and Leonardo 
Marques have contended, district attorneys, especially, were hampered by the broad construction 
of the federal statutes.16 One particular problem was that none of the federal statutes specifically 
banned ships from carrying items (or ‘equipment’ as it was then known), that were designed for 
slave-trading purposes. Much of this equipment, including extra lumber and large quantities of 
food and water, was essential for conducting voyages and was easily recognizable to authorities. 
Indeed, other nations had incorporated so-called ‘equipment clauses’ into their anti-slave trade 
laws and treaties precisely for these reasons. The absence of such clauses in US statutes had a 
detrimental effect on suppression. Although district attorneys used the presence of equipment in 
their prosecutions, it proved insufficient evidence on which to base a criminal conviction or even 
the condemnation of a slaver. As a result, marshals in New York and elsewhere often let vessels 
sail from port even although they knew they were fully equipped for the trade.17 
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The libel prosecution of the US vs. the Isla de Cuba in 1859 indicates the challenges faced 
by district attorneys. In this instance, the vessel, a barque, had reached the African coast when the 
crew decided they didn’t want to go through with the slaving voyage. Instead, they launched a 
remarkable rebellion against the Portuguese supercargo, setting him adrift in a small boat, and then 
sailing to Boston and surrendering the vessel. The barque was carrying a large quantity of lumber, 
barrels of water, and several large cauldrons. These items were clearly meant for building a slave 
deck and provisioning captives, but the counsel for the defense, acting for the owner, Cunha Reis, 
contended otherwise. Using testimony from several merchants engaged in the Africa trade from 
New York, who were themselves involved directly and indirectly in the slave trade, the defense 
explained to the Boston court that the lumber was a common trade good on the African coast, that 
the barrels were used merely to ballast ships as they crossed the Atlantic Ocean, and that the 
cauldrons were meant for boiling African palm oil before it was carried back to the US. Ultimately, 
the court rejected these arguments thanks, mainly, to the extraordinary testimony of the crew, but 
few cases were as open and shut.18  
Even after successful libel cases such as the Isla de Cuba’s, slaving vessels often ended up 
back in the traffickers’ hands. Once the courts had condemned these slavers, marshals were 
required to sell them in the open market on behalf of the state. In many cases, slave traders simply 
purchased them again. After the Isla de Cuba was confiscated in 1859, for example, it was sold at 
auction and bought by its former owners.19 Some observers believed that slave traders actually 
cornered the market for condemned slavers. After Fredericks’ vessel, the Cora, was condemned 
in 1861, the New York Times reported it was “sold at one of those practically private sales, only 
                                                
18 US v. Island of Cuba, Bark et al, Case Files, 1790 – 1917, Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the US, 
1685 – 2009, NARA, Waltham, Ma.  





attended by our slave-trading merchants [and] … at once refitted for another slave-trading 
voyage.” Not long thereafter, the Cora was again captured near Virginia by a US official, Captain 
Faunce, who, the Times reported, “discovered on board of her all the usual insignia of the traffic 
in human ebony.”20  
 Another limitation of the federal statutes was their focus on citizenship. According to 
Section 5 of the Act of 1820, criminal convictions could be sustained only against American 
citizens or anyone serving aboard a slaver owned by a US citizen. In many cases, district attorneys 
saw their cases fall apart because they couldn’t prove that the defendant or the vessel’s owners 
were Americans. Foreign nationals, especially Spanish and the Portuguese immigrants, who were 
deeply involved in the trade in US ports, were typically not naturalized US citizens. According to 
District Attorney John McKeon in New York, some traffickers, including the Portuguese Pedro da 
Cunha, underlined the point by pretending they could not speak English in court.21 The second 
part of Section 5, relating to US ownership of vessels, was also difficult to prove. Some sham 
purchases of slavers were carried out by obscure individuals, whose citizenship district attorneys 
found difficult to ascertain.22 Other buyers were not US citizens at all, and had claimed to be 
Americans at Custom Houses only to gain US papers for their vessels before sailing for Africa. 
Moreover, there was an added protection for those claiming citizenship of another nation: since 
the US did not hold extradition treaties with Spain, Portugal, or Brazil, they could not be sent 
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abroad for trial. As a result, they held a kind of international immunity from prosecution while 
they remained in the US.23 
 The trial of captain James Smith in 1854 illustrates how the citizenship issue complicated 
prosecutions. During opening remarks, District Attorney McKeon stated that he had indicted Smith 
under the Act of 1820. Then, laying out his case, he argued that Smith had captained the brig Julia 
Moulton from New York earlier that year and delivered around 600 captive Africans to Cuba. 
McKeon also stressed that Smith was a US citizen. In response, Smith’s attorney, Charles 
O’Conor, strikingly ignored what McKeon said about the voyage, but hotly disputed the 
citizenship issue. To bolster his case, he paraded a host of Smith’s friends and relatives who 
claimed he had been born in Germany and had only lived in the US for three years. Since 
naturalization could occur only after five years under American law, this meant Smith could not 
be a US citizen. McKeon countered that Smith’s American citizenship was proved by an oath that 
he had taken at the New York Custom House before departing on the voyage, but O’Conor said 
that Smith had simply lied. After deliberating on the case, the jury found Smith guilty, but the 
magistrate, Justice Samuel Nelson, subsequently granted Smith a retrial on the grounds that he had 
not been sufficiently clear in his charge to the jury that the central issue at hand was Smith’s 
citizenship. Perhaps realizing the citizenship question was quicksand, McKeon struck a deal with 
the defense, offering Smith a guilty plea under a lesser charge under the Act of 1800. Smith 
accepted McKeon’s offer and served just two years in jail.24  
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The problems with federal law and its enforcers would dog suppression in courtrooms up 
to the Civil War. As Warren Howard has shown, during the ten years between 1851 and 1860, 152 
individuals were indicted under slave trade laws in US courts.25 Of this number, 63 were tried and 
acquitted, found their jury deadlocked, or were released after the jury was unable to find a bill 
against them. Prosecutors failed to pursue cases against a further 39 indicted prisoners, probably 
owing to the slim chances of conviction. Only 12 individuals were tried and convicted; often, as 
in the case of Smith, on minor charges and with relatively light punishments. All defendants 
avoided execution, the penalty stipulated by the Act of 1820. Meanwhile, an additional 9 
defendants, including Fredericks, escaped custody, either before trial, while released on bail, or 
after sentencing. Prosecutors had more success in libel cases, largely because the evidentiary 
standards were lower than in criminal trials. Yet even here, only about half of libeled vessels were 
confiscated by courts; 33 out of 67 between 1851 and 1860. Moreover, many condemned vessels, 
such as the Isla de Cuba, simply ended up back in the hands of slave traders. This grim picture 
becomes darker still when one considers that the statistics above do not take account of the large 
number of traffickers and vessels that escaped the justice system altogether.26 
 While US suppression struggled at home, it was also laboring overseas. Several federal 
statutes directed Congress to suppress American involvement in the slave trade at sea, and by the 
mid-1850s two of the Navy’s five squadrons included suppression within their remits.27 The first 
of these fleets, the Home Squadron, theoretically covered both US waters and the Caribbean. The 
main field of labor clearly lay in the latter region, where Cuba, unlike the US, remained a major 
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importer of slaves, and use of American vessels was rampant. Despite these trends, the Navy rarely 
sent any of the Squadron’s eight vessels into Caribbean waters before 1859. The misdirection of 
resources rendered the fleet almost impotent. Of the hundreds of American vessels bringing 
captives to Cuba, the Home Squadron intercepted just two slavers between 1850 and 1860, the 
Putnam in 1858 and the Cygnet in 1859.28  
The second US fleet, the Africa Squadron, was barely more successful. Guided by the Act 
of 1819, Congress had been sending cruisers to fight the slave trade in African waters since the 
1820s. This was a puny force, usually one or two vessels, and was also responsible for protecting 
American commerce and supporting the new colony of Liberia, which was closely tied to the 
American Colonization Society. In 1842, after years of neglect and in response to slave traders’ 
growing use of the US flag (as well as mounting international pressure), President Tyler’s 
administration signed the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. This accord did not grant British cruisers the 
right to search American vessels for slaves, a concession the British desperately sought, but did 
pledge that both nations would maintain a “sufficient and adequate squadron” on the African coast, 
carrying at least eighty guns.29  
Despite giving birth to a formalized US Africa Squadron, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
did not create a robust American suppression force on the African coast. Successive navy 
secretaries, including Abel P. Upshur, who later became secretary of state, took advantage of the 
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Treaty’s wording to minimize their outlay of vessels and men. Noting that the Treaty stipulated a 
minimum number of guns, not cruisers, the US Navy sent only three to five vessels rather than a 
larger and probably more effective fleet. By contrast, the British WAS typically numbered around 
thirty vessels. Underlining the US’s weak commitment to the Treaty, the entire US squadron 
carried fewer than the stipulated eighty guns during much of the 1840s and 1850s.30  
Successive American administrations compounded the problem of the Squadron’s 
skimpiness by sending unsuitable vessels to patrol the coast. At a time when traffickers were using 
increasingly fast vessels, the Navy sent a few bulky frigates (which carried almost all the guns), as 
well as brigs and sloops. Commander William McBlair, who toiled aboard the sloop USS Dale in 
1857, complained bitterly about the inadequacy of the Squadron’s sailing vessels. Writing to his 
wife, Virginia, in Maryland, McBlair noted that suspicious vessels bolted as soon as they saw 
American cruisers. Since these cruisers were unable to catch the faster slavers in a chase, they were 
effectively, he said, “mere scarecrows.”31 What McBlair and his fellow commanders sought, and 
regularly requested, were small steamers, which were both fast and maneuverable, but such pleas 
were routinely ignored in Washington. The frustrated McBlair, who only managed to capture one 
slaver, the William G. Lewis, during his two-year cruise, frankly concluded: “Our squadron is a 
farce.”32 
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Another major deficiency was the location of the Squadron’s base at Porto Praya in the 
Cape Verde Islands. The Navy chose this location off the Upper Guinea coast in the early 1840s 
because it had a resident US consul and was conveniently positioned along the shipping routes 
from the US and Europe.33 Yet the Islands were located far from the main slaving grounds, 
especially as the slave trade shifted further southward and became more heavily concentrated in 
West Central Africa. This meant that cruisers had to sail for at least a month to reach the key slave 
embarkation zone, only to return for resupply a few months later.34 As a result, only one or two 
US cruisers were actually in the main slaving grounds at any given time. Frederick Grey, the 
commander of the British WAS made the point to his brother, the former British Secretary of War, 
in1857, complaining that “instead of having a force of suitable vessels as they are bound [by 
Treaty] a cruiser is seldom seen on the coast.”35 The Navy recognized the problem and discussed 
moving the depot to Luanda or to St. Helena in the early 1850s, but the Navy Secretary, William 
Graham, decided to wait and see whether the entire trade would collapse in the wake of Brazilian 
suppression before making a decision.36 The push to relocate the Squadron waned, however, even 
as the trade to Cuba continued into the 1850s. Meanwhile, the fleet contained its poor performance. 
Between its creation in 1843 and 1858, the African Squadron captured just 20 slavers.37 By 
contrast, the large British fleet, which was based in Luanda captured over 500 slavers during the 
same period.38  
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A final, flawed, element of overseas suppression was the constraints placed on US officials. 
These diplomats, including ministers, consuls, and vice-consuls, were widely spread throughout 
the Atlantic basin. Many operated in Cuba and the Iberian Peninsula, where the majority of 
American slavers stopped during the 1850s and 1860s before arriving on the African coast, often 
to change ownership and to take on crew and supplies. Unlike their British counterparts, American 
consuls were generally not active combatants in the fight against the slave trade. Their approach 
was guided largely from Washington, where the State Department and Attorney General’s Office 
made clear that consuls were not to interfere with the sale or clearance of vessels abroad if those 
transactions were not objected to by local authorities. American representatives were also often 
under considerable pressure in foreign ports, especially in Cuba, where public opinion was largely 
in favor of the slave trade. In this context, busy markets for American slave ships such as Havana 
were barely disrupted by US consuls. On occasion, American officials, such as Thomas Savage, 
acting-consul general in Havana in 1858, made earnest attempts to check the traffic by refusing 
the clearances of several US vessels, but in most instances they rarely intervened vigorously.39 
US suppression was therefore patchy at best during the decade up to 1860. At home, 
marshals and district attorneys, though not without fault themselves, struggled with the limitations 
imposed by the law. Congress had not updated these statutes since 1820, when the shape of the 
slave trade was very different. In 1859, after another failed trial against a slave captain, and as the 
traffic rose to record levels, the New York Tribune opined: “at present we can hardly be said to 
have any laws against the African Slave Trade.”40 The Tribune exaggerated; the Acts had some 
success and probably discouraged some Americans from entering the traffic. But they did not 
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constitute effective legislation. US suppression was similarly languishing abroad. Successive 
administrations failed to make naval suppression a priority or to press their diplomats to take a 
firmer line against the traffic in foreign ports. The following sections will address why the 
Congress failed to take the necessary action to address these problems.  
 
American Expansionism and the Slave Trade  
For much of the 1850s, US suppression was powerfully shaped by American ambitions in Cuba. 
Encouraged by the westward and southward expansion of the US during the 1830s and 1840s and 
having witnessed the impressive development of the Cuban slave economy, many Americans, 
especially southerners, contended that Cuba ought to be incorporated into the US. This view had 
been popular in policy circles since the Early Republic, but a new phase of Cuba agitation was 
beginning. The mid-nineteenth century was the height of Manifest Destiny, the belief that US 
territorial expansion was justified and inevitable. The Democratic Party, which supported 
American expansion, dominated the presidency and Congress during much of 1840s and the 
especially the 1850s. After the annexation of Texas in 1845, prominent Democrats, including 
President James Polk, argued forcefully that Spain should relinquish control of the island. They 
also offered to purchase the island, though Spain, having experienced the disintegration of its 
American empire a generation before, and fully appreciating the value of the ‘Pearl of the Antilles,’ 
rejected all US proposals.41  
Spain’s refusals to sell Cuba led some American expansionists and frustrated Latin 
American revolutionaries to believe that the island would have to be taken by force. To that end, 
                                                





in 1850, Narcisco López, a Venezuelan, who favored annexation of Cuba to the US, sailed from 
New Orleans to the island with a band of six hundred southern expansionists and Cuban creole 
revolutionaries. Landing in the island’s shore, they took the town of Cardenas in northern Cuba 
before Spanish troops forced their retreat back to Louisiana. Although the expedition failed to 
inspire the creole revolt López had envisioned, he and his men enjoyed a rapturous welcome on 
his return to New Orleans. In 1851, he made a second expedition, but this too failed and ended in 
his public garroting in Havana.42  
Despite López’s grisly demise, the ‘Cuba Question’ would remain a central matter of 
American foreign policy for the rest of the decade. In 1853, President Franklin Pierce initially 
offered his tacit support to a López-style invasion by the pro-slavery Mississippi adventurer and 
imperialist, John Quitman. Pierce eventually demurred, however, preferring to spend political 
capital on securing slavery in Kansas, a goal he achieved with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act in 1854. Only temporarily sidetracked, the following year, Pierce authorized Louisianan Pierre 
Soulé, his minister in Madrid, to offer Spain up to $130 million for the island. He also explained 
that if Spain refused, Soulé should work toward “the next desirable object, which is to detach that 
island from the Spanish dominion.” When Spain did decline the offer, Soulé met with James 
Buchanan and John Mason, American ministers in Britain and France, in Ostend, Belgium, and 
penned a memorandum, which became known as the Ostend Manifesto. This Manifesto stated that 
the incorporation of Cuba into the US was “necessary” and that should the crown refuse to sell the 
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island, the US would “by every law, human and Divine [be] justified in wresting it from Spain.” 
Pierce’s administration faced criticism at home and abroad when the Manifesto became public and 
did not turn that threat into action. Nevertheless, Buchanan went on to become president from 
1856 to 1860, and would make the acquisition of Cuba a key plank of his foreign policy.43  
As agitation over Cuba intensified, many expansionists used the issue of the illegal slave 
trade to bolster their case for acquiring the island. They were building on a firm foundation. 
Americans were well aware that the traffic to Cuba was ongoing, with newspapers’ foreign 
correspondents and travelers reporting the latest clandestine landings. Moreover, for much of the 
late 1840s and early to mid-1850s, almost all American sources blamed Spain for allowing this 
trade to endure. According to these reports, Spanish officials in Cuba were deeply involved in the 
traffic. Captain generals were singled out for particularly strong criticism. In an article first printed 
in the fiery expansionist newspaper the New Orleans Delta in 1850 and widely reprinted 
elsewhere, the Captain General, Conde Alcoy, was accused of receiving a sack of money worth 
$20,000 in exchange for the landing of 600 slaves. The Norfolk Democrat of Dedham, 
Massachusetts, had a similar take. Referring to all senior Spanish officials in Cuba, the Democrat 
explained that after becoming “millionaires” through the slave trade, “[t]hese nabobs then 
generally return to Spain to spend their ill-gotten fortunes, leaving a crop of clerks to follow in the 
footsteps of their inhuman predecessors.” According to this perspective, Spain was able, but 
unwilling to suppress the traffic. As the Constitution of Middleton, Connecticut, argued: “Money 
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has more than once prevailed over law, and no Government has been more susceptible to its 
influence than that of Spain.”44 
These arguments were given further weight by Cubans themselves. Creole exiles brought 
the message directly to American audiences. La Verdad, a newspaper founded by Cuban creoles 
in New York in 1848, and published in both Spanish and English, consistently denounced the 
Spanish government for the slave trade, often deploying the arguments advanced by the reformist 
Cuban writer, José Antonio Saco. Meanwhile, in New Orleans, an associate of Narcisco López, 
Matanzas-born Ambrosio José Gonzales, published a Manifesto on Cuban Affairs Addressed to 
the People of the US in 1853, calling for Cuban independence. Listing his grievances, including 
excessive taxation and the use of military courts for criminal offenses, he complained about the 
ongoing slave trade to Cuba, which, he contended, continued, “for the special benefit of the Queen 
Mother, the Captain-General, and a powerful Spanish clique in Havana.” Back in New York, in 
January 1854, Lorenzo Allo, a Professor of Political Economy, gave a speech to the Cuban 
Democratic Athenaeum of New York decrying Spanish rule in Cuba in general and its role in the 
slave trade in particular. Demanding the cessation of the traffic, Allo argued that the “trade will 
continue in Cuba whilst the Spanish government rules there, since it serves it policy and its 
treasury.”45 The Spanish government took these critics seriously. In response, it published denials 
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of Spanish complicity in the trade through La Crónica, a newspaper it funded in New York, and 
banned unfriendly publications from entering Cuba. Behind the scenes, Spain also spent thousands 
of pesos on undercover spies to conduct what it called “direct and effective espionage” against 
exiled creoles and annexationists in the US.46  
American expansionists and their creole allies often placed evidence of Spanish 
responsibility for the traffic alongside testimonies of American virtue. The comparison was stark: 
while degraded Spain continued to deal in African slaves, the US had taken early and stringent 
measures against the trade. Attendees at a meeting of Cuban annexationist in Columbus, Ohio, 
made the contrast in 1851, resolving that while Spain offered “consent” to the slave trade, the US 
was “the first of civilized governments to declare the slave trade Piracy.” The following month, in 
an article entitled, “The slave trade in Cuba,” the New York Times noted that “one of the earliest 
legislative acts, on the part of the US, was to abolish it and brand it as piracy.” The Times went on 
to explain that, “we have established it as a permanent and ineffaceable regulation, that the foreign 
slave trade shall never exist in any part of the US.” The Times’ myopia was striking; within a few 
years, New York would be one of the great world centers for the trade.47 
Newspapers underlined the distinction between the US and Spain by emphasizing the 
cruelty of the latter’s crime. In contrast to the US, an apparently enlightened nation, which had 
recognized the inhumanity of the traffic, Spain held no care for the suffering African. After one 
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Cuban landing, the New Orleans Delta described hundreds of “poor, miserable, half-dead shadows 
of men, who had been torn from their homes in Africa, and induced into the Island by consent and 
to the great profit of the Captain General of Cuba.” Describing how the traffic had international 
effects, the Daily Ohio Statesman noted the “crimes of [Spain’s] people who desolate towns in 
Africa, and run thousands of negroes into Cuba.” After the appointment of another captain general 
in 1860, the Commercial Advertiser in New York hoped he would finally put down the “monstrous 
and inhuman traffic.”48  
Although Spanish responsibility for the trade was widely acknowledged in the US, 
expansionists’ emphasis on the luridness of the ‘Spanish’ slave trade to Cuba led antislavery 
activists to compare the traffic unfavorably with the domestic slave trade at home. Some writers 
could not stand the apparent hypocrisy of expansionists excoriating Cuba for the Atlantic slave 
trade when the domestic slave trade in the US was running at records levels. The New York 
Tribune, for example, wrote in 1852, “wherein is the slave trade from Africa to Cuba worse than 
that from Richmond to New Orleans … the more we seek to find such a difference, the more unreal 
and evanescent it appears.” Yet these were not crippling critiques. In their defense, proslavery 
writers attempted to distinguish between the horrors of the slave trade from Africa and the 
supposedly benign nature of slavery in the US. By midcentury, arguments in defense of American 
slavery were well-honed and were easily repurposed. Building on the arguments of South Carolina 
Senator, James Henry Hammond, that slavery was a “positive good,” pro-slavery expansionists 
minimized the scale and brutality of the domestic slave trade and noted that the slave population 
in the US was growing through natural increase while Cuba still relied on the slave trade to 
                                                





replenish labor for the brutal canes fields. In a nutshell, the argument was that American slavery 
was superior to Cuban slavery and if the latter was more like the former, slaves and whites would 
benefit alike. In their view, incorporating the island into the Union would allow this vision to 
become a reality.49 
Aside from the afflictions the slave trade cast upon Africans, American expansionists 
argued the ‘Spanish’ traffic to the island created security problems for the US. On the one hand, 
they argued that Britain’s frustration with Spanish foot-dragging on the traffic could well lead it 
to take drastic action in Cuba. Their main fear was that Britain would force Spain to emancipate 
all its slaves and to replace the slave trade with a free emigration scheme from Africa to Cuba. 
Rumors of this so called “Africanization” scheme were rampant in the US press during 1853 and 
1854 and caused a frantic State Department to demand answers from their consuls in Cuba. The 
prospect of Africanization was a worrisome prospect not only because it would diminish the 
economic prospects of acquiring Cuba, but also because it raised the specter of ‘another Haiti’ on 
America’s doorstep and the restiveness of the American slaves that would surely follow. In 
addition to the Africanization scare, some Americans argued that the slave trade to Cuba was 
offering Britain a pretext to send its warships into the island’s waters. These cruisers, they argued, 
were really designed to accost American merchantmen and curtail American power in the 
Caribbean rather than stop the traffic. When naval interceptions did occur, including a flurry in 
1858, they caused serious diplomatic spats between the US and Britain. In combination, these twin 
concerns were potent. Understanding that the slave trade was intermingling dangerously with 
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American independence, even the moderate antislavery New York Times supported acquiring Cuba 
at least partly on these grounds.50  
According to American expansionists, the natural solution to ending the illegal slave trade 
and all its attendant problems was to remove the heinous power that was responsible for it. The 
Daily Ohio Statesman made the case explicitly in 1853: “If Spain cannot or will not put a stop to 
the baseness of her Viceroy, and the crimes of her people who desolate towns in Africa, and run 
thousands of negroes into Cuba, the Island ought to be wrested from her forthwith.” A more 
benevolent power, the US, would then take control and put an immediate stop to the traffic. As the 
New York Times argued, if Cuba was “annexed to this Union, the slave trade upon her coasts must 
cease.” Indeed, the Times claimed, “[t]he whole power of the government would at once be enlisted 
in active measures for its suppression.” Glorying over the supposedly fearsome US laws against 
the trade, the Cleveland Plain Dealer argued “few will engage in the slave trade while capital 
punishment is the penalty of the crime.” The paper implored bold lawmakers to seize the moment: 
“[t]he statesman who should bring about the annexation of Cuba, would … enjoy the satisfaction 
of having at once and forever annihilated the Atlantic Slave Trade.”51 Cora Montgomery held 
similar views, writing in her book, “If the US receive [Cuba], humanity will at least rejoice over 
the suppression of the slave trade, and a mitigation of the horrors of the Spanish system of 
servitude.”52 
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Leading policymakers made similar arguments. Slave trade suppression featured 
prominently among the various reasons James Buchanan, John Mason, and Pierre Soulé laid out 
for the immediate acquisition of Cuba in the Ostend Manifesto in 1854. According to the authors, 
“[t]hat infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy 
and avaricious officials, who, to attain their ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles 
under foot.” Although they gave Spain some benefit of the doubt about their motives, they also 
raised the specter of an out-of-control colony. “The Spanish government, at home, may be well 
disposed,” they noted, “but experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositaries 
of its power.” Their final argument was that Spain’s inability to control the slave trade created 
security concerns that the US could not ignore: “We should … commit base treason against our 
posterity should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its 
attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, 
seriously to endanger our actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.”53 
When Buchanan became President in 1856, he used his new platform to expand these 
arguments. Buchanan’s annual presidential messages to Congress – key opportunities for 
presidents to lay out foreign policy objectives – tackled the issue directly. By 1858, the US was 
deeply embedded in the slave trade, especially in New York, yet that did not prevent Buchanan 
declaring in his annual message of that year that Cuba “is the only spot in the civilized world where 
the African slave trade is tolerated.” This traffic, he claimed, was replete with problems for the 
US. Referencing the recent diplomatic spat with the British in the Gulf of Mexico, he explained 
that “the late serious difficulties between the US and Great Britain respecting the right of search, 
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now so happily terminated, could never have arisen if Cuba had not afforded a market for slaves.” 
Then, striking a paternalistic tone, he turned to the wounds that the ‘Cuban’ trade was afflicting 
upon Africa. “Whilst the demand for slaves continues in Cuba,” he argued, “wars will be waged 
among the petty and barbarous chiefs in Africa for the purpose of seizing subjects to supply this 
trade.” The only solution, according to Buchanan, was for Spain to finally sell Cuba to the US. 
When that was accomplished, he assured the American people, “the last relic of the African slave 
trade would instantly disappear.”54  
The anti-Spanish narrative offered by Buchanan and some sections of the press deflected 
attention from US participation in the trade during the 1850s. One clear example is the New York 
Herald’s reporting of the Lady Suffolk, one of the first examples of a voyage with deep US 
connections in the 1850s. This American-built vessel was bought in Baltimore on behalf of the 
Cuban slave trader Julián Zulueta, sent to New York to outfit, and then to Havana before departing 
for Mozambique. It subsequently returned to the la ensenada de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in May 
1853 with over a thousand slaves and several American sailors manning the decks. Although the 
American connections were clear, especially when the voyage came to light in the US press, “Un 
Amigo,” a writer in the Herald, cared only for the complicity of the Captain General. To “Un 
Amigo,” Spanish law was nothing more than a “dead letter.” Underscoring its position, when the 
Herald learned that the Lady Suffolk had again been sold to slave traders in Havana the following 
year, it argued not that the American government should prevent the sale of ships in Havana, but 
that Spain’s obvious complicity in the trade justified the US seizing the island.55  
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Senior policymakers followed the same pattern as the Herald. Buchanan notably failed to 
address American participation in the traffic in any of his presidential messages, even though he 
mentioned the slave trade in three of the four, and American connections were by then impossible 
to deny. Some writers, often of a Republican bent, pointed out the omissions on Buchanan’s part. 
The New York Times, which by the late 1850s was acknowledging that both Spain and the US were 
at fault for the slave trade, excoriated Buchanan for pinning the blame entirely on the Iberian power 
in his 1860 speech. His “attempt to fasten the whole blame on Spain” it argued, “unpleasantly 
resembles hypocritical cant.”56 Buchanan’s narrative was powerful, however, at least until 1860, 
when the Republicans secured the presidency. Until that point, the Democratic view of Cuba, and 
the slave trade, held sway in the Federal Government and with a majority in Congress. 
The lasting effect of pinning the blame on Spain was the not the acquisition of Cuba, which 
Spain continued to resist with British aid, but on the slave trade itself. The ideology of blaming 
Spain encouraged Americans to downplay the role of the US in the trade and sucked energy from 
efforts to suppress it. The New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette made the case in 1858: “There is 
no use in keeping British and American cruisers on the African coast as long as faithless Spain 
keeps up a slave mart in the lovely Cuban isle.” It was partly under this rationale that the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in the US Senate proposed a bill to openly break the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty and withdraw American cruisers in 1854. The Senate did not pass the bill in the 
end, but it settled, effectively, for undersupplying the fleet throughout the 1850s. Meanwhile, the 
few congressional efforts aimed at seriously tackling the US trade, such as a bill introduced in the 
Senate by William Seward in 1859, were roundly defeated. Although not perfect, Seward’s bill 
                                                





had attempted to introduce equipment restrictions aboard vessels, expand the powers of police in 
US ports, and beef up the Africa Squadron. Certainly, merchants in cities such as New York had 
a part to play in opposing these restrictions, as Seward later acknowledge, but it was the Spain-
blaming mantra, based on the undying pursuit of Cuba, that provided the underlying resistance to 
serious American suppression during the 1850s. It was only when Republicans such as Seward 
ascended to power in the late 1850s, that the suppression of US involvement in the slave trade 
would become a priority.57   
 
American Antislavery and Rising Tensions over the Slave Trade 
Like their Democratic opponents, the Republican Party’s approach to the slave trade was shaped 
by the issue of slavery in the US, and more particularly, the issue of slavery expansion. The Party 
was established in 1854 largely from the rump of the Whig Party, which had been a major national 
force in US politics for a generation. Though many Whigs held reservations about slavery, as a 
whole, their Party had been wary of inflaming disputes over the issue, which were increasingly 
breaking down along sectional lines. Although this approach had alienated antislavery radicals, 
including Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison, who called for immediate abolition of 
slavery throughout the US, it had kept the Party together in a loose national coalition. By 
midcentury, however, the Whigs struggled to maintain unity in the face successive national crises 
over slavery, including the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, which forced northerners to return escaped 
slaves to the South, the annexation of Texas, and agitation over Cuba. By the passage of Kansas-
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Nebraska Act in 1854, which repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820, forbidding slavery in 
Kansas, the Party was on the brink of collapse.58  
Although the Kansas-Nebraska issue proved the last straw for the Whigs, it was the genesis 
of the Republican Party, which emerged from “anti-Nebraska” meetings held throughout much of 
the Great Lakes region during 1854. Composed of many ex-Whigs and smaller remnants of the 
Free Soil and Know-Nothing Parties, the Republicans steadfastly opposed the extension of slavery 
in the US. Founded chiefly on a commitment to free labor ideology, and receiving greatest support 
in the North and upper West, especially in rural communities and small towns, the Republicans 
were determined to keep slavery out of the territories. One of the leading Republican figures, 
Abraham Lincoln, set the tone for the Party at a speech at Peoria, Illinois in October 1854. 
Responding to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln walked listeners through a litany of slavery 
extensions since the Louisiana Purchase, before declaring: “we know the opening of new countries 
to slavery, tends to the perpetuation of the institution, and so does KEEP men in slavery who 
otherwise would be free.” “This result” Lincoln said, “we do not FEEL like favoring, and we are 
under no legal obligation to suppress our feelings in this respect.”59 As Lincoln made clear, the 
Party was no friend of slavery and would resist its extension. This strategy was different than that 
of Garrison and Douglass who sought the immediate destruction of slavery, but according to 
Lincoln’s Republicans, the constriction of slavery would ultimately lead to its demise. 
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 To explain the successes of slavery expansionism over recent years, the Republicans drew 
generously on the concept of The Slave Power. This theory, first developed by the antislavery 
movement in the 1830s, argued that proslavery forces had taken over the federal government, were 
reinterpreting the Constitution as a proslavery document, and were determined to expand slavery 
at the expense of free labor.60 This interpretation gained currency during the 1840s and by the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, the Slave Power was commonly invoked in 
Republican as well as abolitionist speeches. Senator William Seward, a leading Republican from 
New York, pumped the bellows in the buildup to the presidential election in 1856, which returned 
another Democrat, Buchanan, to the White House. In a speech titled, The Overthrow of the 
Constitution - Dangers from the Slave Power, Seward argued the Slave Power had hijacked the 
nation’s founding document in the interests of slavery. After listing the various extensions of 
slavery into the territories, he suggested that Cuba was next.61 The following year, the Supreme 
Court’s Dred Scott decision, which among other things, ruled that the federal government had no 
right to prohibit slavery in the territories, seemed to imply the Slave Power had even infiltrated the 
highest Court of the land. These developments led the diarist George Templeton Strong to 
conclude: “our federal government exists chiefly for the sake of nigger-owners.”62 
 Both Seward’s Republican Party and the antislavery radicals interpreted US involvement 
in the slave trade through the lens of the Slave Power and slavery expansion.63 Their arguments 
began with an acknowledgement that although Spain was in many ways culpable for the slave 
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trade, the US also deserved a large portion of the blame. To that end, Republican papers, 
particularly in New York, emphasized American connections to the latest slavers landing in Cuba, 
as well as fascinating exposés of the slave trade in US ports. They also covered court proceedings 
against indicted slave traders in great detail. For these papers, there was no minimizing the US role 
in the trade. As Republican paper, The New York Times, reminded its readers in 1856 (even before 
the main flush of US slave trading began), “We have over and over again called public attention 
to the fact the Slave Trade, in spite of all the laws against it, is actively and constantly carried on 
from the ports of New York and Baltimore. No one familiar with the details of the shipping 
business in this City is ignorant of it. The recent revelations in our Courts of law place it beyond 
controversy.”64 The following year, the Barre Gazette, announcing the arrival of two more 
American slavers in Cuba stated, “though we have pronounced slavery piracy, we are in fact the 
most successful slave-dealers, not even excepting the Cubans.”65  
According to these papers, the federal government, under the guidance of the Slave Power 
and Democratic party, had simply abandoned the slave trade laws. The New York Evening Post, 
which kept a close eye on the trade, and allowed Emilio Sanchez to publish his exposés, repeatedly 
attacked Buchanan’s administration. Arguing that the US was more to blame for the slave trade 
than Spain, the Post posited “but for the connivance of the federal government, it is almost certain 
that the African slave trade would have been entirely stopped years ago.”66 According to The 
Times, the message filtered down through the ranks to local functionaries. Although the “trade is 
condemned by our laws and by the public sentiment of the civilized world” it noted, “nothing is 
done by the officers of government to enforce the law or vindicate the honor and dignity of the 
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country.”67 It didn’t help that Marshal Isaiah Rynders, the head officer in New York, was widely 
reported to be not only a Democrat, but an outspoken proponent of expanding slavery’s borders 
into Cuba and central America.68  
Democratic organs, especially in the South, but also in the North, vigorously rejected these 
critiques. Sticking to a familiar line, an editorial in The New York Herald argued that although the 
trade was certainly active in US ports, the “one thing” that was “certain” was that suppression 
could only be achieved by the annexation of Cuba.69 Democratic papers also attempted to make 
political capital out of northern involvement in the trade, the supposed home of antislavery. In an 
1854 article titled “Slavers in New York” the New Orleans Times Picayune noted that “[i]n the 
midst of the public clamor there against the slaveholding South, as criminal enslavers of the black 
man, the slave trade is carried on to a great extent now, from the ports of the North.” Until they 
were prepared to deal with the traffic “under their own eyes”, the Times Picayune argued, 
northerners should “cease to come abroad in order to find means for easing their consciences.”70 
The Herald agreed: “the country resounds with philippics and tirades against the South from 
Northern orators, and a Northern press, for one negro who may have been whipped to death at the 
hands of a brutal taskmaster, [but] we have nothing to say against the heartless and fiendish men 
by whom this traffic is carried on, and who live in our very midst upon their ill-gotten gains.”71 
These arguments were at once a defense of Democratic suppression efforts and an attack on their 
antislavery foes.  
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Although Republicans could hardly deny that the trade was taking place mainly from 
northern ports, they countered that its emergence merely demonstrated the pervasive influence of 
the Slave Power. Republicans, who drew their support mainly from rural communities and small 
towns, had long been skeptical of the sympathies that Northern cities such as New York held for 
slavery and the South. In 1858 at the peak of slave trading activity in New York, the abolitionist 
Unitarian preacher, Reverend Theodore Parker, declared that the “four great commercial cities of 
the North” – New York, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Boston – vote as the “slave power” tells 
them.72 “The Southernization of the North” as Parker termed it, apparently extended to the slave 
trade. One Republican newspaper underlined the point, using an exposé of the slave trade in New 
York to remind its readers that the city now “belongs as much to the South as to the North.”73 The 
Barre Gazette took up the theme, suggesting the lack of slave trade enforcement was “chargeable 
to the southern proclivities of our judicial tribunals and executive officers.”74 The influence of 
slavery interests seemed even to extend to religious denominations, which by midcentury were 
splintering over the slavery issue in the US. In 1860, the New York synod of the Episcopal Church 
failed to approve a resolution denouncing the slave trade at their general meeting, despite the 
passionate urgings from a few lonely delegates. The Evening Post reflected: “Even the Episcopal 
Church then, it appears, is quite prepared not merely to justify men stealers, but to add the weight 
of its authority to their hideous cause.”75 
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According to Republicans, the Democratic Party, under the direction of the Slave Power, 
was not only allowing the slave trade to flourish in the North, but was also using the issue to satisfy 
its ultimate goal of expanding slavery south and west. In Republican eyes, by blaming Spain for 
the trade, Democrats were brazenly using the traffic as an argument for taking Cuba into the Union. 
If they were successful in taking the island, they would surely have to close the slave trade to its 
shores and replace it with the domestic slave trade from the US. In other words, the slave trade 
between Africa and Cuba would merely be supplanted by a slave trade from Virginia and Cuba. A 
more radical interpretation was that after securing Cuba, a democratic administration would 
continue to permit imports of slaves from Africa in an attempt to prevent the steady erosion of 
slavery in the Upper South through the domestic trade. “In this way,” the Hartford Republican 
argued, “the planters mean to avail themselves of the African slave trade, to strengthen and spread 
their 'Institution.'”76 This same premise could also be applied to populating the West with slaves. 
With the retention of the trade to Cuba rendering the slave trade laws effectively repealed, 
southerners could reopen the traffic to their shores as well.  
Events in the South during the 1850s seemed to suggest repealing the slave trade laws was 
not merely mischievous speculation. In 1853, South Carolinian, Leonidas Spratt, purchased a 
Charleston newspaper, the Standard, to advocate for reopening the slave trade. Spratt quickly 
became what Horace Greeley, the editor of the antislavery New York Tribune, dubbed the 
“philosopher” of the reopening movement.77 Drawing on a common proslavery refrain, Spratt 
argued that slavery needed to expand in order to survive. His twist was that the Deep South should 
draw on slaves not from the Upper South, but from the “teeming thousands from the plains of 
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Africa.”78 To Spratt and other ‘reopeners,’ the argument held a number of benefits: for slavery 
itself, which could now expand freely westward, while not sacrificing support in the Upper South 
through slave depopulation; for whites who could access slaves at low prices and broaden the base 
of slaveholders; and for even for Africans, who would now enjoy the “blessing” of American 
slavery. Drawing on the prevailing criticisms of ‘Northern’ traffickers, Spratt argued there could 
be a place in this traffic for Yankee slave traders, who, he argued, would “bring them to us … as 
fast as we will be ready to receive them.”79   
Spratt’s ideas were widely discussed in the South, but they attracted limited support. The 
reopening movement gained the favor of a few influential radical newspapers, including the 
Charleston Mercury and the New Orleans Bee. Some policymakers, such as James H. Adams, the 
governor of South Carolina, also backed the idea. During the next few years, the issue became the 
major topic of debate at annual regional commercial conventions, with the majority of delegates 
eventually endorsing the position. In the Louisiana legislature in 1858, the House passed a bill to 
reopen the slave trade, but it was narrowly defeated in the Senate. Most southerners, however, 
including South Carolina Senator J.J. Pettigrew, opposed reopening, largely because it promised 
to divide the South, a fear sustained by the cold reception for the idea received in Virginia and 
Maryland. Indeed, for many among the minority of southerners who did make the case for 
reopening, the ultimate goal was not to actually reopen the trade, but to foster secessionism. 
William Yancey of Alabama, for example, sought to use the issue as a wedge to precipitate a break 
from the Union. This angle was well understood by many southerners, including Roger Pryor, the 
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editor of the Richmond South, who rejected reopening and demanded of its advocates: “If you 
intend to dissolve the Union, say so, in manly and explicit language.”80  
Despite gaining limited traction in the South, the reopening movement had a considerable 
political impact in the North. Republicans argued that reopening was not an idle threat, but a 
genuine plan. The National Era noted “[f]rom indications in prominent Southern journals, it would 
seem to be taking on the form of a settled opinion among certain portions of our Southern 
brethren.” Then, borrowing Spratt’s language, it asked, “And why not? If it be right to hold human 
beings as property, can it be wrong to transfer or exchange them as property? If it be right and 
decent to ship human beings at Norfolk, send them to New Orleans, and sell them in its public 
market, can it be wrong and indecent to ship them from Dahomey, and sell them to the planters of 
Louisiana?”81 The Barre Gazette similarly noted that “it is by no means strange that the friends of 
the repeal, encouraged by the success of their previous efforts to perpetuate the ‘peculiar 
institution,’ should advocate the measure with boldness, and with entire confidence in its ultimate 
success.”82 
To Republicans, the reopening agitation was not only an appalling violation of settled 
national policy, but a serious – perhaps the most serious – blow to its restrictionist strategy. Lincoln 
made the point in his first big slavery speech in 1854, in which he noted that slaveholders’ 
arguments that they should ought to be able to carry slaves into new territories in the West could 
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just as easily be used to justify reopening the slave trade from Africa.83 Similarly, in Seward’s 
famous ‘Slave Power’ speech in 1856, the New York Senator presented the “restoration of the 
African slave trade” as the culmination of westward expansion and the true aim of the dark forces 
at work in the federal government.84 The Boston abolitionist paper, the Liberator, shared this view. 
Contending that “The Slave Power will consummate its diabolical purposes to the uttermost,” it 
posited, “[t]he Northwest Territory, Nebraska, Mexico, Cuba, Hayti, the Sandwich Islands, and 
colonial possessions in the topics – the seize and subjugate these to its accursed reign, and 
ultimately to reestablish the foreign Slave Trade as a lawful commerce, are among its settled 
designs.”85 The Albany Evening Journal also tied the slave trade to expansion, arguing that to 
prevent the “slave oligarchy” from reopening the slave trade, “we must insist upon freedom for 
Kansas.”86 
These arguments took on much greater momentum when some southern radicals turned 
rhetoric into action. In 1858, a Georgia businessman Charles Lamar bought a yacht named the 
Wanderer. With help from others, but working largely outside the regular US slaving networks 
based in New York and New Orleans, Lamar organized the voyage and sent the vessel to West 
Central Africa for slaves. The Wanderer subsequently took on about 400 captives in the Congo 
River, escaped coastal patrols, and landed the survivors on the south Georgia coast, where they 
were transported inland and sold. US authorities eventually captured the Wanderer, which was 
condemned and auctioned, but the Africans were never located. Moreover, Lamar, who was 
charged with violating federal law, was acquitted by a Georgia jury. This verdict came soon after 
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the trial of the crew of another slaver, the Echo, which had been intercepted by a US patrol off the 
coast of Cuba, and rerouted to Charleston, South Carolina. In this case, the crew, who were 
defended by none other than Leonidas Spratt, were also acquitted by a southern jury.87  
The Wanderer and Echo cases received a fierce reaction in the antislavery press. Although 
the landings were isolated incidents, with only one other vessel, the Clotilda, bringing African 
captives to the US, in 1860, antislavery newspapers were convinced that these instances were just 
the tip of the iceberg.88 Rumors abounded that the slave trade laws had effectively been repealed 
by southern courts and the trade reopened. In 1858, the National Era published an article titled: 
‘Startling Discourses – African Slave Trade reopened at the South,’ which contained details of 
numerous supposed landings in the South.89 Meanwhile, in New York, the State Anti-Slavery 
Convention turned attention away from the slave trade at its door to declare that the slave trade to 
the South was “virtually now reopened.” All that remained, they argued, was the formal repeal of 
federal law.90 In 1859, the Republican-leaning Commercial Advertiser in New York promised such 
a move was afoot. “Southern members” of Congress, it argued, “intend to make the repeal of that 
law the great issue at the coming Presidential election, and in all election of members of 
Congress.”91  
The Republicans were just as eager to bring the issue onto the national political stage. As 
Leonardo Marques has noted, both Lincoln and Seward warned of the likely repeal of the slave 
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trade laws in their famous ‘house divided’ and ‘irrepressible conflict’ speeches in 1858.92 For both 
men, reopening was the culmination of the Democratic Party’s slavery-extending schemes that had 
imperiled the Union. Meanwhile, Seward and his allies piled the pressure on Buchanan in 
Congress. In January 1859, Seward proposed a bill to amending the Act of 1819 in the US Senate. 
Amongst the bill’s many provisions were the allocation of more cruisers for the African coast, 
larger bounties for African Squadron and US-based servicemen, as well as for civilian informants, 
a requirement that ships clearing American ports for the African coast be searched before 
departing, and the prohibition of US vessels sailing from foreign ports to Africa. According to 
Seward, $1 million would be required to enforce this Act, although ultimately the Democratic-
controlled Senate rejected the bill.93  
By the end of the 1850s, the slave trade issue had therefore reached a crescendo. The traffic 
from US ports – mainly in the North – had peaked, helping to deliver record levels of African 
captives to Cuban shores. New York, especially, had cemented its position as one of chief slave 
trading cities in the world. The involvement of these ports in the traffic was well known and 
passionately critiqued by Democrats and Republicans alike. Meanwhile, in the South, radical 
southerners not only assailed federal slave trade laws, but some openly defied them. Although 
most Democrats, North and South, distanced themselves from such schemes, Republicans argued 
the reopening movement reflected the prevailing view in the South, that the trade was actually 
effectively reopened already, and that this state of affairs would soon be sanctioned by law. The 
slave trade issue was therefore replete with meaning for both sides of the slavery debate and for 
the both sides of the sectional divide. 
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Federal Efforts to Suppress the Slave Trade, 1859-1863 
Facing increasing criticism from Republicans and with a view to the forthcoming presidential 
election in 1860, Buchanan revamped American suppression efforts in the late 1850s. He began 
modestly by distancing himself from proslavery extremists. In the fall of 1858, Buchanan secured 
a Congressional appropriation to send the Echo Africans, who had been intercepted by an 
American cruiser in the Gulf of Mexico, to Liberia, despite objections from several Democrats 
who baulked at the cost and cries from proslavery radicals who argued they should be retained in 
the South and sold as slaves. Buchanan vigorously defended his position a few months later in his 
presidential address to Congress.94 The next year, Buchanan went a step further, using his annual 
address to openly denounce the reopening movement. Although maintaining that Cuba was 
ultimately responsible for the trade, he declared his support for existing slave trade laws in the US 
and reminded Congress that “the fathers of the Republic, in advance of all other nations, 
condemned the African slave trade.” Positioning himself as a moderate and couching his argument 
in the paternalistic language familiar to defenders of slavery, he argued that reopening the trade 
would disturb the “sober, orderly, and quiet slaves” of the South, who would be exposed to the 
“wild, heathen, and ignorant barbarians” of Africa. To that end, Buchanan assured Congress, “All 
lawful means at my command have been employed, and shall continue to be employed, to execute 
the laws against the African slave trade.”95 
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 Although this statement certainly embellished Buchanan’s record on suppression, his 
administration had begun taking genuine measures to curtail the trade. One small initial step was 
to send a secret agent, Benjamin F. Slocumb, into the South in 1859 to report the rumors of illicit 
slave disembarkations. During his two-month trip, Slocumb travelled from North Carolina to 
Texas, gathering intelligence on illicit landings from officials, newspaper editors, and local slave 
dealers. Finding little evidence to support the rumors, he argued with some accuracy that they were 
“wholly founded upon the movements of the Wanderer negroes, or else they were mere 
fabrications, manufactured and circulated for political effect, or to fill a column in a sensation 
newspaper.”96 Meanwhile, Buchanan’s administration was taking serious steps to curb the very 
real US involvement in the slave trade to Cuba. In the summer of 1859, Buchanan’s Secretary of 
the Navy, Isaac Toucey, doubled the African Squadron from four to eight vessels. All four 
additions were the oft-requested steamers. Toucey also moved the Squadron’s base from the Cape 
Verde Islands to Luanda. Finally joining the British and Portuguese, the American fleet was now 
positioned a few hundred, rather than thousand, miles from the epicenter of the trade. Closer to 
home, Toucey bolstered the Home Squadron from five to thirteen vessels, including four steamers 
which he dispatched to the Gulf of Mexico. No longer largely absent or lonely “scarecrows,” the 
US Navy suddenly became a much more effective force. Between 1859 and 1860, American 
cruisers captured 20 slavers, more than double the haul from 1851-1858. These slavers had been 
carrying around 5,000 captives, whom the Buchanan’s administration now sent to Liberia, 
following the precedent laid down in the Echo case.97  
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 Although Buchanan’s assault on the slave trade was a new departure in American 
suppression, it was still inadequate. Naval suppression had never been as successful, but 1859 and 
1860 also marked years of highest US participation in the slave trade. In 1859, for example, more 
slavers fitted out in US ports than ever before, helping deliver more Africans to Cuban shores than 
any other year in its history. Meanwhile, in Cuba and Iberia, American consuls continued to 
rubberstamp the sale of slavers before they sailed for the African coast. At sea, the vast majority 
of slavers dodged American cruisers, in part because the Navy saw its priority as protecting 
American commerce rather than tackling the slave trade. Meanwhile, the much larger British fleet 
was still denied the right to detain and search American slavers. It was true that the slave trade to 
the South was defunct, bar an additional landing of 150 Africans from the slaver Clotilda in 
Alabama in 1860, but this success was less to do with Buchanan’s suppression measures, than the 
paltry appetite for actually reopening the trade in the South.98 
 As the ineffectiveness of the Democratic assault on the trade became apparent, Republicans 
stepped up their attacks. The New York Times, which dismissed the new approach as mere “tricks 
and schemes of the Buchananite Cabinet” rather than genuine policy, pointed out how the measures 
did little to tackle the trade at home. In particular, they failed to lower the burden of proof for 
prosecutors, which the Times saw as a critical impediment to securing convictions.99 In March 
1860, Henry Wilson, a Republican Senator from Massachusetts, attempted to push beyond 
Buchanan’s measures by introducing a bill, which among other provisions, provided for the 
construction of five steamships for the African coast and authorized the President to open 
negotiations with foreign powers to allow the right of search within two hundred miles of the 
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African coast.100 The latter provision was a stark departure from traditional American policy, but 
as Wilson’s colleague, Seward, told the Senate: “We are a powerful nation, and it is simply a point 
of duty to apply our power to bring this evil to an end.”101 Underlining their commitment to 
suppression (and the Democrats’ lack thereof), the Republican Party adopted the following 
platform for the 1860 presidential campaign: “We brand the recent reopening of the African slave 
trade, under the cover of our national flag, aided by perversions of judicial power, as a crime 
against humanity, and a burning shame to our country and age, and we call upon Congress to take 
prompt and efficient measures for the total and final suppression of that execrable traffic.”102  
 Lincoln’s subsequent victory in the presidential election of November 1860 would have 
important consequences for the slave trade, but the immediate impact was to raise national tensions 
over slavery to crisis levels. First for the first time, a president was promising an end to the 
expansion of slavery in the US, a policy that many southerners would not tolerate. Lincoln hardly 
shied away from the issue. During his inaugural speech in Washington he declared: “One section 
of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is 
wrong and ought not to be extended.” Illustrating his point, the new president argued that if the 
South seceded, it would reopen the slave trade, while the North would refuse to return escaped 
slaves as required by the Fugitive Slave Act. He hoped to avoid war, he said, but reminded the 
South that it did not have the right to break up the Union.103  
Shortly before Lincoln painted this stark picture, others had desperately tried to prevent 
secession. In December 1860, John Crittenden, a US senator from Kentucky attempted to forge a 
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compromise in Congress. His rescue plan included six amendments to the Constitution and four 
Congressional resolutions all concerning slavery. Perhaps sensing that suppression now had 
mainstream support on both sides of the isle, Crittenden proposed in one resolution that the slave 
trade laws “ought to be made effectual, and ought to be thoroughly executed; and all further 
enactments necessary to those ends ought to be promptly made.” There proved not to be enough 
common ground, however, and both the House and the Senate rejected Crittenden’s plan. All other 
attempts to stave off secession failed, and in December, 1860, South Carolina became the first 
state to secede from the Union. Ten other states would follow, forming the Confederate States of 
America under the presidency of Jefferson Davis, and with Montgomery, Alabama, as their 
temporary capital. In April 1861, the Confederate Army fired shots at Union troops lodged in Fort 
Sumter in Charleston harbor and the Civil War began.104 
   The outbreak of War created a new context that encouraged both the Union and the 
Confederacy to take action against the slave trade. Although many leading lights of the secession 
movement had urged reopening the slave trade to the South, the Confederacy rejected the traffic 
outright. Early in 1861, the newly created Confederate Constitution expressly outlawed the 
“importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country other than the slaveholding 
States or Territories of the US of America.”105 One reason for this policy was, as many southerners 
had previously pointed out, that the issue divided the South. Now that the Confederacy was at war, 
internal unity was especially critical. The Confederacy was also seeking to assure the British of its 
motives at a time of when it sought their support against the Union, or at least, diplomatic 
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recognition. Moreover, with the Confederacy at war and Union warships blockading southern 
ports, the chances of reviving the slave trade were slim.106  The British did discuss internally how 
they might deal with Confederate vessels if they appeared on the coast, but in the end, none did.107  
 By contrast, some early signals from the Union did not appear to back up Republican 
rhetoric of previous years. As the Confederates were drawing up their Constitution in the spring 
of 1861, Lincoln was debating withdrawing cruisers from the African coast. Sensing his priorities 
lay at home, not overseas, Lincoln discussed the matter with his Navy Secretary, Gideon Welles, 
who assured the president that the vessels were “well adapted for service on our own coast.”108 
Lincoln subsequently instructed Welles to recall the entire African Squadron, except one vessel, 
which was to remain for six months. The news was well received on the African coast, where 
according to Willie Leonard, a sailor aboard the USS Constellation, there was “nothing talked of 
now, but the North, and the South, War to the death, Abolitionism, and Secession.”109 After they 
returned to US waters, these men would end up fighting on both sides of the conflict, while the 
cruisers were redeployed against the Confederacy. Although this shift of resources came under 
special circumstances, it was a radical step in American slave trade policy; it was the first time in 
almost half century that the US had not had even a nominal presence on the African coast to fight 
the trade. The British, especially, harbored concerns about the impact of the American decision, 
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and even considered removing some of its own cruisers from the Mediterranean to Africa to make 
up for the shortfall.110  
 Other steps taken by Lincoln’s administration proved, however, that it was serious about 
suppression. In spring 1861, the withdrawal of the cruisers notwithstanding, Lincoln sent early 
signals that slave trade suppression was a priority. First, he reorganized the Interior Department to 
create the Office for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, similar to the British Foreign 
Office’s Slave Trade Department, albeit, with a purely domestic remit.111 Second, Lincoln 
approved a bill designed to bolster the federal slave trade laws. Among its provisions, the Act of 
March 2, 1861, allocated $10,000 to suppression in US ports. This new “secret fund,” which was 
small, but not inconsiderable given the imminent threat of War, was dispersed by Lincoln’s new 
Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Smith, to the federal government’s new district attorneys and 
marshals.112 These appointees had been carefully selected and proved to be committed to 
suppression. During the next few years, officials in every slaving port still within the Union, from 
Maryland to Maine, would use the new secret funds, with the largest sums deployed in the traffic’s 
major hub, New York.  
Robert Murray, the new Marshal in New York was particularly committed to suppression 
and judicious in his use of these new funds. In contrast to his predecessors, such as Isaiah Rynders, 
whose work had been questionable at best, Murray was determined as he put it, to pursue “those 
iniquitous dealers in human flesh night and day.”113 His appointment was especially astute, 
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because, as former harbor master in New York, he was familiar with the waterfront and its 
merchants, ships, and sailors. Upon his appointment in the spring of 1861, Murray launched a 
vigorous campaign against the trade. Operating much like the British, he initiated a major 
surveillance campaign on slave traders, often co-opting local watermen, including tug boat 
captains, into his operations (though apparently not Emilio Sanchez, who was still working for the 
Foreign Office). Between the spring of 1861 and the spring of 1862, Murray spent several thousand 
dollars on ‘watchers,’ including four men who kept an eye on the docks in New York and Brooklyn 
on a regular basis.114 He also sent deputies laden with cash to Portland and Baltimore to procure 
evidence for trials.115 In perhaps his clearest message to local traffickers, in the summer of 1861, 
he hosted a meeting of marshals from a host of Union states in New York to discuss suppression 
tactics. During their visit, Murray led the marshals around the docks and took them to visit 
imprisoned slave traders in the Tombs jail.116 Rattled by Murray’s approach, the slave traders 
attempted to gain his favor, but apparently, he was above reproach. In early 1862 he told the 
Interior Department that “barely two months ago, the Slave dealers held a meeting, and, 
unanimously decided to abandon the idea of influencing me.”117 Meanwhile, Murray’s efforts were 
met by high praise in the Republican press, as well as the London Times, which said he had done 
more to suppress the slave trade than both the US or British fleets during the past ten years.118 
 The energetic work of officials such as Murray and the new tone emanating from 
Washington set the stage for several important trials. None was more important than that of the 
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American slave ship captain, Nathaniel Gordon. A seasoned trafficker, Gordon had completed at 
least three voyages since 1850. In the summer of 1860, during the later days of Buchanan’s 
administration, Gordon had been arrested by the US Navy aboard the Erie while exiting the Congo 
River. The vessel, which had travelled from the US to Cuba, and then to Africa, was captured with 
almost 900 captives aboard. After the interception, the African Squadron sent the Africans to 
Liberia and returned the Erie and Gordon to the US for adjudication and trial. Having been caught 
with slaves aboard, the Erie was unsurprisingly condemned and sold. Meanwhile, in July 1861, 
Gordon went on trial under the Act of 1820 in New York.119  
 Delafield Smith, a Republican Party member and the new District Attorney in the Southern 
District of New York, worked diligently and prudently to secure a conviction. Appreciating the 
high evidentiary threshold expected in these cases, he sent informants to Massachusetts to 
determine the ownership of the vessel, and to Maine, Gordon’s home state, for testimony on his 
citizenship.120 Smith’s efforts proved to be insufficient on the first attempt, and Gordon was 
acquitted by the jury. Convinced, however, that he had “carried a majority” of the jury, Smith 
redoubled his efforts.121 Casting the net wider, he gathered new information from as far as Havana 
and tracked down several key witnesses to testify in court. Smith then initiated a second trial, 
which began in the fall of 1861. Understanding that some among the jury might be wary of 
convicting anyone of a capital crime, he proceeded cautiously. As he later wrote to the Department 
of the Interior, he laid out his argument clearly, but dispensed with a second counsel to prevent the 
“idea of persecution” to the jury. He also tiptoed around the broader issue of slavery, which had 
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many friends in New York, by laboring “to separate the case from all questions as to slavery or 
slavery extension in this country.” The defense countered in familiar terms, that Gordon was not a 
US citizen, but this time, the argument did not prevail. After just thirty minutes of deliberations 
the jury delivered a guilty verdict.122  
 The jury’s decision was the first conviction under the Act of 1820 since 1854 and a great 
victory for the suppressionist cause, but it remained to be seen what would happen next. Delafield 
Smith underscored the surprise of many, noting that after the trial “Persons crowded into my office, 
the following morning, and asked if it was really so.”123 While the Republican press cheered the 
news, which the New York Times believed was another chapter in the “Dying Struggles of the 
Slave Trade,” it was unclear if Lincoln would grant Gordon a presidential pardon or allow the 
sentence to be carried out.124 The few prisoners who had previously been convicted under the Act 
of 1820, including James Smith in 1854, had escaped with just a few years in prison or been 
pardoned completely.125  
Gordon’s fate subsequently became a matter of intense debate. Newspapers gave varying 
accounts about whether Lincoln would stay the execution or not, with the Democratic press 
maintaining that the punishment was harsh, and that he would demur.126 Meanwhile, in the White 
House, Lincoln was inundated with advice. Rhoda White, the wife of a New York judge, wrote to 
the president arguing that Gordon had merely been involved in the slave trade “when many then 
in power upheld it, and engaged in it” and that the sentence really ought to be commuted to life in 
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prison.127 Eleven thousand petitioners from New York, including lawyers, clergy, and state 
lawmakers, agreed that the punishment was too harsh.128 Meanwhile, Delafield Smith published a 
newspaper article, which soon reached Lincoln’s hands, arguing for execution.129 Behind the 
scenes, Lincoln met with his new Secretary of State, Seward, to discuss the matter and took advice 
from his Attorney General, Edward Bates.130 In the end, he decided to go through with the 
execution. After a short reprieve, Gordon was hanged in New York on February 21, 1862. He was 
the first slave trader to be executed under the Act of 1820.131 
 A few months after this stunning execution, the US entered into an international Treaty 
that was unprecedented in American history. In 1861, Seward, intimated to Lord Lyons, the British 
Minister in Washington, that the US would be prepared to be more flexible on the Right of Search 
than previous administrations. Although Seward was following up on his arguments in the Senate 
the previous year, his suggestion was also guided by the realpolitik. Like the Confederacy, the US 
was seeking British support for the War, an aim that had been jeopardized been by the Trent Affair 
in 1861, in which a Union warship had arraigned a British vessel carrying two Confederate 
diplomats en route to London. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Palmerston sought to press home the 
advantage. In September 1861, he suggested to his Foreign Minister, John Russell, that the “north” 
should “prove their abhorrence of slavery, by joining and helping us heartily in our operations 
against slave trade, by giving us facilities for putting it down when carried under US flag.”132 The 
subsequent negotiations between Lyons and Seward were the polar opposite of the caustic tone 
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during the Buchanan era. In contrast to Buchanan’s Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, who had been 
hostile to the British and bitterly opposed to Right of Search, Seward was remarkably upbeat. 
Seward wrote to Lyons that “a very great change which had taken place in public opinion 
concerning the Slave Trade” and that Lincoln and his cabinet were “warmly in favor” of a 
Treaty.133 When Lyons queried what he would make of British cruisers bringing an American 
slaver into New York harbor, Seward said he would “see it with pleasure.”134  
 Although Seward presented too rosy a picture of American attitudes towards the British 
navy, with some careful maneuvering, he was able to guide a Right of Search agreement through 
the Senate. To clear the path, Seward requested that both nations publically agree that it had been 
the US that had first proposed a treaty, even though Britain had drawn up the initial draft. The 
reason, which Lyons relayed to the Foreign Office, was not that Congress was opposed to 
suppression, but that there were “many who retained the old jealousy of Great Britain on the 
subject of the Right of Search.”135 Presenting the accord as an American idea, would, apparently, 
sweeten the pill. The ruse worked, and in April 1862 the Senate unanimously ratified by the Lyons-
Seward Treaty. According to its provisions, Britain was permitted to search American vessels 
within two hundred miles of the African coast and thirty leagues of Cuba, while the US would be 
responsible for enforcing the Treaty at home. The equipment clause, a long absent feature of 
American slave trade law, was a central component of the Treaty, with the essential items, 
including shackles, boilers, cooking apparatus all accounted for. Marking another radical 
departure, the US joined the Court of Mixed Commission system. The US even committed to 
establish a Mixed Court in New York, which would adjudicate vessels captured near Cuba. 
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Reflecting on this great change in American policy, Seward wrote to Lincoln calling the Treaty, 
“the most important act of your life and of mine.”136 Two years later, in 1864, Lincoln’s 
administration would cap its suppression efforts by extraditing José Agustín Argüelles, a Spanish 
official caught up in the slave trade, to Cuba, finally closing a legal loophole that had protected 
foreign traffickers for over a decade.137 
The suppression measures introduced by the federal government between the spring of 
1861 and spring of 1862 had a decisive effect on US participation in the illegal slave trade. In the 
wake of Gordon’s execution and the vigorous efforts of US officials, slave traders in New York 
and elsewhere considered their options. Indictments were flying for outfitters and intermediaries 
in several US ports, including Albert Horn in New York and Appleton Oaksmith in Boston. Some 
of these individuals escaped serious punishment, including Oaksmith, who escaped from custody, 
but these occurrences were now exceptional.138 Gordon’s execution, especially, had a profound 
effect on the traffickers. In the buildup to the execution, consul Archibald in New York reported 
that the slave traders “are so alarmed that it is surmised that those who are under bonds will prefer 
forfeiting their bail rather than stand their trials.”139 One of these was João Machado, one of the 
most important intermediaries since the early 1850s, who was twice arrested and eventually 
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skipped bail and fled, likely, to Havana.140 Other prominent figures, including João Abranches, 
Almeida, J. Lima Viana, and Antonio Ros, left the US for good.141  
Some of these traffickers, including Mary Watson, attempted to reinvigorate the trade 
elsewhere. One of the few American women mentioned in British and US slave trade records, 
Watson was allegedly Machado’s business partner and lover. Unlike Machado, Watson fled to 
Portugal and then to Spain, where she attempted to resume operations, perhaps hoping to link up 
with Machado on the Cuban end.142 Robert Murray was aware of her departure and sent his 
operatives in pursuit. Murray worked with the US Consul in Cadiz and US Minister in Madrid, 
and prevented Watson from dispatching four vessels to the African coast.143 Having now been shut 
down in the New York and in Spain, and with Lyons-Seward Treaty dissolving the usefulness of 
the American flag, Watson was out of options. Reports emerged from Spain that she had sought 
“solace in the cup” and died as a result.144 The news was well received by Murray back in New 
York. By then, the slave traders had all fled his jurisdiction or melted back into other pursuits, 
although he had three indictments waiting for Watson in case she returned.145 
Figure 5.2 charts the impact of growing US suppression efforts on American participation 
in the slave trade between 1859 and 1865. The blue and orange lines represent voyages departing 
US ports and vessels flying under the US flag, two of the main American connections to the traffic 
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since 1850. The black dotted line roughly marks the moment when Buchanan’s administration 
began to bolster US suppression in 1859. The green dotted lines mark Lincoln’s election in 1860 
and the three decisive moments in his administration’s assault on the slave trade between 1861 and 
1862; namely, his appointments of new slave trade agents in US ports, the execution of Gordon, 
and the Senate’s ratification of the Lyons-Seward Treaty. As the graph shows, Buchanan’s 
suppression efforts did little to arrest US participation in the traffic. By contrast, American 
involvement in the trade declined precipitously under Lincoln’s presidency, especially as his new 
agents got to work in New York and other ports. After Gordon’s execution and the ratification of 
the Treaty, US participation in the trade finally petered out. 
Figure 5.2. US participation in the slave trade by voyages departing US ports and 
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In the summer of 1862, Gabriel Tassara, the Spanish Minister in Washington DC, wrote to his 
superiors in Madrid about the great changes that were taking place in relation to the slave trade in 
the US. In contrast to missives from previous years, in which he reported streams of slaving vessels 
leaving US ports, this message concerned the recently-ratified Lyons Seward Treaty, which 
promised to squash these departures completely. After leading his superiors through the main 
features of the accord – a copy of which he enclosed – Tassara determined that the Right of Search 
concession was a “great innovation” and that the Treaty as a whole would likely heap pressure on 
Spain to ramp up its own suppression campaign. In an attempt to account for the important 
developments in the US, Tassara pointed to the change of government in Washington. In his view: 
“It is more than likely that had the democratic party continued in power this treaty would never 
have been celebrated. The republican party on the contrary doesn’t do more than obey its principle 
when celebrating it.”146  
Tassara’s analysis captured the essence of the situation. The suppression measures that had 
culminated in the Lyons Seward Treaty were indeed great innovations and were largely down to 
the change in administration. Throughout the 1850s, successive Democratic administrations had 
rejected granting Britain the Right of Search and generally failed to prioritize slave trade 
suppression at home and aboard. Although their approach was partly to do with long-standing 
opposition to British interference with American shipping, it was largely because Democrats had 
blamed Spain for the trade in order to bolster the case for acquiring the island and spreading 
American slavery. The Republican Party, by contrast, were committed to checking slavery in all 
                                                





its forms. For the Republicans, obeying their principles meant not only limiting the expansion of 
slavery to the places where it already existed, but extinguishing the slave trade, which promised to 
drive the institution into new territories. Their work began during the mid-1850s and helped force 
Buchanan to take some suppression measures in 1859. With their assent to power in 1860 and 
secession sweeping much Democratic opposition aside, Lincoln’s administration was able to move 












Despite the twin losses of New York as a slave-trading haven and the valuable protection of the 
US flag, the traffic continued for another five years on a diminishing scale. During this period, 
Spain took a more prominent role in the logistics of the trade. The port of Cadiz became an 
especially important embarkation point for slavers. In 1862, New York exiles Antonio Augusto 
Botelho and José Lima Vianna were key players in dispatching slavers from Cadiz, although they 
were gradually supplanted by local merchants and shipowners such as Manuel Lloret.1 By 1864, 
Lloret and his allies had made Cadiz, in the words of the British consul Alexander Dunlop, “the 
European center of the trade.”2 If Cadiz led the way, Barcelona and Bilbao were not far behind. 
Bilbao was particularly favored by the Basque native Julián Zulueta in Cuba. In 1863, one of 
Zulueta’s vessels, the Luiza, sailed from Bilbao to the Bight of Benin for slaves. In a letter 
intercepted by the British, João Soares Pereira, a Portuguese trafficker in the Bight, informed 
Zulueta that a cargo of “oil” would be waiting for the Luiza when it arrived. The metaphor hardly 
needed careful deciphering.3 
As Spanish ports took a greater role in dispatching vessels into the slave trade, their 
residents increased their financial stake in voyages. Although investors in Cadiz, Barcelona, and 
Bilbao had always had some opportunities to finance illegal slaving voyages thanks to their ties 
with Cuban traffickers and the occasional departures from Spanish ports, the growing importance 
of Spanish shipping after 1861 created additional opportunities. Wealthy merchants with close ties 
to Cuba were best positioned to invest. The Portillo family of Cadiz became some of the most 
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prominent Spanish slave traders in the 1860s, owing, in part, to a business partner in Havana.4 
Iberian friends of Zulueta also stood to do well. In 1863, a telegram arrived in Bilbao from Cuba 
announcing the safe arrival of another of Zulueta’s slavers, Noc Daqui. It had surely been sent by 
Zulueta to reassure nervous investors at home.5      
 As ties between slave traders based in Cuba and Spain grew stronger and the influence of 
US faded, the position of investors in West Central Africa also weakened. Now left to deal with 
the Cubans without their allies in New York, the most favorable arrangement they could forge was 
a normal ‘freighting’ deal coupled with a prayer that the Cubans would fairly remit the spoils. The 
1863 voyages of the Cicerón and the Haydee are two examples of this approach, although in the 
latter case the British intercepted the vessel and no-one made money.6 According to Joseph 
Crawford, the British consul in Havana, some West Central African investors were prepared to 
make even less favorable arrangements. In 1862, he informed the Foreign Office that “desperate” 
West Central African traffickers had appeared on the island, “offering slaves deliverable at certain 
points, so very cheap that they are hardly to be resisted.”7 This proposal, which entailed 
shouldering all the risks at sea as well as a heavy discount, was highly unfavorable and reflected 
the increasingly weak position of West Central African investors as the 1860s wore on.  
The changing dynamics of voyage financing became irrelevant, however, as the Spanish 
authorities in Cuba began to take serious action against the trade during the mid-1860s. The origins 
of this shift were partly external. The Lyons-Seward Treaty in 1862 had isolated Spain as the final 
major international power still unwilling to take serious measures against the traffic. Spanish 
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officials in the Americas were certainly upset that the Treaty seemed to imply that Spain was solely 
at fault for the trade. Reporting on the Treaty to Madrid, Tassara in Washington complained that 
it was “height of brazenness [for the US] to make us responsible for a sin that at least was common 
to us.” Yet Tassara also appreciated that as a result of the Treaty, the spotlight was now entirely 
on Spain. In the same letter to Madrid, he argued that “in the current state of things we must not 
allow ourselves to be overtaken by anyone in the repression of the trade.”8 Tassara’s instincts 
appeared astute, especially as other powers began increasing pressure on the Spanish government 
after the Treaty. In 1863, Britain sent six cruisers to Cuban waters to patrol for slavers, the largest 
deployment since 1858, when tensions with Buchanan’s administration had forced the British to 
withdraw from the Gulf of Mexico.9 The following year, the US and Britain requested a joint anti-
slave trade treaty with Spain. Madrid rejected the proposal, still concerned about foreign designs 
on Cuba, but the fact that even the US were now asking for a slave trade treaty marked how isolated 
the Iberian power had become.10        
 As external pressures mounted, a series of reformist captain generals in Cuba attempted to 
vigorously suppress the trade. Each of these governors – Francisco Serrano, Domingo Dulce, and 
Francisco Lersundi – were more committed to suppression than many their predecessors. Serrano, 
for example, requested on several occasions that Madrid declare the slave trade piracy, although 
his superiors rejected the proposal, fearing that such a move might anger Cuban planters.11 A few 
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years later, Serrano’s successor, Dulce, departed from protocol by expelling two Cuban traffickers, 
Francisco Durañona and Antonio Tuero, from the island. Dulce also ejected several recently-
arrived Portuguese.12 More broadly, these governors sought to convince Madrid that the trade’s 
days were numbered and that the future security of slavery on the island would not be imperiled 
by suppressing the traffic. In the summer of 1861, only a few months after the US Civil War broke 
out, Serrano wrote to Madrid insisting that “[t]he indisputable principle is laid, that the trade is 
going to decline in the world and that sooner or later it will have to be extinguished.” “It would be 
insanity,” he added, “for slavery in Cuba, an institution almost indispensable today for the 
development and maintenance of its prosperity, to depend upon it.”13 Indeed, Serrano argued that 
given the international assault on the trade, continuing the traffic could endanger Cuban slavery 
itself. As he put it succinctly to his superiors in Madrid, “the only means of keeping the one is to 
finish with the other.”14 Putting a more positive spin on the situation, Serrano also argued that 
Cuba could become like US, Brazil, and Puerto Rico, where slavery had grown in strength even 
after slave importations had ceased.        
 As Spain’s response to Serrano’s piracy proposal suggested, however, full suppression of 
the trade to Cuba could only come with support from the Iberian Peninsula. By the mid 1860s the 
conservative approach to suppression that had characterized previous Spanish governments began 
to change as a wave of liberalism that swept Madrid. Colonial reform, including slave trade 
suppression, was an important element of this movement, and was championed by new 
publications such as Revista Hispano-Americana and by Cuban creoles who denounced the trade 
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at home and in the metropole. Meanwhile, reformers created the Spanish Abolition Society, and 
the former governors, Serrano and Dulce, who had returned to Spain, campaigned for suppression 
in the upper house of the Cortes. The end of the US Civil War in 1865 and the demise of slavery 
in the American South multiplied and galvanized the critics. When a liberal government headed 
by General O’Donnell returned to power during the same year, serious action against the traffic 
was all but assured. In 1866, O’Donnell’s government introduced a strong new slave trade bill, 
which among other measures, broadened the definition of trafficking to include direct and indirect 
support for voyages, increased penalties for offenders, and negated Article 9 of the Penal Law, 
which had prevented the Cuban authorities from searching estates for newly arrived slaves.15 The 
Spanish Senate passed the bill the following year. It was fully implemented in Cuba by Captain 
General Joaquín Manzano, who demonstrated his desire to end the traffic by making an additional 
proclamation in Havana, which contained even sterner regulations and punishments.16   
 The end of US participation in the slave trade, Spain’s growing international isolation, and 
the stronger efforts of the Spanish government to suppress the traffic were reflected in the demise 
of the slave trade in the 1860s. In contrast to the Brazilian case in 1850, when a massive trade was 
suddenly cut off by a dramatic death blow, the decline in the trade to Cuba was gradual and the 
result of several wounds, none individually mortal, but collectively fatal. In 1861, when Lincoln’s 
administration first began to take serious action against the trade, around 24,000 captives boarded 
slave ships on African shores. That number roughed halved every year until the closure of the trade 
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in 1867.17 Although it emerged from various sources, government action in the US, Spain, and 
Britain, gradually took its toll on the trade. Despite the fact that world sugar and Cuban slave prices 
remained high, action by these states effectively raised the risk of voyages to the point where 
traffickers were unprepared to send their ships to sea.18 According to Manzano, one final slaver 
arrived in Cuba in the summer of 1867, but there were no reliable reports of further 
disembarkations.19  
*** 
The suppression of the slave trade to Cuba signaled that the final phase of the transatlantic slave 
trade was over. The midcentury traffic had always been in some ways fragile. After several 
generations of sustained assault by a growing cast of assailants, the traffic had few open defenders. 
The collapse of the traffic to Brazil in 1850 had been a particularly significant blow for global 
antislavery. As the international web of suppression stretched wider, the traffic became confined 
to three main zones: the US, West Central Africa, and Cuba. Yet even here it was not totally secure. 
The US, Spanish, and Portuguese made some effort to suppress the trade, while the British, having 
precipitated the closure of the Brazilian trade, drove especially hard to finally extinguish the traffic 
altogether. Slave traders and sugar barons in Cuba were well aware that the slave trade might not 
last much longer. For this reason, many Cuba-based traffickers, including the infamous Portuguese 
                                                
17 ‘Voyages’ http://slavevoyages.org/estimates/iYqQPDao 
18 Bergad, Iglesias García, and Carmen Barcia, The Cuban Slave Market, 48-50. For Cuban planters’ positions on 
these changes during the 1860s, see María del Carmen Barcia, Burguesía esclavista y abolición (Havana: Editorial 
de Ciencias Sociales, 1987). 






slave trader Cunha Reis, who had operated in the island from 1858, promoted ‘free’ emigration 
schemes from Africa, while others became involved in the nascent ‘coolie’ trade from China.20  
 Despite this pressure, the traffic survived, and at times thrived, for much of the midcentury 
period. Planter demand for slave labor in Cuba was strong, while Spain, wary of planters’ political 
loyalties and shielded from British pressure by the US, failed to vigorously and consistently 
prosecute the traffic. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, several African societies remained 
strongly attached to the trade and saw limited demand for alternative exports. The British 
themselves aided the traffic indirectly by selling slave trading goods on the African coast and by 
importing vast amounts of Cuban sugar. The British government acknowledged this problem 
internally, but never resolved it. Meanwhile, slave traders proved remarkably adept at adjusting to 
the new scenarios. Under increased international pressure, they migrated to locations where 
suppression was weaker and forged new transatlantic alliances. By the close of the traffic in 1867, 
they had brought over a quarter of a million captives aboard their vessels since 1850. 
 As midcentury traffickers and their opponents fought one another, they turned their 
battleground into a strikingly modern arena. Although the traffic was more geographically 
constricted than before, it had probably never been as internationalized. Unlike the fairly discrete 
North and South Atlantic trades of before, the traffic now crossed even more jurisdictional, legal, 
and linguistic boundaries. Slave traders themselves were a particularly multiethnic and transient 
group, largely because of the new international networks at play and because suppression forced 
them to be on the move. Regular shipping patterns and faster vessels also allowed them to travel 
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more quickly. Indeed, although their work was just as brutal as before, in many ways it was more 
technically advanced. Slave traders used larger, faster vessels, often built in the US, and harnessed 
new technologies such as the telegram. In Cuba, traffickers occasionally transported slaves inland 
from the coast using railroads and found new ways of laundering and transferring capital, including 
through Cuba’s first bank, Banco Español. Antislavery forces responded with modern weapons of 
their own. The British created a vast intelligence network stretching from the Americas, via 
Europe, to Africa, using steamers and railways, not to mention a growing network of spies and 
consuls who were now spread throughout the Atlantic world thanks to growing global trade. On a 
smaller scale, Manzano and his regional lieutenants began communicating across Cuba by 
telegram during the final crackdown on the trade in the mid 1860s.21 During the final phase of the 
slave trade, therefore, both the traffic and its suppression bore the hallmarks of the modern world. 
 The US proved to be a critical player in both the slave trade and its eventual suppression. 
The US’s growing commercial and diplomatic strength were particularly important in sustaining 
the trade. American shipbuilders produced fast vessels – ideal for illegal slaving – and US ports 
contained merchants who already operated in the long-distance trade to slaving zones and proved 
to be useful allies to traffickers. The huge shipping and financial center of New York was an 
especially attractive hub for slave traders thanks to its large international trade, many overseas 
merchants, and abundance of dockworkers and seamen. The US government’s ability to resist 
British diplomatic pressure to give up the Right of Search made the US flag particularly appealing. 
Despite the fact that Britain had compelled all other major slaving nations to concede the Right of 
Search, and that the trade was now almost completely conducted under the US flag, Washington 
                                                





refused to yield to British demands. The British did occasionally violate American sovereignty by 
intercepting vessels flying US colors, but strong reactions in the US limited these interventions. 
British frustration with this situation was manifested in their hiring of Sanchez, who they believed 
could provide sufficient evidence of US ownership to sustain their captures and mollify the 
American government. 
 The politics of slavery and the slave trade in the US would have an even a greater impact 
on the traffic and its suppression. During the early and mid-nineteenth century, the US expanded 
territorially into many parts of North America, often introducing African American slavery along 
the way. By the late 1840s, Cuba was a major target of many expansionists, especially among 
those with ties to slavery. Many Americans, including leading policymakers in the ruling 
Democratic Party, supported this position. These individuals did not have a vested interest in the 
slave trade except to use it as a tool to delegitimize Spanish rule in Cuba. By the time the dozen or 
so migrant traffickers from the South Atlantic trade arrived in New York in the early and mid 
1850s, many newspaper editors and senior policymakers were already committed to blaming Spain 
for the traffic to Cuba. The effect of this argument, which held sway in the White House and in 
Congress for much of the 1850s, was to neglect suppression at home even as it grew to 
extraordinary levels later in the decade. 
 The emergent Republican Party, however, viewed the slave trade very differently. Favoring 
free labor and free soil over slavery expansion, the Republicans considered the rising role of the 
US in the slave trade as further evidence of the Slave Power’s hold over the federal government 
and slavery’s seemingly inexorably spread throughout the nation. Radical southerners’ suggestion 
that the Abolition Act ought to be repealed and the arrival of a few hundred Africans on US soil 





would make these arguments central to their national antislavery platform in the late 1850s, which 
in turn stoked sectional tensions between North and South. When they entered power and the Civil 
War erupted, the Republican leadership moved swiftly to concede the Right of Search to the British 
and to oust the slavers from New York and other US ports.  
 The effect of the US departure from the trade was considerable. With US ports no longer 
active in the trade and with no protection from the American flag, traffickers in Europe, Africa, 
and Cuba struggled keep the traffic going. Meanwhile, in the diplomatic sphere, the US Treaty 
with Britain further highlighted Spain’s growing isolation. The course of the Civil War also 
suggested that slavery itself might be imperiled in Spain did not finally suppress the trade. These 
factors, in alliance with a new approach to the traffic by Cuban governors and growing liberalism 
in Spain, resulted in vigorous attempts to suppress the traffic in Cuba and reluctance by slave 
traders to conduct further voyages. The US, therefore, was in many ways the linchpin in the 
triangular nexus sustaining the traffic, despite the fact that only a few hundred African slaves 
arrived on its shores. Although slavery would survive in Cuba and in Brazil until the 1880s, the 














Table 2.4: Voyage investment data, 1851-1866.  
 
These are voyages for which investment data is available in British and US state archives, 
personal papers, newspapers, and secondary works.  
 
Name Voyage # in ‘Voyages’ Year of Voyage  Source 
Cobra 4453 1852 ADM 123/177, TNA 
Providencia - 1852 ADM 123/177, TNA 
Restaurador 4155 1853 
John Beecroft to 
Lord Clarendon, 
Feb. 20, 1854, 
FO84/950, TNA. 
Unnamed brig - 1854 New York Times, June 25, 1856 
Dolores - 1855 
John Morgan to 
Lord Clarendon, 
Mar. 8, 1856, 
FO84/995, TNA. 
Braman  - 1856 
New York Times, 
June 25, 1856; New 
York Tribune Oct. 
10, 1856. 
Pierre Soulé 4209 1856 
John O’Sullivan to 
Lewis Cass, Mar. 
28, 1857, SDR, 
NARA. 
Mary E. Smith 4968 1856 
John Morgan to 
Clarendon, Aug. 11, 
1856 & W. Stafford 
Jerningham to Lord 

























Clotilda 36990 1860 
Diouf, Dreams of 
Africa in Alabama, 
55-9 
Cicerón 4988 1863 
John V. Crawford 
to Lord Russell, 
Dec. 12, 1863, 
FO84/1197, TNA. 
Haydee 4830 1863 
Commodore 
Wilmot to Rear-
Admiral Sir B. 
Walker, Dec. 31, 
1863 in W. G. 
Romaine to E. 
Hammond, Apr. 29, 
1864, FO84/1228, 
TNA. 
Unnamed vessel   1865 
WYL/28/29-31, W. 
Vredenburg to W. 
Wylde, Aug. 25, 







Table 2.6: “Cargo” Account of the Pierre Soulé, 1856 
 
This accounting document, found by the Portuguese authorities during a house raid in Angola, 
shows the division of the ‘freights’ in the voyage of the Pierre Soulé. The first column lists the 
names of the thirty-five ‘cargo’ owners. Among those who are traceable, almost all were natives 
of Portugal living in the embarkation zone in southern Angola. The second column reports the 
number of captives each ‘cargo’ owner sent aboard the vessel. The third column shows that each 
investor was remitted US$79.3275 for each captive that arrived alive. At the bottom of the 
document we see that investors were not owed returns for captives in their ‘lot’ who had died 
before landfall in Cuba. The final column shows the total amount that each investor was to receive 
in remittances. Figures were given to four decimal places in the original table, but have been 
rounded to two here for the totals column; as a result, the grand total is very slightly different from 
the sum of the totals for each investor. Note: this was not an especially lucrative voyage for the 
‘cargo’ investors, since the Cuban buyers refused to pay the pre-arranged fee.  
 
Names “Packages” Prices (US$) Total (US$) 
J. P. da Cunha and J. P. Xavier 94 79.3275 7,456.79 
Antonio de Carvalho Guimaraês 2 79.3275 158.66 
L. A. de Sousa Monteiro 16 79.3275 1,269.24 
B. Pacheco dos Santos (6 lost) 44 79.3275 3,490.41 
João Soares & M Lino Ferreira  
(2 lost) 46 79.3275 3,649.07 
D. Maria Boyd 1 79.3275 79.33 
Maria Ferreira 6 79.3275 475.97 
Manuel de Paula Barbosa 12 79.3275 951.93 
Society of the Three (2 lost) 66 79.3275 5,235.62 
M. Ferreira Torres 5 79.3275 396.64 
Ant. Martin de Castro & D. Anna 16 79.3275 1,269.24 
Francisco José da Silva Moraes 11 79.3275 872.60 
Manuel A Maurity 2 79.3275 158.66 
JP de Carvalho Braga 29 79.3275 2,300.50 
Soares e Sousa 6 79.3275 475.97 





João M. de Moura 4 79.3275 317.31 
R.N. de Carvalhos Sequeira 1 79.3275 79.33 
Antonio de Almeida 2 79.3275 158.66 
José Lopez da Silva 10 79.3275 793.28 
Manuel da Costa Sousa 17 79.3275 1,348.57 
José Alexandre 2 79.3275 158.66 
B H Pinheira & Rezo (2 lost) 29 79.3275 2,300.50 
D Isabel & Correa Evangelista 13 79.3275 1,031.26 
J. A. da Silva 6 79.3275 475.97 
M. A. S. Moranha 8 79.3275 634.62 
J. H. Fernandez 10 79.3275 793.28 
J. Lucas 2 79.3275 158.66 
                    
Total of the packages arrived: 467               37,045.94 
                    
Lost                   
of B. P. dos Santos 6     
of Society of the Three 2     
of João Soares & M. L. Ferreira 2     
of Pinheiro & Rezo 2     
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